Syllabus

- The nature of equity and the trust p.8
- Express trusts
  - Certainty of intention and subject matter p.14
  - Certainty of objects p.19
  - The beneficiary principle p.23
  - The constitution of trusts p.31
  - The duties of trustees and breach of trust p.37
- Resulting trusts and Quistclose trusts p.53
- Constructive trusts p.60
- Trusts of homes p.67
- Dishonest assistance and unconscionable receipt p.76
- Tracing p.84
- Charities p.90
- Theoretical perspectives on equity and trusts p.99
- Revision material p.110

Lecture Materials

2012-13
Learning aims of this module
The aims of the module are to ensure that students understand and are able to assess critically: the principles associated with equity and with trusts law; the application of those principles to factual circumstances; the manner in which these principles affect people in their everyday lives; how those principles are to be reconciled with the principles governing the creation of express trusts, the imposition of trusts by law; how equity and trusts law adapt to changing social conditions; and how other legal models challenge the traditional understanding of equity.

Learning objectives of this module

Knowledge

By the end of this module, a successful student will be able to explain what a trust is and how it operates in England and Wales, in particular:

- the informal acquisition of an interest in property through a resulting or constructive trust;
- the formal requirements for the establishment of a valid express trust, both inter vivos and on death;
- the enforceability of trusts which have not been properly constituted;
- the problems with purpose trusts and their enforceability;
- charitable trusts including the operation of the cy-pres doctrine;
- the nature of the fiduciary relationship and the protection of the beneficial interest;
- powers and duties of the trustees and remedies for any breach of duty;
- the liability of third parties in respect of trust property; and
- analyse and explain how trust principles are being used to solve complex commercial problems as well as to minimise liability to tax; and
- evaluate the trust and, in particular, the office of trustee in a modern society.

Skills

By the end of the course, a successful student should:

- be familiar with both primary and secondary (including electronic) legal sources relevant to equity and trust law;
- be able to analyse legal materials, in particular statutes, appellate judgements and, where appropriate, make constructive criticism;
- be able to evaluate learned articles and reports;
- in relation to factual problems, be able to identify the legal issues; apply the applicable legal principles to facts; evaluate the differences between the various legal authorities and journal literature; and come to a conclusion on the merits of the various parties in that problem and comment more generally on the further legal policy issues which are raised by that problem;
- in relation to essays, be able to assess critically the statement or subject on which the essay is set; and to analyse the legal principles, academic literature and practical problems which arise from the appropriate area of law in the light of the essay title;
- be able to expound upon contemporary policy issues; and
- be able to communicate effectively their knowledge of equity and trusts either orally during tutorials or in writing.

Lectures will be delivered by Prof Alastair Hudson and Dr Remi Nwabueze. Prof Hudson is the course co-ordinator.
**Lay-out of materials**
These “Lecture Materials” cover the module for the entire year, although if appropriate further materials may be circulated to you.

**Reading**
These Lecture Materials provide you with a comprehensive list of your case law and statutory reading for lectures and seminars, together with an illustrative list of key articles and other materials for lectures and seminars.

You are expected to read all statutory material - this will be essential for an understanding of the subject. Cases marked ** are essential reading, being leading or very important cases, and so must be read in full in the law reports. All other cases can be read in a casebook or covered in a textbook. You are also expected to read all cases marked with an asterisk * at the very least in a casebook but you are advised to read them in full in the law reports.

**Copies of these materials**
Materials for this module will be stored on-line at www.alastairhudson.com/trustslawindex.html and on Blackboard.

### Textbooks
Your recommended textbook is:-

- **Alastair Hudson: Equity and Trusts (7th ed., Routledge, 2012).**  
  The publisher’s companion web-site also contains podcasts by Professor Alastair Hudson on various aspects of this module and other materials. That book is referred to in these materials as “Hudson”.

There are other textbooks available, including the following:-


**Other textbooks to which you might want to refer are:-**

- Virgo, The Principles of Equity and Trusts (OUP, 2012)

### Cases and materials books
You are not required to have a cases and materials book, but some people find them useful to extract some of the main principles. The best cases and materials books in this area are:-

- Maudsley and Burn: Trusts and Trustees: Cases and Materials (7th ed.: Butterworths 2008) – an excellent digest of the most significant cases.

### Introductory reading
Some students like to have a shorter book to read at the start of the course by way of an introduction, or to give them an overview of the principles before starting their work, or to give them the big picture at revision time. You may find the following useful:

- **Hudson, Understanding Equity and Trusts (4th ed, Routledge, 2012): designed for introductory reading in those dark, early days or before revision begins, or simply a few pages before lectures.**
- Hackney, Understanding Equity and Trusts (Fontana, 1987).

### Practitioners’ texts:-
When you come to preparing for assessments, or when you want to probe some of the issues more deeply, you may benefit from consulting the following texts which are written for practitioners:-

- GW Thomas and AS Hudson, The Law of Trusts (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, 2010, 1,907pp): not only considers the basic principles of trusts law but also puts them in the
context of particular uses of trusts in practice, including international trusts law practice and financial uses of trusts. You may find it useful for essays or preparation on specific topics.

- Hayton (ed), *The International Trust* (3rd ed, Jordans, 3011) includes a complete coverage of international aspects of trusts law, drawing heavily on English law sources.

Among the excellent Australian books on trusts law are:-


**Background reading**

Hudson’s *Equity & Trusts*, has a long bibliography containing a large amount of journal and treatise literature. Journal literature is referred to in these “Lecture Materials” and in the “further reading” sections in the Seminar Materials, although you are encouraged to identify journal and treatise literature, and other reading online, for yourself. In the footnotes to your set reading there are cross-references to this bibliography. This is how you will find further reading, as well as the articles to which you are referred in these Lecture Materials. A number of further files and web-links can be found at [www.alastairhudson.com/trustslaw](http://www.alastairhudson.com/trustslaw) in .pdf format.

**Assessment – summative assessment**

This module is assessed partly by means of a single piece of coursework and partly by means of written examination.

**Course Work: 20%**

During the second semester you will be assigned an assessed essay title(s). You must complete this essay so as to hand it in on the appointed date during the first week of the third term: that date will be announced at a later date.

There is a word limit of 2,000 words. This essays counts as 20% of your overall grade for this module.

**Written Examination: 80%**

A written examination constitutes 80% of your overall grade for this module. The examination will take place during the examination period in the third term of this academic year.

The examination will last three and a half hours, the first half hour of which is a reading period during which you may not begin to write your answers.

The questions will be of two kinds: essays questions and problem questions. You will be given a specimen examination question for practice purposes during the course of the module, as well as being able to rely on previous years’ examination papers in the library in the usual way.

You may take an unannotated copy of the property legislation into the examination. Highlighting is permitted, but no annotations.

**Changes to the syllabus and composition of this module**

Note that the team of teachers delivering this module has had significant changes since the last academic year. However, for the most part, the syllabus for this module remains the same albeit that the following changes have been made: the module has been reorganised in terms of the sequence of topics; its coverage of material within topics, the range of journal literature, and the range of international material have all been expanded; and several updates have been made to account for new case law and new statutes. Therefore, it is important that you have the latest editions of the relevant textbooks and other materials. You will be guided throughout this module in lectures and in seminars about what is expected from you to complete this module successfully.
**Formative assessment – (i.e. non-assessed written work)**

Each student is expected to produce one piece of written work in each semester. Your in-course assessment questions are contained in your “Seminar Materials” pack – although your class tutor may decide to set you different assessments.

The aim of these assessments is to educate you as to what the end-of-year examiners are looking for in a good equity and trusts law script. You should also refer to the marking scheme which will be provided to you.

**Seminars**

You will be issued with seminar outlines separately in the “Seminar Materials”. Your seminar group will meet fortnightly. Each seminar topic follows on after that topic has been completed in lectures.

You are expected to contribute to seminars: there is no doubt that an ability to verbalise your ideas in this subject will help your written work immeasurably. It goes without saying that you are expected to be fully prepared for seminar sessions and able to answer the questions included on the seminar sheets.

ASH
This module outline sets out the sequence of lectures in this topic. Students should be warned, however, that it is susceptible to minor change as the year progresses, particularly if there are new cases. Your own work should be dictated by the order of seminar topics as set out in the Seminar Materials pack; although the structure for lectures does compliment that for seminars.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Week: Date of lectures</th>
<th>Topic: first lecture / second lecture (approx)</th>
<th>Seminar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1: 5 / 10</td>
<td>Introduction to equity / The nature of the trust &amp; Certainty of intention</td>
<td>No seminar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2: 12 / 10</td>
<td>Certainty of intention and subject matter / Certainty of subject matter</td>
<td>No seminar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3: 19 / 10</td>
<td>Certainty of objects / Certainty of objects</td>
<td>Certainty of intention and subject matter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4: 26 / 10</td>
<td>The beneficiary principle / The beneficiary principle - unincorporated associations</td>
<td>Certainty of intention and subject matter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5: 2 / 11</td>
<td>Constitution of trusts / Constitution of trusts</td>
<td>Certainty of objects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6: 9 / 11</td>
<td>Dispositions equitable interests / Duties of trustees (i) – general principles &amp; Hastings Bass</td>
<td>Certainty of objects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7: 16 / 11</td>
<td>Duties of trustees (ii) - Investment / Duties of trustees (iii) – Exclusion clauses</td>
<td>The beneficiary principle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8: 23 / 11</td>
<td>Breach of trust (i) - claim / Breach of trust (ii) – remedies</td>
<td>The beneficiary principle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9: 30 / 11</td>
<td>Resulting trusts (i) / Resulting trusts (ii) – illegality</td>
<td>The constitution of trusts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10: 7 / 12</td>
<td><strong>Quistclose trusts / Constructive trusts (i) – Westdeutsche Landesbank</strong></td>
<td>The constitution of trusts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11: 14 / 12 break</td>
<td>Constructive trusts (ii) – secret profits / Constructive trusts (iii) – bribes, etc.</td>
<td>Trustees’ duties and breach of trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15: 11 / 1</td>
<td>Trusts of homes (i) / Trusts of homes (ii)</td>
<td>Trustees’ duties and breach of trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18: 1 / 2</td>
<td>Trusts of homes (iii) / Trusts of homes (iv)</td>
<td>Constructive trusts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19: 8 / 2</td>
<td>Dishonest assistance (i) / Dishonest assistance (ii)</td>
<td>Constructive trusts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20: 15 / 2</td>
<td>Unconscionable receipt (i) / Unconscionable receipt (ii)</td>
<td>Trusts of homes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21: 22 / 2</td>
<td>Tracing – at common law / Tracing – in equity (i: basis of claim)</td>
<td>Trusts of homes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23: 8 / 3</td>
<td>Charities / Charities</td>
<td>Dishonest assistance &amp; unconscionable receipt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24: 15 / 3 end of term</td>
<td>Charities / Charities</td>
<td>Tracing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29: 19 / 4</td>
<td>Theoretical perspectives on trusts implied by law / Restitution of unjust enrichment</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>30: 26 / 4</td>
<td><strong>Revision lectures</strong></td>
<td>Charities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31: 3 / 5</td>
<td><strong>Revision lectures</strong></td>
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</tr>
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<td>32: 10 / 5</td>
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<td>No seminar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33: 17 / 5</td>
<td>No lecture</td>
<td>No seminar</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
How to study for this module

1. University study and education is about developing yourself as an individual: consequently, preparing for an examination requires you to learn how you personally work best.

2. You *should* read in advance of lectures. You *must* prepare in advance of seminars so that (a) you have consulted your lecture notes, all prescribed reading and any background reading and (b) you must have prepared (ideally in writing) answers to all of the seminar questions.

3. Your seminar should be in the middle of your preparation. It is very important that as soon as practicable after your seminar that you settle your ideas for yourself (in a final set of notes or whatever works best for you), because it is after the seminar that you will understand the material best.

4. There is a lot of *background reading* referred to in Hudson's textbook's footnotes and in that textbook's *bibliography*. You can find commentary and so forth from these sources, as well as in these Lecture Materials and the Seminar Materials.

5. It is not acceptable to attend seminars unprepared; nor is it acceptable to take notes from the work of other students in seminars without having prepared yourself; nor is it acceptable to plagiarise the work of other students or of other people. This module is about ethics: it also requires that you understand the ethic bound up with being part of a community of scholars.

6. You learn a lot about yourself in an intellectually demanding, technically-sophisticated, content-heavy and yet surprisingly fulfilling module such as *Equity & Trusts*. Your seminars are fortnightly: this does not mean that you only need to do half as much work as for a module with weekly seminars. Rather you should expect to have done between 15 and 20 hours preparation for each seminar.

7. *Equity & Trusts* is a complex way of thinking about and analysing factual situations and theoretical concepts. You will find that it is not simply about learning rules and regurgitating them. Rather this module is about understanding how different arguments and different conceptual models can be deployed to reach different conclusions on the same factual circumstances. These techniques take time to assimilate and so you will need to read the cases, books and articles carefully to absorb and to understand them.

8. The exam requires you not simply to record all the cases you know about. Rather the exam requires you (a) to identify the relevant issues, (b) to set out the relevant (possibly conflicting) legal principles, (c) to apply the various legal principles in a structured fashion to the facts of any given problem or to address the issues raised by an essay title, (d) to use those principles to argue your way to a conclusion (or to reflect competing conclusions), and (e) to incorporate any relevant commentary outwith the legal principles.

9. You will encounter ideas in this module which you will not necessarily understand immediately. You must read them and think about them over and over until you do. This is the character-building aspect of this module. Perseverance is how you grow, it is how you learn, it is why people study for law degrees. While the rest of the world wants things to be easier, smaller and dumber, equity is capacious, intricate and subtle. Coming to terms with this module will be an intellectual challenge for you.
INTRODUCTION: CORE PRINCIPLES

General reading: Hudson Chapters 1 and 2, especially pp.1-8, 36-62; Martin Chapters 1&2; Pettit Ch 1&3

(A) The nature of equity

Reading: Hudson, section 1.1; ME 3-49; PET 1-29

1) Philosophical ideas of equity

The following ideas come from Aristotle’s Ethics, and could be understood as considering the difference between common law and equity:

“For equity, though superior to justice, is still just … justice and equity coincide, and although both are good, equity is superior. What causes the difficulty is the fact that equity is just, but not what is legally just: it is a rectification of legal justice.”

So it is that equity may provide for a better form of justice than the common law because it provides for a more specific judgment as to right and wrong in individual cases which rectifies any errors of fairness which the common law would otherwise have made:

“The explanation of this is that all law is universal, and there are some things about which it is not possible to pronounce rightly in general terms; therefore in cases where it is necessary to make a general pronouncement, but impossible to do so rightly, the law takes account of the majority of cases, though not unaware that in this way errors are made. … So when the law states a general rule, and a case arises under this that is exceptional, then it is right, where the legislator owing to the generality of his language has erred in not covering that case, to correct the omission by a ruling such as the legislator himself would have given if he had been present there, and as he would have enacted if he had been aware of the circumstances.”

Thus, equity exists to rectify what would otherwise be errors in the application of the common law to factual situations in which the judges who developed common law principles or the legislators who passed statutes could not have intended.

2) Early case law on the role of equity

Earl of Oxford’s Case (1615) 1 Ch Rep 1, per Lord Ellesmere:
“the office of the Chancellor is to correct men’s consciences for frauds, breach of trusts, wrongs and oppressions … and to soften and mollify the extremity of the law”

Lord Dudley v Lady Dudley (1705) Prec Ch 241, 244, per Lord Cowper:
“Now equity is no part of the law, but a moral virtue, which qualifies, moderates, and reforms the rigour, hardness, and edge of the law, and is an universal truth; it does also assist the law where it is defective and weak in the constitution (which is the life of the law) and defends the law from crafty evasions, delusions, and new subtleties, invested and contrived to evade and delude the common law, whereby such as have undoubted right are made remediless: and this is the office of equity, to support and protect the common law from shifts and crafty contrivances against the justice of the law. Equity therefore does not destroy the law, nor create it, but assist it.”

3) The fusion of common law and equity

The conflicting approaches of various judges: e.g. Lord Nottingham and Lord Mansfield.
Judicature Act 1873, its effect on equity

4) The structure of English private law

Reading: Hudson, section 1.2
• Common law and equity were always distinct: the courts of common law were in Westminster Hall at one time, the courts of equity were in Lincoln’s Inn Hall.
• For a good illustration of the difficulties caused by this distinction see Charles Dickens’s Bleak House and the course of the fictional Jarndyce v Jarndyce litigation which keeps people in poverty for many years before wasting the testator’s fortune on legal fees.
• Judicature Act 1873 merged the two streams of courts, however the intellectual distinction between common law and equity remains very important.

### Common law  |  Equity
---|---
**Examples of claims:**
Breach of contract  |  Breach of trust
Negligence  |  Tracing property
Fraud  |  Claiming property on insolvency

**Examples of remedies available:**
Damages  |  Compensation
Common law tracing  |  Equitable tracing
Money had and received  |  Specific performance  
  |  Injunction  
  |  Rescission  
  |  Rectification  
  |  Imposition of constructive trust  
  |  Imposition of resulting trust  
  |  Subrogation  
  |  Account, etc..

(H) The core principles of equity

Reading: Hudson, section 1.4; Martin 3-48; Pettit 21-29

The twelve propositions set out below are culled, as a list, primarily from Snell’s Equity, (31st ed., 2004) by McGhee, 27. The trust is built on equitable principles and the following, key equitable principles will emerge again and again in your studies. We will consider them only in outline at this stage.

• Equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy
• Equity follows the law
• Where there is equal equity, the law shall prevail
• Where the equities are equal, the first in time shall prevail
• He who seeks equity must do equity
• He who comes to equity must come with clean hands
• Delay defeats equities
• Equality is equity
• Equity looks to the intent rather than to the form
• Equity looks on that as done that which ought to have been done
• Equity imputes an intention to fulfil an obligation
• Equity acts in personam

Hudson adds to that list three further principles:-

• Equity will not permit statute or common law to be used as an engine of fraud (e.g.: Rochefoucauld v. Boustead);
• Equity will not permit a person who is trustee of property to take benefit from that property qua trustee (e.g.: Westdeutsche Landesbank);
• Equity abhors a vacuum (e.g.: Vandervell v. IRC).
We will focus, for the time being, on trusts...

(B) The structure of the trust relationship.

Reading: **Hudson, sections 2.1 and 2.2; Martin 49–78; Pettit 30–65**

‘The essence of a trust is the imposition of an equitable obligation on a person who is the legal owner of property (a trustee) which requires that person to act in good conscience when dealing with that property in favour of any person (the beneficiary) who has a beneficial interest recognised by equity in the property. The trustee is said to “hold the property on trust” for the beneficiary. There are four significant elements to the trust: that it is equitable, that it provides the beneficiary with rights in property, that it also imposes obligations on the trustee, and that those obligations are fiduciary in nature.’

- Thomas and Hudson, *The Law of Trusts*

‘A trust is an equitable obligation, binding a person (called a trustee) to deal with property owned by him (called trust property, being distinguished from his private property) for the benefit of persons (called beneficiaries or, in old cases, cestuis que trust), of whom he may himself be one, and any one of whom may enforce the obligation [or for a charitable purpose, which may be enforced at the instance of the Attorney-General, or for some other purpose permitted by law though unenforceable].’

- Underhill and Hayton, *The Law of Trusts and Trustees*, as amended by Pettit

(C) Classification of trusts.

Reading: **Hudson, section 2.2; Martin 49–78; Pettit 66–85**

The four types of trust

1. Express trusts
2. Resulting trusts
3. Constructive trusts
4. (Implied trusts)

Section 53(2) Law of Property Act 1925 refers to “implied, resulting and constructive trusts”.

**Westdeutsche Landesbank v. Islington** [1996] 1 AC 669, per Lord Browne-Wilkinson:­

“(i) Equity operates on the conscience of the owner of the legal interest. In the case of a trust, the conscience of the legal owner requires him to carry out the purposes for which the property was vested in him (express or implied trust) or which the law imposes on him by reason of his unconscionable conduct (constructive trust).”

(D) The means by which the different forms of trusts come into existence.

Reading: **Hudson, section 2.2, Martin 123–154; Pettit 86–99**

The three forms of trust come into existence in the following ways:

‘A trust comes into existence either by virtue of having been established expressly by a person (the settlor) who was the absolute owner of property before the creation of the trust (an express trust); or by virtue of some action of the settlor which the court interprets to have been sufficient to create a trust but which the settlor himself did not know was a trust (an implied trust); or by operation of law either to resolve some dispute as to ownership of property where the creation of an express trust has failed (an automatic resulting trust) or to recognise the proprietary rights of one who has contributed to the purchase price of property (a purchase price resulting trust); or by operation of law to prevent the legal owner of property from seeking unconscionably to deny the rights of those who have equitable interests in that property (a constructive trust).’

- Thomas and Hudson, *The Law of Trusts*
An express trust can be understood as follows, comprising the “magic triangle” of settlor, trustee and beneficiary. The core of the “trust” is the inter-action of personal rights and claims between these persons in relation to the trust property. It is therefore vital to distinguish between “in personam” and “in rem” rights.

**Significant features of the trust**

1. Once a trust is created, the settlor ceases to have any property rights in the trust or any control over the trust in her capacity as settlor.
2. The instant that the trust is declared (or deemed to have been created in the case of a constructive or resulting trust) the legal title in the trust property is owned by the trustee(s) and the equitable interest is owned by the beneficiary(-ies).
3. The trustee(s) hold the legal title in the trust property.
4. The trustee(s) owe equitable obligations to the beneficiaries to obey the terms of the trust. The trustee(s)’ obligations are fiduciary in nature (thus requiring the utmost good faith and prohibiting any conflict of interest).
5. The beneficiaries own equitable proprietary rights in the trust fund (each has an “equitable interest” as a consequence).
6. There can be an infinite number of beneficiaries in theory, or there may be only one beneficiary (a bare trust).
7. The same human being can be settlor, one of the trustees and also one of the beneficiaries. If she is only one of the trustees or only one of the beneficiaries then some other person will have acquired rights in relation to that property. Importantly, she will be acting in different capacities in each context (as though she were three different people). However, the same person may not be the settlor, the sole trustee and the sole beneficiary because then no property rights would have moved at all.
8. The beneficiaries may fall into various classes with different qualities of rights: e.g. there may be a beneficiary entitled to the income from the trust fund during her lifetime (a “life tenant”) with the capital being divided among the other beneficiaries after her death (“remainder beneficiaries” or “remaindermen”).
9. Individual items of property making up the trust fund may, if the terms of the trust permit it, be sold or exchanged for other property – that other property then becomes part of the trust fund.
10. Significantly, then, more than one person can have property rights in the same property at the same time: this enables settlors to create an infinite range of property holdings to suit their circumstances.
11. The trustee(s) will be personally liable for any loss caused to the trust by her/their breach of trust.
12. The trust, or “settlement”, is endlessly flexible (provided it is not illegal).
**F** The concept of fiduciary responsibility.

*Reading: *Hudson, section 2.3.3; and the essay comprising chapter 14.*

A trustee is an example of a fiduciary (along with, inter alia, company directors, agents, and partners “acting in common with a view to profit”). So, it is important to understand what the concept of fiduciary responsibility entails.

‘A fiduciary is someone who has undertaken to act for or on behalf of another in a particular matter in circumstances which give rise to a relationship of trust and confidence. The distinguishing obligation of a fiduciary is the obligation of loyalty. The principal is entitled to the single-minded loyalty of his fiduciary. The core liability has several facets. A fiduciary must act in good faith; he must not make a profit out of his trust; he must not place himself in a position where his duty and his interest may conflict; he may not act for his own benefit or the benefit of a third person without the informed consent of his principal. This is not intended to be an exhaustive list, but it is sufficient to indicate the nature of fiduciary obligations. They are the defining characteristics of the fiduciary.’

- *Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew* [1998] Ch 1 at 18, *per* Millett LJ

"A person will be a fiduciary in his relationship with another when and in so far as that other is entitled to expect that he will act in that other's interests or (as in a partnership) in their joint interests, to the exclusion of his own several interest."


**G** The benefits of trusts

*Reading: *Hudson, section 2.5


- Proprietary right in the trust property for beneficiaries, not simply a personal claim against the trustees.
- Provides preferential rights in an insolvency. Important in giving priority for beneficiaries in the event of the trustee's bankruptcy.
- A range of equitable remedies enforceable against the trustees and any third parties by the beneficiaries in the event of loss.
- Flexibility – useful in commercial and domestic situations, as considered below.
- Usefulness in tax planning and estate planning generally.
- A trust is a "gift over the plane of time" giving the settlor flexibility and control.
- Trusts constitute the most significant players in UK securities markets in the form of pension funds and investment funds (like unit trusts).

**H** Fundamental principles of trusts: the obligations of trustees and the rights of beneficiaries

*Reading: *Hudson, section 2.4


*Saunders v Vautier* (1841) – the rights of the beneficiary

**“THE RELEVANT PRINCIPLES OF TRUST LAW:”**

(i) Equity operates on the conscience of the owner of the legal interest. In the case of a trust, the conscience of the legal owner requires him to carry out the purposes for which the property was vested in him (express or implied trust) or which the law imposes on him by reason of his unconscionable conduct (constructive trust).

(ii) Since the equitable jurisdiction to enforce trusts depends upon the conscience of the holder of the legal interest being affected, he cannot be a trustee of the property if and so long as he is ignorant of the facts alleged to affect his conscience …

(iii) In order to establish a trust there must be identifiable trust property …

(iv) Once a trust is established, as from the date of its establishment the beneficiary has, in equity, a proprietary interest in the trust property, which proprietary interest will be enforceable in equity against any subsequent holder of the property (whether the original property or substituted property into which it can be traced) other than a purchaser for value of the legal interest without notice.

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### (I) How equity is like “cool jazz”

**Reading:** Hudson, section 1.3.3, p.24

In *Time* magazine (8 November 1954, ‘The Man on Cloud 5’), a review of The Dave Brubeck Five described their brand of “cool” jazz in the following terms:

“It is tremendously complex, but free. It flows along, improvising constantly but yet it is held together by a firm pattern. … The essence is the tension between improvisation and order; between freedom and discipline.”

Miles Davis, *Sketches of Spain*, 1960

Charlie Parker, ‘White Christmas’

Equity is not “random” nor wilfully confused; instead it appears to improvise constantly while being held together by a firm pattern.

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### (J) How learning equity is very like learning the English language

**Reading:** Hudson, section 7.1.1, p.328

The English language has an exception to almost every grammatical rule you learn. And yet it is made of a number of complex idiomatic rules and principles:

“It may look like this is an area of law which is entirely concerned with random decisions by judges on a case-by-case basis according to what they think is ‘fair’ or ‘conscionable’, but in truth there is a very subtle understanding of how these various principles fit together, just like there is a very subtle understanding among the English-speaking peoples about how English grammar operates. … The English mind is therefore a mixture of strict rules and fluid principles.”
Topic 1. CERTAINTY OF INTENTION AND CERTAINTY OF SUBJECT MATTER

General reading: *Hudson*, chapter 3; *Martin* 98–106; *Pettit* 47–58

The need for the three certainties

Reading: *Hudson*, sections 3.1 and 3.2

Wright v. Atkyns (1823) *Turn. & R.* 143, 157, *per* Lord Eldon: “...first...the words must be imperative...; secondly...the subject must be certain...; and thirdly...the object must be as certain as the subject”

*Knight v Knight* (1840) 3 *Beav* 148

(A) CERTAINTY OF INTENTION.

Reading: *Hudson*, section 3.3, and also 2.6; *Martin* 98–101; *Pettit* 47–50

Question: When a person seeks to create a trust (the settlor) in what ways must that person’s intention be manifested?

(1) The core principle: an intention to create a trust can be inferred from the circumstances

Reading: *Hudson*, section 3.3.1

**Paul v Constance** [1977] 1 W.L.R. 527

**Re Kayford** [1975] 1 WLR 279, Megarry J:

“The sender may create a trust by using appropriate words when he sends the money (though I wonder how many do this, even if they are equity lawyers), or the company may do it by taking suitable steps on or before receiving the money. If either is done, the obligations in respect of the money are transformed from contract to property, from debt to trust. Payment into a separate bank account is a useful (though by no means conclusive) indication of an intention to create a trust, but of course there is nothing to prevent the company from binding itself by a trust even if there are no effective banking arrangements.”

*Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley* [2002] UKHL 12 at [71], [2002] 2 All ER 377 at [71], [2002] 2 AC 164:

‘A settlor must, of course, possess the necessary intention to create a trust, but his subjective intentions are irrelevant. If he enters into arrangements which have the effect of creating a trust, it is not necessary that he should appreciate that they do so; it is sufficient that he intends to enter into them.’

*Don King Productions v. Warren* [1998] 2 All E.R. 608 (an example of how the court may have to infer the intention to create a trust even in complex commercial case)

*Re Farepak Food and Gifts Ltd* [2006] All ER (D) 265 (Dec) (an anomalous decision of Mann J which was *per incuriam* Re Kayford and which sought to rely on Quistclose trust)

*Annabel’s (Berkley Square) Ltd v Revenue and Customs Commissioners* [2009] EWCA Civ 361, [2009] 4 All ER 55 (tronc system for restaurant wait staff = trust in favour of staff, held by troncmaster as trustee)

*Byrnes v Kendle* [2011] HCA 26, 14 ITELR 299 (use of the word “trust” usually suggests a trust – here husband disingenuously seeking to argue that when he had used word “trust” it had not meant trust)
(2) Trusts as opposed to merely moral obligations
Reading: Hudson, section 3.3.2
(Lambe v. Eames (1871) L.R. 6 Ch. 597 ("to be at her disposal in any way she may think best, for the benefit of herself and her family" = merely moral obligation)).
Re Adams and the Kensington Vestry (1884) 27 Ch. D. 394 ("unto and to the absolute use of my dear wife ... in full confidence that she will do what is right as to the disposal thereof between my children" = a merely moral obligation).
Cf. Comiskey v. Bowring-Hanbury [1905] A.C. 84 (HL) ("in full confidence that... she will devise it to one or more of my nieces as she may think fit..." = a trust).
Re Hamilton [1895] 2 Ch 370 ("take the will you have to construe and see what it means, and if you come to the conclusion that no trust was intended you say so", per Lindley LJ).

(3) Intending to create express trusts without knowing what a trust is
Paul v. Constance [1977] 1 W.L.R. 527 ("... we are dealing with simple people, unaware of the subtleties of equity ...”).

(4) Lack of intention where a joke or an imperfect gift
Jones v Lock (1865) 1 Ch App 25 ("... look you here, I give this to the baby ...")
Richards v Delbridge (1874) LR 18 Eq 11 (failure to effect transfer of lease)

(5) Sham trusts and trusts intended to defraud creditors
Reading: Hudson, section 3.3.3
Snook v London and West Riding Investments Ltd [1967] 2 QB 786, esp 802
Marquis-Antle Spousal Trust v R 2009 TCC 465, 12 ITEL R 314 (Canadian case: sham discretionary trust in Barbados seeking to avoid liability to tax).

(6) Intention to create a charge not a trust
Reading: Hudson, section 3.3.3
Clough Mill v Martin [1984] 3 All ER 982 (floating pool of property)

(7) Trusts and bank accounts
Reading: Hudson, section 3.3.3
Foley v Hill (1848) 2 HL Cas 28

(8) The financial crisis 2007-09, complex financial transactions & the intention to create a trust
Reading: Hudson, section 3.3.3
(Re Kayford Ltd [1975] 1 WLR 279)
(Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] UKHL 12)

Cases following the collapse of Kaupthing Singer Friedlander (“KSF”):
*Brazzill v Willoughby [2009] EWHC 1633 (Ch), [2010] 1 BCLC 673, Smith J (Kaupthing went insolvent – KSF directed by statutory order of the Financial Services Authority to pay amounts to match client deposits into an account with Bank of England – use of the word “trust” = trust)
*Mills v Sportsdirect.com Retail Ltd [2010] EWHC 1072 (Ch), [2010] 2 BCLC 143, Lewison J (repo transaction – securities transferred to the client’s “box”, “ringfenced” securities, intention that client takes rights, even though existence of trust left unclear before the counterparty Kaupthing went insolvent = trust)

Alastair Hudson, The Law of Finance (Sweet & Maxwell, 2009) for Glossary; and Ch.50 on ordinary repo’s; and Ch.32 for an account of the global financial crisis by December 2008.

Summary
An intention to create a trust may be inferred
- Paul v Constance
- Re Kayford
- Annabel’s (Berkley Square) Finance law cases
- Brazzill v Willoughby
- Mills v Sportsdirect.com
(B) Certainty of Subject Matter.

Reading: *Hudson*, section 3.4; *Martin* 101–106; *Pettit* 50–58

**Question:** What is the necessity of ascertaining subject matter and extent of beneficial interests; and what is the effect of lack of certainty of subject-matter?

(1) The traditional principle – the trust fund must be separately identifiable

Reading: *Hudson*, section 3.4.2

*Palmer v Simmonds* (1854) 2 Drew. 221 (“bulk of my... residuary estate”; not valid).

*Sprange v Barnard* (1789) 2 Bro. C.C. 585 (“remaining part of what is left, that he does not want for his own wants and use to be divided...”; not valid).

*Re London Wine Co. (Shippers) Ltd.* (1986) Palmer’s Co. Cas. 121, Oliver J (wine bottles to be held on trust not separated from other bottles): ‘I appreciate the point taken that the subject matter is a part of a homogenous mass so that specific identity is of as little importance as it is, for instance, in the case of money. Nevertheless, as it seems to me, to create a trust it must be possible to ascertain with certainty not only what the interest of the beneficiary is to be but to what property it is to attach.’

*MacJordan Construction Ltd v Brookmount Erostin Ltd* [1992] BCLC 350

**Re Goldcorp** [1995] 1 A.C. 74 (necessity of segregating trust property - bullion “ex bulk”)

*Westdeutsche Landesbank v Islington* [1996] AC 669

(2) A different principle for intangible or for fungible property?

Reading: *Hudson*, section 3.4.3


*Re Harvard Securities* [1997] 2 BCLC 369


*White v Shortall* [2006] NSWSC 1379 (criticism of *Hunter v Moss*).

(3) FSA Client Asset Sourcebook (“CASS”): the obligation to segregate client assets

Reading: *Hudson*, section 3.4.5

(a) The CASS principles

EC Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (“MiFID”)

The CASS rules can be found at: [http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/handbook/CASS/7/7](http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/handbook/CASS/7/7)

**CASS 7.7.2R** (06/08/2010)

“A firm receives and holds client money as trustee (or in Scotland as agent) on the following terms:

(1) for the purposes of and on the terms of the client money rules and the client money distribution rules;

(2) subject to (42), for the clients (other than clients which are insurance undertakings when acting as such with respect of client money received in the course of insurance mediation activity and that was opted in to this chapter) for whom that money is held, according to their respective interests in it;
(3) after all valid claims in (2) have been met, for clients which are insurance undertakings with respect of client money received in the course of insurance mediation activity according to their respective interests in it; (4) on failure of the firm, for the payment of the costs properly attributable to the distribution of the client money in accordance with (2); and (5) after all valid claims and costs under (2) to (4) have been met, for the firm itself.”

CASS 7.7.3R (01/01/2009)
“A trustee firm which is subject to the client money rules by virtue of CASS 7.1.1 R (4): (1) must receive and hold client money in accordance with the relevant instrument of trust; (2) subject to that, receives and holds client money on trust on the terms (or in Scotland on the agency terms) specified in CASS 7.7.2 R.”

(b) Assets in unsegregated accounts, insolvency, and breach of regulatory obligations

*Re Global Trader Europe Ltd (in liquidation) [2009] EWHC 602 (Ch), [2009] 2 BCLC 18, Park J (trust could be found in favour of any client for whom assets had actually been segregated, but no trust if assets had not been segregated in fact)
*Re Lehman Bros International (Europe)(No2) [2009] EWHC 3228 (Ch), [2010] EWHC 47 (Ch),[2010] 2 BCLC 301, (Briggs J considered the poorly drafted regulations in Part 7 of the FSA rulebook CASS (“CASS 7”), following Re Global Trader) – overturned on appeal…
*Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe)(in administration) v CRC Credit Fund Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 917, Court of Appeal – on appeal from Briggs J under a slightly different name; then appealed to …

- The traditional rule would have required that no trust would be found.
- Global Trader and Briggs J followed the traditional rule: no segregation, no trust.
- The Court of Appeal was eager to find a valid trust – it used White v Shortall to get to the answer it wanted: it was held that the unsegregated pool of property should be treated as being “a single trust” and that each client was one of many beneficiaries in that trust.
- The Supreme Court focussed specifically on the “statutory trust” in CASS, and therefore it could be said not to relate to general law of trusts at all.
- The Lehman Brothers insolvency was enormous and its role in the world economy was pivotal – therefore, perhaps this is a policy decision? See Lord Dyson at para [148].
- Lord Walker doubted the “single trust approach” on these facts and considered that the law of trusts was left too uncertain.

(c) Securities held within investment banking groups – the “hub” cases

*Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe)(In Administration) [2010] EWHC 2914 (Ch), Briggs J (single “hub” holding entity for each geographic region where client assets and Lehman Bros assets all pooled together – no trust in favour of any client) (overturned on appeal…)
*Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe)(In Administration) [2011] EWCA Civ 1544 (Hunter v Moss applied) –
Lloyd LJ [75]: “there is no ground for saying that the trust could not take effect in law because its subject-matter lacked certainty”.

- Automated book-keeping and a knowing breach of the regulations for many years.
- Operation of a pooled account so that the bank could, in essence, speculate with clients’ assets as well as its own.
Barclays and JP Morgan have also been fined by the FSA for breach of these regulations.
Would the trust be a good device to protect consumers if the Goldcorp principle was retained?

The mismanagement of Lehman Brothers and the challenge to law
Some reading on the failure of Lehman Brothers – we must never let this happen again:-
Anton Valukas’s report “In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc” for the United States Bankruptcy Court Southern District of New York (Chapter 11 Case No. 08-13555), 11 March 2010, and its discussion of “repo 105”.
McDonald, A Colossal Failure of Common Sense (Ebury Press, 2009)
Tett, Fool’s Gold (Abacus, 2010)
Sorkin, Too Big to Fail (Penguin, 2010)

(4) What is the nature of the property which can make up a trust fund?

Re Celtic Extraction [1999] 4 All ER 684
Swift v Dairywise Farms [2000] 1 All ER 320

(5) A different approach in commercial law
Sale of Goods Act 1979, s 20A – tenants in common of the combined fund
(Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act 1995)
Re Wait [1927] 1 Ch 606 – old approach applied trusts law not commercial law
Re Staplyton [1994] 1 WLR 1181: SGA applied instead of trusts law

(6) A note on the nature of property in trusts law

Reading: Hudson, section 31.1
Re Goldcorp [1995] 1 A.C. 74 – the identity of the property is paramount
Attorney-General for Hong Kong v. Reid [1994] 1 AC 324, [1993] 3 WLR 1143 – the morality of the situation is paramount


Summary

The traditional rule
- Re London Wine
- Re Goldcorp
- MacJordan v Brookmount
- Re Global Trader
- Lehman Brothers per Briggs J

Bending the rule
- Hunter v Moss
- Lehman Bros (No2)

Criticising Hunter v Moss, and finding a large single trust
- White v Shortall
- Lehman Bros v CRC
Topic 2. CERTAINTY OF OBJECTS

Reading: *Hudson*, section 3.5; *Martin* 107–121; *Pettit* 50–65

Question: how certain must the words used by the settlor be in creating a trust, and in what way will the court measure sufficient certainty?

Commentary:
- J.A. Hopkins, (1971) 29 C.I.J. 68

Introduction: the central principle

Reading: *Hudson*, section 3.5.1


- The need for the court to be able to police the trustees’ management of the trust
- If the court cannot know with certainty, how can the trustees know and how can the court police the trustees?

**Re Hay’s Settlement Trusts** [1982] 1 W.L.R. 202: for the most useful summary of these principles and of the various forms of power.

1) Distinguishing between types of power and of trust

The distinction between “powers” and “trusts”:

- Fixed trusts and bare trusts obligations
- Discretionary trusts, (once known as “powers in the nature of a trust”)
- Fiduciary powers: powers of appointment and powers of advancement (known as “mere powers” because they are merely powers and not trusts)
- Personal, non-fiduciary powers

Cf. The nature of beneficial entitlements (cf. mere powers) in general and of corresponding trustees’ duties.

*Burrough v. Philcox* (1840) 5 My. & Cr. 72.

*Re Hay’s Settlement Trusts* [1982] 1 W.L.R. 202

2) Certainty rules for fixed trusts (e. g. fixed shares within a class).

Reading: *Hudson*, section 3.5.2


- A complete list of the beneficiaries must be possible.
- Both conceptual and evidential certainty required.

3) Certainty rules for fiduciary “mere powers”, e. g. powers of appointment.

Reading: *Hudson*, section 3.5.3

*Re Gestetner Settlement* [1953] Ch. 673 (the old, strict approach).

**Re Gulbenkian’s Settlement** [1970] A.C. 508: the “any given postulant test”; aka the “is or is not test”. NB: note uncertainty pre-McPhail v Doulton as to which test the court is said to be advancing here.
4) Certainty rules for discretionary trusts.
   Reading: Hudson, section 3.5.4

   **McPhail v. Doulton [1971] A.C. 424 (can it be said with certainty that any given individual is or is not a member of the class?).
   “the trust is valid if it can be said with certainty that any given individual is or is not a member of the class” – Lord Wilberforce.

5) Certainty rules for personal powers.
   Reading: Hudson, section 3.5.5

   (a) Not void on the ground of uncertainty of objects
   *Re Hay’s Settlement Trusts [1982] 1 W.L.R. 202
   Re Leek [1967] Ch 1061, 1076
   Mettoy Pension Trustees Ltd v Evans [1990] 1 WLR 1587

   (b) May be held void for excessive exercise of that power

6) Mechanisms for eluding the “any given postulant test” (1): conceptual and evidential certainty.
   Reading: Hudson, section 3.5.3, 3.5.4 and also 3.5.7
   (Re Allen [1953] Ch 810)
   **Re Baden’s Deed Trusts (No 2) [1973] Ch. 9.
   **Re Barlow [1979] 1 WLR 278

7) Mechanisms for analysing the “any given postulant test” (2): “administrative unworkability” in discretionary trusts and powers.
   Reading: Hudson, section 3.5.3, 3.5.4 and 3.5.10
   McPhail v. Doulton [1971] AC 424
   (Re Manisty’s Settlement [1974] Ch. 17.)

8) Some particular concepts causing problems
   Reading: Hudson, section 3.5.8

   (a) “Friends”
   Re Gibbard [1966] 1 All ER 273 (“old friends” from the old school = certain)
   Re Barlow [1979] 1 WLR 278 (friends and a gift = certain in the circumstances, e.g. long relationship)

   (b) “Customers”
   Sparfax v Dommett (1972) The Times, 14 July

   (c) “Relatives”
   McPhail v. Doulton [1971] AC 424
   Re Baden’s Deed Trusts (No 2) [1973] Ch. 9.

9) Mechanisms for eluding the “any given postulant test” (3): use of an expert.
   Reading: Hudson, section 3.5.9

   (McPhail v. Doulton [1971] AC 424)
   (Re Manisty’s Settlement [1974] Ch. 17.)
   Re Tuck’s ST [1978] 2 WLR 411
10) Mechanisms for eluding the “any given postulant test” (4): let the trustees do whatever they want

Reading: *Hudson, section 3.5.9*

(a) Trustees’ opinion decisive
*Re Coxen* [1948] Ch 747 (trustees’ opinion may not be itself replace certainty)
*Re Jones* [1953] Ch 125 (ditto)

(b) Wide powers
*Re Manisty’s Settlement* [1974] Ch. 17 (granting wide powers – e.g. “trustees may give to anyone in the world except x” – may be certain if clear who excluded).
*Blausten v IRC* [1972] Ch 256 (if class so wide that it is not really a class at all – e.g. everyone in the world – then uncertain)

11) When the trust fails, resulting trust for settlor

The result of a trust failing is that the property is held on resulting trust for the settlor. Where part of the gift fails, the whole gift must fail, to give effect to the settlor’s intention: *(Re Gulbenkian* [1970] A.C. 508)
*Vandervell v IRC* [1967] 2 AC 291
*Cf Re Leek* [1969] 1 Ch 563

12) Considering the various forms of uncertainty

Reading: *Hudson, para 3.5.10* on these categories.
“There must be sufficient certainty for the trustees to execute the trust according to the settlor’s intentions”

(a) Conceptual uncertainty
Where the words are unclear. If impossible to be certain: the trust fails. Test: “is or is not”.

(b) Evidential uncertainty
Where it is impossible to prove whether or not potential beneficiaries succeed in falling within the category. This will not invalidate the trust (in most circumstances): *Baden No.2*

(c) Ascertainability
Where it is impossible to find beneficiaries: perhaps because they have died. This will not necessarily render the trust invalid: *Re Benjamin; McPhail v. Doulton*

(d) Administrative workability
Where the requirements of the trust make it impossible for the trustees to perform their fiduciary obligations. This will invalidate the trust, per Lord Wilberforce.

**Learning point:** your role here as a student of law is to analyse sets of facts and to decide (i) which form of power or trust is at issue, then (ii) apply the appropriate test from the appropriate leading case. There may, however, be alternative analyses on some of the cases in the lower courts. You have to be able to apply each analysis in turn and identify (a) the different results each would produce and (b) comment on the desirability of each approach.

(D) Perpetuities and accumulations

Reading: *Hudson, para 4.2.7*

1) The principle under the case law: trusts created before 1964
*Re Thompson* [1906] 2 Ch 199, 202, Joyce J:
‘The rule against perpetuities requires that every estate or interest must vest, if at all, not later than 21 years after the determination of some life in being at the time of the creation of such estate or interest, and not only must the person to take be ascertained, but the amount of his interest must be ascertainable with the prescribed period.’
The maximum period (under the case law) for the vesting of interests under trusts: a life or lives in being + 21 years.

2) **Trustrs created after 16 July 1964**

*ss. 1, 3 and 4 of the Perpetuities and Accumulations Act 1964.*

- The parties “wait and see” for a statutory limitation period whether or not the trust comes to an end, further to s.3.
- If it does not, then the class closing rules in s.4 apply so as to close the beneficial class to any future members.

3) **Trustrs created after 6 April 2010**

Perpetuities and Accumulations Act 2009

(a) **The ambit of the Act**

Section 1 describes the ambit of the PAA 2009, subject to the notion in s.1(1) that “The rule against perpetuities applies (and applies only) as provided by this section”

Hence, the Act applies to
- trusts with successive interests;
- trusts subject to some condition precedent (such as “the beneficiary must reach the age of 21”);
- trusts subject to some condition subsequent (such as “provided that the beneficiary does not marry”);
- wills with successive interests; and
- powers of appointment.

(b) **The statutory perpetuity period**

- s.5(1): ‘The perpetuity period is 125 years (and no other period).’
- Section 5(2): s.5(1) applies “whether or not the instrument … specifies a perpetuity period; and a specification of a perpetuity period in that instrument is ineffective”.
- Section 6: the starting point for measuring the period of 125 years is the time at which the relevant instrument takes effect.

(c) **Trusts which would otherwise be invalid**

- Section 7: “wait and see” until the statutory period has expired and then any unused parts of the trust come to an end.
- Section 8 then introduces a “class closing” rule to eliminate beneficiaries once the statutory perpetuity period has been reached.

(d) **Non-charitable purpose trusts**

- Section 18 provides that nothing in the Act affects the rule that “limits the duration of non-charitable purpose trusts”

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### Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Definitions</th>
<th>Personal powers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Re Hay’s Settlement Trusts</td>
<td>Re Hay’s Settlement Trusts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed Trusts</td>
<td>Alternative approaches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRC v Broadway Cottages</td>
<td>Re Baden No 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mere powers</td>
<td>Re Barlow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Re Gulbenkian</td>
<td>Re Tuck’s ST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discretionary trusts</td>
<td>Re Coxen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McPhail v Doulton</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Topic 3. THE BENEFICIARY PRINCIPLE & UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS

I. THE BENEFICIARY PRINCIPLE

Question: when will a trust be void for want of a beneficiary, and what manner of beneficiary will be necessary?

General reading: Hudson, Chapter 4; Martin 385-414; Pettit 58-65

Commentary: Gravells (1977) 40 M.L.R. 397

(A) The nature of the beneficiary’s rights in the trust fund

Reading: Hudson, section 4.1

1) The principle in Saunders v Vautier

**Saunders v Vautier (1841) 4 Beav 115**

Re Bowes [1896] 1 Ch 507
Re Smith [1928] Ch 915 (could compel transfer to beneficiaries even where two classes of beneficiaries under discretionary trusts)

In re Holt’s Settlement [1969] 1 Ch 100, 111, per Megarry J:
‘If under a trust every possible beneficiary was under no disability and concurred in the re-arrangement or termination of the trusts, then under the doctrine in Saunders v Vautier those beneficiaries could dispose of the trust property as they thought fit; for in equity the property was theirs. Yet if any beneficiary was an infant, or an unborn or unascertained person, it was held that the court had no general inherent or other jurisdiction to concur in any such arrangement on behalf of that beneficiary.’

2) The proprietary rights of beneficiaries

Saunders v Vautier (1841) 4 Beav 115

Re Nelson [1928] Ch 920
Stephenson v Barclays Bank [1975] 1 All ER 625 (beneficiary able to take separate share from the trust where property naturally divisible)

Lloyds Bank v Duker [1987] 3 All ER 193 (prevention of removal of interest because loss of majority shareholding for other beneficiaries)

3) The nature of the rights of objects of discretionary trusts

Reading: Hudson, section 4.1.4

Prof Geraint Thomas, Powers (2nd ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 2011), para 6-268

Saunders v Vautier (1841) 4 Beav 115
Gartside v IRC [1968] AC 553, at 617, per Lord Wilberforce
CPT Custodian Pty Ltd v Commissioner of the State Revenue [2005] HCA 53
Richstar Enterprises Pty Ltd v Carey (No.6) [2006] FCA 814

4) Protective trusts (note only)

Re Detmold (1889) 40 Ch D 585 (all property to be transferred to wife in the event of bankruptcy)
Trustee Act 1925, s.33

5) Resettlement or variation of trusts (note only)
Variation of Trusts Act 1958
In re Holt’s Settlement Trusts [1969] 1 Ch 100

(B) The beneficiary principle.

Reading: Hudson, section 4.2

1) The general principle

"There can be no trust, over the exercise of which this court will not assume control ..If there be a clear trust, but for uncertain objects, the property... is undisposed of... Every...[non-charitable] trust must have a definite object. There must be somebody in whose favour the court can decree performance" (per Lord Grant M.R.).

Bowman v Secular Society Ltd [1917] AC 406

2) The strict, traditional principle

**Leahy v. Att.-Gen. for New South Wales** [1959] A.C. 457 (trust for ‘such order of nuns’ as trustees shall select) — this case is considered in detail below.

3) Illustrations of the traditional general principle

Re Nottage [1885] 2 Ch 649 (yachting cup held to be for the purpose of promoting yachting and not for the benefit of people who participated)
Re Wood [1949] 1 All ER 1100
*Re Astor’s S.T.* [1952] Ch. 534. (‘trust’ intended inter alia for ‘the maintenance of … good understanding sympathy and co-operation between nations’ & for the maintenance of high standards in newspapers (The Observer) = void purpose trust (per Roxburgh J) because (1) the terms used are too uncertain (2) a trust must have a beneficiary (3) these purposes are not charitable)
Re Shaw (development of a new alphabet = void purpose trust)
Re Endacott [1960] Ch. 232 (“no principle has greater sanction or authority”).
**Leahy v. Att.-Gen. for New South Wales** [1959] A.C. 457 (This case is considered again below — trust over a small farmhouse and a sheep station for an “order of nuns” constituted a void purpose trust.)
**Re Grant’s WT** [1979] 3 All ER 359 (gift “for the benefit of the HQ of the Chertsey CLP” = void purpose trust; see below).

4) Effect of the beneficiary principle

- An abstract purpose trust will be void and so all of the equitable rights in the property will remain with the settlor. A trust will only be valid if it is for the benefit of people.
- In this section we have considered examples of the strict, traditional principle. However, there are other interpretations which are considered in the next section.
(C) Alternative interpretations of the beneficiary principle

Reading: *Hudson, section 4.2*

It is important to understand that whereas the traditional principle continues in effect, there have nevertheless been alternative analyses accepted by some courts of ostensibly similar factual circumstances. Your role here is to understand the effect of applying these various approaches to factual circumstances, who wins and who loses in such circumstances, and why different courts might take different approaches.

1) Interpreting what is ostensibly a purpose trust as being a trust for the benefit of persons

**Re Denley’s Trust Deed [1969] 1 Ch. 373** (trust “directly or indirectly for the benefit of individuals” = people trust and therefore valid):

I think there may be a purpose or object trust, the carrying out of which would benefit an individual or individuals, where that benefit is so indirect or intangible or which is otherwise so framed as not to give those persons any locus standi to apply to the court to enforce the trust, in which case the beneficiary principle would, as it seems to me, apply to invalidate the trust, quite apart from any question of uncertainty or perpetuity. Such cases can be considered if and when they arise. The present is not, in my judgment, of that character… Where, then, the trust, though expressed as a purpose, is directly or indirectly for the benefit of an individual or individuals, it seems to me that it is in general outside the mischief of the beneficiary principle.

2) Interpret the power to be something other than a trust

a) Transfer interpreted to be a gift


There would seem to me to be, as a matter of common sense, a clear distinction between the case where a purpose is prescribed which is clearly intended for the benefit of ascertained or ascertainable beneficiaries, particularly where those beneficiaries have the power to make the capital their own, and the case where no beneficiary at all is intended (for instance, a memorial to a favourite pet) or where the beneficiaries are unascertainable: as in the case, for instance, of *In re Price* [1943] Ch. 422. If a valid gift may be made to an unincorporated body as a simple accretion to the funds which are the subject matter of the contract which the members have made inter se - and *Neville Estates Ltd. v. Madden* [1962] Ch. 832 and *In re Recher’s Will Trusts* [1972] Ch. 526 show that it may - I do not really see why such a gift, which specifies a purpose which is within the powers of the association and of which the members of the association are the beneficiaries, should fail.

*Cocks v Manners* (1871) LR 12 Eq 574 (similar facts to Leahy but different interpretation, trust held by Mother Superior deemed to be gift in favour of individual nun)

b) Transfer interpreted to be for other purposes

*Re Osoba* [1979] 2 All ER 393 – (“for the maintenance and training of my daughter up to university…” interpreted as a gift to the three women mentioned in the instrument)

*Re Abbott Fund* [1900] 2 Ch 326 – (trust for the maintenance of old ladies – surplus funds on heir death held on resulting trust – i.e. impossible purpose = resulting trust)

c) Use of the principle in *Saunders v Vautier*

*Re Boves* [1896] 1 Ch 507 – (use of Saunders v Vautier to allow human beneficiaries to displace settlor’s stated intention)
3) The strict approach still in rude health

**Re Grant’s WT [1979] 3 All ER 359 (“for the benefit of Chertsey CLP…” not a people trust).

(D) Recognised exceptions to the beneficiary principle.

Reading: Hudson, section 4.2

1) Charitable trusts (public purpose trusts).
   - Restricted to legal definition of charity (relief of poverty; promotion of education; advancement of religion; other miscellaneous purposes recognised in case law).
   - Benefit to a class of the public not defined by personal nexus (except in case of relief of poverty).
   N.B. Charitable trusts will be dealt with in detail, as a distinct topic, later in the course.

2) "Concessions to human weakness or sentiment".
   A group of anomalous cases:-
   Pettingall v. Pettingall (1842) 11 L.J. Ch. 176 (maintenance of an identified pet animal – valid).
   Re Dean (1889) 41 Ch. D. 552 (for the maintenance of testator’s horses and hounds for fifty years after his death – valid, time limited, North J can see no objection to use of own property for own purposes).
   Bourne v. Keane [1919] A.C. 426 (trust for the saying of masses in private may be valid if for a limited perpetuity period – Lord Buckmaster).
   Re Thompson [1934] Ch. 342 (promotion of fox hunting – valid).
   Re Hooper [1932] 1 Ch. 38 (for the upkeep of graves and monuments for 21 years, held valid although not charitable).

Cf. Re Endacott [1960] Ch. 232 (above - “a useful memorial to myself” was found to be void and the leading view re-instated).

II. Unincorporated Associations

(A) Conceptual issues with property held for unincorporated associations.

Reading: Hudson, section 4.3

1) Analytical problems associated with the application of the beneficiary principle and other requirements of certainty and validity for trusts
   Transfer to an association is a transfer not to a legal person and therefore someone must hold the property for the benefit of the association: that may render the transfer capable of being analysed as a void purpose trust.

2) The various modes of interpretation
   a) Invalid purpose trusts
b) Transfer to association’s officers as an accretion to funds, as part of contract law

*Neville Estates Ltd. v. Madden* [1962] Ch. 832.

**Re Recher’s Will Trust** [1972] Ch. 526 at 538 per Brightman J:

‘A trust for non-charitable purposes, as distinct from a trust for individuals, is clearly void because there is no beneficiary. It does not, however, follow that persons cannot band themselves together as an association or society, pay subscriptions and validly devote their funds in pursuit of some lawful non-charitable purpose. … Such an association of persons is bound, I would think, to have some sort of constitution; that is to say, the rights and liabilities of the members of the association will inevitably depend on some form of contract inter se, usually evidenced by a set of rules. In the present case it appears to me clear that the [members of the society] were bound together by a contract inter se. Any such member was entitled to the rights and subject to the liabilities defined by the rules. … In my judgment the legacy in the present case [to the society] ought to be construed as a legacy of that type, that is to say, a legacy to the members beneficially as an accretion to the funds subject to the contract which they had made inter se.’

c) Transfer to association’s officers subject to a mandate to use in accordance with club’s constitution

**Neville Estates Ltd. v. Madden** [1962] Ch. 832, 849, per Cross J:

‘... a gift to the existing members not as joint tenants but subject to their respective contractual rights and liabilities towards one another as members. In such a case a member cannot sever his share. It will accrue to the other members on his death or resignation, even though such members include persons who became members after the gift took effect. It will not be open to objection on the score of perpetuity or uncertainty unless there is something in its terms or circumstances or in the rules of the association which preclude the members at any given time from dividing the subject of the gift between them.’

**Conservative and Unionist Central Office v. Burrell** [1982] 1 W.L.R. 522, [1982] 2 All E.R. 1, at p.6, per Brightman LJ:

‘No legal problem arises if a contributor (as I will call him) hands to a friend (whom I will call the recipient) a sum of money to be applied by the recipient for political purposes indicated by the contributor, or to be chosen at the discretion of the recipient. That would be a simple case of mandate or agency. The recipient would have authority from the contributor to make use of the money, in the indicated way. So far as the money is used within the scope of the mandate, the recipient discharges himself vis-à-vis the contributor. … No trust arises, except the fiduciary relationship inherent in the relationship of principal and agent. … [If the contribution were made to an unincorporated association and paid to its treasurer then] the treasurer has clear authority to add the contribution to the mixed fund (as I will call it) that he holds. At that stage I think the mandate becomes irrevocable.’

**The key problem** with the contractual solutions remains: who owns the property at issue?

d) A summary of the foregoing approaches

*Re Horley Town FC* [2006] EWHC 2386

(B) Analytical possibilities of transfers to unincorporated associations

Reading: *Hudson, section 4.3.3*

- A transfer to the individual members of the association for their benefit – *Re Denley*
- A transfer for present and future members of the association – *Leahy v Att Gen NSW*
- A transfer to the trustees or other officers of the association to hold as an endowment – *Leahy; Re Grant’s WT*
A transfer to the existing members beneficially as an accretion to the association’s funds - *Re Recher*

A transfer to the officers with a mandate to use it for particular purposes - *Conservative Association v Burrell*, per Brightman LJ

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Various analyses of transfer to unincorporated association</th>
<th>Abstract purpose trust</th>
<th>“People trust”</th>
<th>Gift passing “complete control”</th>
<th>An accretion to funds</th>
<th>Taking property as agent subject to mandate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leading case exhibiting this analysis</td>
<td>Leahy v Att-Gen NSW</td>
<td>Re Denley</td>
<td>Re Lipinski</td>
<td>Re Recher</td>
<td><em>Conservative Association v Burrell</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valid or Void?</td>
<td>Void</td>
<td>Valid</td>
<td>Valid</td>
<td>Valid</td>
<td>Valid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the transfer retain control of money after transfer?</td>
<td>Yes, but void</td>
<td>Yes, because governed by trustee’s fiduciary duties</td>
<td>No, because all title passes</td>
<td>No, because governed only by terms of association’s constitution</td>
<td>Yes, because governed by agent’s fiduciary duties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is it clear who owns property?</td>
<td>Yes, but void</td>
<td>Yes, held on trust</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If there has been a transfer made for the benefit of an association and/or its members, then these are the analytical possibilities of that transfer. You should consider the facts of each transfer and decide which you consider to be the most appropriate analysis of the facts in front of you.

(C) **Winding up unincorporated associations**

**Reading**: *Hudson, section 4.3.4*

1) **The problem of terminating unincorporated associations**

When an association is wound up, how is the property which is held connected to its purposes to be distributed: among the existing members, to identified persons only according to the association’s constitution, or to the Crown?

2) **Terminating unincorporated associations & the division of property**

*Re Sick and Funeral Society of St John’s Sunday School, Golcar* [1973] Ch. 51 (per capita distribution among members at time of dissolution).

*Re West Sussex Constabulary’s Widows, Children and Benevolent (1930) Fund Trust* [1971] Ch. 1 (the old view – resulting trust).

*Re Bucks Constabulary Fund (No 2)* [1979] 1W.L.R. 936 (modern view: contract decisive)

*Re GKN Bolts & Nuts Ltd, etc.* [1982] 1 WLR 774 (the broad sword of common sense)

*Westdeutsche Landesbank v Islington* [1996] AC 669 (the bona vacantia principle)

*Air Jamaica v Charlton* [1999] 1 WLR 1399

**Re Horley Town FC* [2006] EWHC 2386

*Hanchett-Stamford v Attorney-General* [2008] EWHC 330 (Ch), [2008] 4 All ER 323 (if there was still one member left of a moribund association then the property attributed to that association would not pass bona vacantia to the Crown)

(D) **Is the beneficiary principle justifiable?**

1) Problems of enforceability, uncertainty, perpetuity associated with private purpose trusts.

2) Other means of control: the striking down of capricious purposes.

*Brown v. Burdett* (1882) 21 Ch. D. 667 (a trust, requiring trustees to board up a house for twenty before transferring it to a named beneficiary, was held to be void by striking out the capricious
3) Challenges to beneficiary principle: is the beneficiary principle necessary for the modern trust?

Reading: Hudson, paras 4.2.8 and 21.2.3


**Hayton, “Developing the obligation characteristic of the trust” (2001) 117 LQR 96.**

Hudson, section 21.2

4) A politics of trusts law

Reading: Hudson, para 2.7.3

(a) The attitude to tax avoidance


‘… no Forsyte had as yet died; they did not die; death being contrary to their principles, they took precautions against it, the instinctive precautions of highly vitalized persons who resent encroachments on their property.’

(b) Asset protection trusts and tax havens


- Jurisdictions without the beneficiary principle as part of their trusts law: this enables investment of one’s assets without ownership for tax purposes.
- The use of “protector” or “enforcer” in place of the beneficiary.
  - Levying of no taxes or only nominal taxes.
  - A lack of transparency so as to prevent the open and consistent implementation of tax laws and the preparation of appropriate accounting information.
  - The absence of laws or administrative practices which prevent the giving of relevant information to other governments or supra-national bodies.
  - The absence of any substantial activities being carried on in the tax haven itself by entities which have the protection of that jurisdiction’s laws.
- The problem of the “limping trust”.

(c) The impact of international investment trusts on real people: the ethics of international trusts law


Summary

The traditional rule
- Morice v Bishop of Durham
- Leahy v Att-Gen for NSW

Alternative approaches
- Re Denley
- Re Lipinski
- Re Grant’s Will Trusts

Unincorporated associations
- Re Recher’s Will Trusts
- Conservative Association v Burrell

Winding up associations
- Re West Sussex Constabulary, etc.
- Re Bucks Constabulary, etc.
- Re Gillingham Bus Disaster Fund
- Re Horley Town FC
Topic 4. THE CONSTITUTION OF TRUSTS.

Question: How is an express trust created?

General reading: Hudson, Ch.5; Martin 123-154; Pettit 100-126

- Transfer of property by settlor to trustee(s) to be held on trust for beneficiaries, or
- Declaration by settlor that property which settlor already holds or will receive is held by settlor on trust for beneficiaries, or
- Declaration by settlor to trustees that property which trustees hold on his/her behalf is henceforth to be held by them for beneficiaries.

N. b. that, in each of the above cases, the settlor’s title to the property may be legal or equitable; and that property may be subjected to a trust either by will or through inter vivos (lifetime) transactions.

(A) Statutory formalities applicable to the subjection of property to a trust by will: Wills Act 1837 s. 9.

Reading: Hudson, section 5.1.1

- will in writing
- testator’s signature (or equivalent) shows intention to give effect to will
- signature in presence of two or more co-present witnesses
- who attest will or acknowledge signature in testator’s presence

(B) Two fundamental principles

Reading: Hudson, section 5.1.2, and 5.2.4

1) Once a trust is created, it cannot be undone
   Reading: Hudson, sections 5.1.2
   *Paul v. Paul (1882) 20 Ch. D. 742

2) Settlor must have appropriate property rights at time of creating trust
   Reading: Hudson, sections 5.2.4
   Re Brooks ST [1939] 1 Ch 993
   Re Ralli’s WT [1964] 1 Ch 288

(C) Exclusions from the need for formalities.

General reading: Hudson, section 5.3

a) Resulting, implied and constructive trusts require no formalities for their creation
   Reading: Hudson, sections 5.3.1
   LPA 1925, s. 53 (2)

b) “Statute may not be used as an engine of fraud”: fraud and unconscionability
   Reading: Hudson, sections 5.3.2
The proper constitution of trusts & the problem of incompletely constituted trusts.

General reading: *Hudson, sections 5.4 and 5.6*

**Question:** What if the settlor promises to settle property on trust but fails to constitute the trust properly: can the intended beneficiary claim a right in conscience to the property?

1) Methods for the proper constitution of a trust
   Reading: *Hudson, section 5.4*
   *Milroy v. Lord* (1862) 4 De G. F. & J. 264

2) Imperfect gifts may not be effected by means of a trust …
   Reading: *Hudson, sections 5.4.3*
   ***Milroy v. Lord* (1862) 4 De G. F. & J. 264, *per* Turner LJ (there is no equity to perfect an imperfect gift): '… in order to render a voluntary settlement valid and effectual, the settlor must have done everything which, according to the nature of the property comprised in the settlement, was necessary to be done in order to transfer the property [to the trustee] and render the settlement binding upon him. He may, of course, do this by actually transferring the property to the persons for whom he intends to provide, and the provision will then be effectual and it will be equally effectual if he transfers the property to a trustee for the purposes of the settlement, or declares that he himself holds it in trust for those purposes … but in order to render the settlement binding, one or other of these modes must, as I understand the law of this court, be resorted to, for there is no equity in this court to perfect an imperfect gift.'

3) … except where transferor has does everything necessary for him to do to effect the transfer
   Reading: *Hudson, section 5.4.4*
   *Re Rose* [1949] Ch 78
   ***Re Rose* [1952] Ch. 499 (ineffective transfer of legal title to shares but equitable title held to pass because inequitable for transferor to seek to renge on the transfer).**
   Cf. *Re Fry* [1946] Ch 312 (no agreement by Treasury, still transferor could not rely on having done everything necessary for him to do)

4) A loosening of the *Rose* principle
   Reading: *Hudson, section 5.4.4*
   *T Choithram International SA v Pagarani* [2001] 1 WLR 1
   *Pennington v Waine* [2002] 1 WLR 2075

5) The return of common sense
   Reading: *Hudson, section 5.4.4*
   *Kaye v Zeital* [2010] EWCA Civ 159, [2010] 2 BCLC 1
   *Curtis v Pulbrook* [2011] EWHC 167 (Ch), [2011] 1 BCLC 638, Briggs J, three ways to make the *Rose* principle work:
   "The first is where the donor has done everything necessary to enable the donee to enforce a beneficial claim without further assistance from the donor... The second is where some detrimental reliance by the donee upon an apparent although ineffective gift may so bind the conscience of the donor to justify the imposition of a constructive trust ... The third is where by a benevolent construction an effective gift or implied declaration of trust may be teased out of the words used."

**E) A reminder: how is an effective declaration made by the settlor?**

Reading: *Hudson, section 2.6, and especially 3.3*

These cases have already been considered in relation to certainty of intention.

*Jones v. Lock* (1865) 1 Ch. App. 25 (no effective declaration).
Richards v. Delbridge (1874) L.R. 18 Eq. 11 (ineffective transfer not to be treated as declaration of trust).

Paul v. Constance [1977] 1 All E.R. 195 (C.A.) (“The money is as much yours as mine”).

(F) Covenants and promises to create a settlement.

Question: What if the settlor promises to put property into trust but does not actually transfer or allocate the property to it?

Reading: Hudson, section 5.6

Before beginning this reading, you should return to paras 5.4.1 and 5.4.2 as a reminder of the issue in this context. The skill you are learning here is how to structure a transfer of property by means of a promise so as to make it enforceable, in what circumstances trusts law will hold such a transfer to be invalid, and how contract law may grant other remedies. For a trusts lawyer, using the techniques considered in these cases to achieve your client’s goals is a key skill.

1) Can the intended beneficiaries enforce the settlor’s promise?

a) Introduction
Reading: Hudson, section 5.6.1

b) The settlor must own the property settled on trust at the time of purporting to declare that trust
Reading: Hudson, section 5.6.2
*Re Brooks ST [1939] 1 Ch 993
*Re Ralli’s WT [1964] 1 Ch 288

c) A settlement cannot be unmade once it has been made
Reading: Hudson, section 5.6.3
*Paul v. Paul (1882) 20 Ch. D. 742

d) Mere promise unenforceable if beneficiary gave no consideration:
Reading: Hudson, section 5.6.3
‘equity will not assist a volunteer’/ ‘equity will not perfect an imperfect gift’.
Re Brooks ST [1939] 1 Ch 993

e) But enforceable by someone who has given consideration for the promise at common law or is within marriage consideration...
Reading: Hudson, section 5.6.3
Pullin v. Koe [1913] 1 Ch. 9 (widow and children within marriage consideration).

f) ... or by someone who is a party to the settlor’s binding covenant to create the trust.
Reading: Hudson, section 5.6.3
Cannon v. Hartley [1949] Ch. 213 (volunteer able to enforce as party to covenant under seal).

g) The law of contract
Reading: Hudson, section 5.6.3
Contract (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999

2) Trustee not permitted to enforce promise under trusts law, but maybe different under contract law.

Reading: Hudson, “section 5.6.4” page 240 et seq.
a) Is there an enforceable covenant (consideration, etc)?
Can ‘trustees’ enforce (at common law) as parties to the covenant?
If so what remedy could they get?

b) Should common law rights to enforce a binding promise/agreement be exercised against the spirit of the maxim ‘equity will not assist a volunteer’?
Re Pryce [1917] 1 Ch. 234 (court won’t direct trustees to enforce covenant for volunteer).
Re Kay’s S.T. [1939] Ch. 329 (trustees must not enforce).
Re Cook’s S.T. [1965] Ch. 902 (trustees cannot be required to enforce).

3) A trust of the promise itself – a means of validating this promise through trusts law

Reading: Hudson, section 5.6.4 “A trust of the promise itself”

(a) the settlor’s binding promise as ‘property’ held on trust by the intended trustee(s): a ‘trust of the benefit of the covenant’.

*Fletcher v. Fletcher (1844) 4 Hare 67.

(b) modern cases on whether contracts can themselves form the subject matter of a trust, even if those contracts are unassignable

Re Celtic Extraction Ltd (in liq). Re Bluestone Chemicals Ltd (in liq) [1999] 4 All ER 684
Swift v. Dairywise Farms [2000] 1 All E.R. 320 (milk quotas are property, even if non-transferable)

4) Summary of these principles

Reading: Hudson, section 5.6.5 “A summary of the principles discussed in this section”

(G) Dispositions of equitable interests.

General reading for this topic: Hudson, section 5.7

This topic is subtle and complex. The problem for the clients involved here was their trusts being rendered void by virtue of s.53(1)(c) LPA 1925. There are a range of cases, however, which illustrate the different methods which imaginative lawyers have used to avoid s.53(1)(c). For you as law students, it is important to understand the differences between these various approaches and to analyse factual situations so as to identify which analysis is applicable to those facts. For a trusts lawyer, using the techniques considered in these cases to achieve your client’s goals is a key skill.

Statutory material

*LPA 1925 s. 52 (1): "All conveyances of land or of any interest therein are void for the purpose of conveying or creating a legal estate unless made by deed".
*s. 53 (1) (b): “A declaration of trust respecting any land or any interest therein must be manifested and proved by some writing signed by some person who is able to declare such trust.”

**s. 53 (1) (c): “A disposition of an equitable interest or trust subsisting at the time of the disposition, must be in writing signed by the person disposing of the same, or by his agent.”

[Cf. Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989 s.2 re contracts relating to land.]

1) Declarations of trust may sometimes amount to dispositions of an equitable interest and so be caught by s. 53 (1) (c)

Reading: *Hudson*, section 5.7.1 and esp. 5.7.2; *Martin* 84–95; *Pettit* 87–96


“…given its natural meaning, it cannot, I think, be denied that a direction given by Mr Hunter, whereby the beneficial interest in the shares theretofore vested in him became vested in another or others, is a disposition”, *per* Viscount Simonds.

2) Direction to transfer legal estate (carrying with it the equitable interest) is not a disposition under s. 53 (1) (c)

Reading: *Hudson*, sections 5.7.3 and 5.7.4; *Martin* 84–95; *Pettit* 87–96


3) Structures falling outside s 53(1)(c)

a) Sub-trusts not a disposition of the equitable interest if some rights retained

Reading: *Hudson*, section 5.7.6

*Re Lashmar* (1891) 1 Ch 258

*Grainge v Wilberforce* (1889) 5 TLR 436

b) Declaration of a new trust, rather than disposition of equitable interest

Reading: *Hudson*, section 5.7.7


c) Contract transfers equitable interest automatically

Reading: *Hudson*, section 5.7.8


d) Transfers in (c) now understood to take effect by constructive trust

Reading: *Hudson*, section 5.7.9


e) Were *Grey* and *Vandervell* correctly decided?

Reading: *Hudson*, section 5.7.5

Summary

The constitution of trusts and imperfect gifts
  • *Milroy v Lord*
  • *Re Rose*
  • *Pennington v Waine*
  • *Kaye v Zettal*
  • *Curtis v Pulbrook*

A trust will not perfect an imperfect gift
  • *Paul v Paul*
  • *Re Brook's ST*
  • *Re Ralli's WT*
  • *Cannon v Hartley*
  • *Re Cook*
  • *Fletcher v Fletcher*

Dispositions under s.53(1)(c) LPA 1925
  • *Grey v. IRC*
  • *Vandervell v. IRC*
  • *Re Lashmar and Grainge v Wilberforce*
  • *Cohen and Moore v IRC*
  • *Oughtred v IRC and Neville v Wilson*
  • *(Jerome v Kelly)*
Topic 5. THE DUTIES OF TRUSTEES & BREACH OF TRUST

I. THE DUTIES OF TRUSTEES

Reading: Hudson, Ch8&9; Martin, Ch18-19, 23; Pettit, Ch16-17, 23

(A) The trustees’ duties in outline.

1) The core trustees’ duties

This chapter of the course considers a selection of the key duties of trustees. Hudson, 2005, chapter 8 considers 13 general duties, as well as the procedures for the appointment and removal of trustees:

(1) The duties on acceptance of office relating to the need to familiarise oneself with the terms, conditions and history of the management of the trust.
(2) The duty to obey the terms of the trust unless directed to do otherwise by the court.
(3) The duty to safeguard the trust assets, including duties to maintain the trust property, as well as to ensure that it is applied in accordance with the directions set out in the trust instrument.
(4) The duty to act even-handedly between beneficiaries, which means that the trustees are required to act impartially between beneficiaries and to avoid conflicts of interest.
(5) The duty to act with reasonable care, meaning generally a duty to act as though a prudent person of business acting on behalf of someone for whom one feels morally bound to provide.
(6) Duties in relation to trust expenses.
(7) The duties of investment, requiring prudence and the acquisition of the highest possible rate of return in the context.
(8) The duty to distribute the trust property correctly.
(9) The duty to avoid conflicts of interest, not to earn unauthorised profits from the fiduciary office, not to deal on one’s own behalf with trust property on pain of such transactions being voidable, and the obligation to deal fairly with the trust property.
(10) The duty to preserve the confidence of the beneficiaries, especially in relation to Chinese wall arrangements.
(11) The duty to act gratuitously, without any right to payment not permitted by the trust instrument or by the general law.
(12) The duty to account and to provide information.
(13) The duty to take into account relevant considerations and to overlook irrelevant considerations, failure to do so may lead to the court setting aside an exercise of the trustees’ powers.

There are other duties considered in Hudson, section 8.1 and in chapter 9 (relating specifically to investment of the trust property); and there are also general powers for trustees considered in Hudson, chapter 10. We will be focusing only on those duties with emboldened numbers.

2) Key concepts in the obligations of trustees

i) The requirement of good conscience

Reading: Hudson, para 8.2.4

ii) The general duty of care and prudence

Reading: *Hudson*, para 8.3.5

(a) Under case law:
- *Speight v Gaunt* (1883) 9 App Cas 1
- *Learoyd v Whiteley* (1887) 12 App Cas 727

(b) Under statute:
- Trustee Act 2000, s.1:
  
  "(1) Whenever the duty under this subsection applies to a trustee, he must exercise such care and skill as is reasonable in the circumstances, having regard, in particular –
  
  (a) to any special knowledge or experience that he has or holds himself out as having, and

  (b) if he acts as trustee in the course of a business or profession, to any special knowledge or experience that it is reasonable to expect of a person acting in the course of that kind of business or profession."

iii) Duties to act jointly

- *Luke v South Kensington Hotel* (1879) 11 Ch D 121 — ordinarily trustees must act jointly
- Trustee Act 2000, s.11 — the trust instrument may permit some other arrangement
- *Consterdine v Consterdine* — (1862) 31 Beav 330 — or the nature of the trust property may require separate holding.

iv) Liability for breach of trust

*Target Holdings v Redfems* [1996] 1 AC 421

This topic is considered in detail in the next chapter of these Course Documents.

(B) Fiduciary responsibility of trustees.

Reading: *Hudson*, section 8.6

Trustee Act 2000


1) What it means to be a fiduciary

*White v Jones* [1995] 2 AC 207 at 271, *per* Lord Browne-Wilkinson:

‘The paradigm of the circumstances in which equity will find a fiduciary relationship is where one party, A, has assumed to act in relation to the property or affairs of another, B.’

*Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew* [1998] Ch 1 at 18, *per* Millett LJ:

‘A fiduciary is someone who has undertaken to act for or on behalf of another in a particular matter in circumstances which give rise to a relationship of trust and confidence. The distinguishing obligation of a fiduciary is the obligation of loyalty. The principal is entitled to the single-minded loyalty of his fiduciary. The core liability has several facets. A fiduciary must act in good faith; he must not make a profit out of his trust; he must not place himself in a position where his duty and his interest may conflict; he may not act for his own benefit or the benefit of a third person without the informed consent of his principal. This is not intended to be an exhaustive list, but it is sufficient to indicate the nature of fiduciary obligations. They are the defining characteristics of the fiduciary.’

2) Conflicts of interest not permissible

Reading: *Hudson*, para 8.3.9

(i) The general principle against secret profits and conflicts of interest in general terms
Considered in detail in relation to "Constructive Trusts" later in the course.

Keech v Sandford [1726] Sel Cas Ch 61
Boardman v Phipps [1967] 2 AC 46

(ii) The self-dealing principle

Ex parte Lacey (1802) 6 Ves 625 (any transaction in which the trustee has a personal interest is voidable at the instance of the beneficiary)

Holder v Holder [1968] Ch 353 (the court may not inquire into the trustee’s intentions)

(iii) The fair-dealing principle

Tito v Waddell (No 2) [1977] 3 All ER 129, per Megarry V-C:

"... if a trustee purchases the beneficial interest of any of his beneficiaries, the transaction is not voidable ex debito justitiae, but can be set aside unless the trustee can show that he has taken advantage of his position and has made full disclosure to the beneficiary, and that the transaction is fair and honest."

3) Duty of impartiality

Reading: Hudson, section 8.3.4; Pettit Ch.18

a) The duty in general terms

**Cowan v Scargill [1985] Ch 270, 286, per Megarry V-C:

'It is the duty of trustees to exercise their powers in the best interest of the present and future beneficiaries of the trust, holding the scales impartially between the different classes of beneficiaries.'

b) The duty in relation to trustees’ powers of investment


'A trustee must act fairly in making investment decisions which may have different consequences for differing classes of beneficiaries. … The trustees have a wide discretion. They are, for example, entitled to take into account the income needs of the tenant for life or the fact that the tenant for life was a person known to the settlor and a primary object of the trust whereas the remainderman is a remoter relative or stranger. Of course, these cannot be allowed to become the overriding considerations but the concept of fairness between classes of beneficiaries does not require them to be excluded. It would be an inhuman rule which required trustees to adhere to some mechanical rule for preserving the real value of capital when the tenant for life was the testator’s widow who had fallen upon hard times and the remainderman was young and well-off.'


c) The duty in relation to pension funds

Edge v Pensions Ombudsman [2000] Ch 602, 627:

'the so-called duty to act impartially … is no more than the ordinary duty which the law imposes on a person who is entrusted with the exercise of a discretionary power: that he exercises the power for the purpose for which it is given, giving proper consideration to the matters which are relevant and excluding from consideration matters which are irrelevant. If pension fund trustees do that, they cannot be criticized if they reach a decision which appears to prefer the claims of one interest – whether that of employers, current employers or pensioners – over others. The preference will be the result of a proper exercise of the discretionary power.'
4) Validity of exclusion clauses

Reading: *Hudson*, section 8.5

(a) The core principle


‘[T]here is an irreducible core of obligations owed by the trustees to the beneficiaries and enforceable by them which is fundamental to the concept of a trust. If the beneficiaries have no rights enforceable against the trustees there are no trusts. But I do not accept the further submission that there core obligations include the duties of skill and care, prudence and diligence. The duty of trustees to perform the trusts honestly and in good faith for the benefit of the beneficiaries is the minimum necessary to give substance to the trusts, but in my opinion it is sufficient ... a trustee who relied on the presence of a trustee exemption clause to justify what he proposed to do would thereby lose its protection: he would be acting recklessly in the proper sense of the term.’


(b) Case law examples

*Bogg v Raper* (1998/99) 1 ITELR 267
*Wight v Olswang (No.2)* (1999/2000) 2 ITELR 689
*Walker v Stones* [2001] QB 902
*Barracough v Mell* [2005] EWHC 3387 (Ch), [2006] WTLR 203
*Baker v JE Clark & Co (Transport) UK Ltd* [2006] EWCA Civ 464

(c) Gross negligence and questioning the central principle

*Spread Trustee Ltd v Hutchison* [2010] WTLR 315, Guernsey Court of Appeal, as affirmed by the majority of the Privy Council [2011] UKPC 13, *per* Lord Kerr:

‘If, as I suggested at the beginning of this judgment, the placing of reliance on a responsible person to manage property so as to promote the interests of the beneficiaries of a trust is central to the concept of trusteeship, denying trustees the opportunity to avoid liability for their gross negligence seems to be entirely in keeping with that essential aim.’

(C) Duty to invest.

General Reading: *Hudson*, Ch9; *Martin* Ch18; *Pettit* Ch17

1) The power of investment under TA 2000

*Trustee Act 2000, s 3(1)*

‘...a trustee may make any kind of investment that he could make if he were absolutely entitled to the assets of the trust.’

2) The statutory duty of care

*Trustee Act 2000, s.1*

‘(1) Whenever the duty under this subsection applied to a trustee, he must exercise such care and skill as is reasonable in the circumstances, having regard in particular –
(a) to any special knowledge or experience that he has or holds himself out as having, and
(b) if he acts as trustee in the course of a business or profession, to any special knowledge or experience that it is reasonable to expect of a person acting in the course of that kind of business or profession.

(2) In this Act the duty under subsection (1) is called “the duty of care”.

3) The duty to prepare standard investment criteria.

**Trustee Act 2000, s.4.

‘4(1)… a trustee must have regard to the standard investment criteria.

(3) The standard investment criteria in relation to a trust are –
(a) the suitability to the trust of investments of the same kind as any particular investment proposed to be made or retained and of that particular investment as an investment of that kind, and
(b) the need for diversification of investments of the trust, in so far as is appropriate to the circumstances of the trust.’

4) The duty to take expert advice.

**Trustee Act 2000, s.5.

‘(1) Before exercising any power of investment … a trustee must … obtain and consider proper advice about the way in which, having regard to the standard investment criteria, the power should be exercised.

(3) The exception is that a trustee need not obtain such advice if he reasonably concludes that in all the circumstances it is unnecessary or inappropriate to do so.’

5) General duties regarding protection and investment of trust assets on the case law.

(i) Seek the highest available return


(ii) Act as though a prudent person of business investing on behalf of someone for whom one feels morally bound to provide

Learoyd v Whiteley (1887) 12 App. Cas. 727 (HL) (the ‘prudent businessman’).
Bartlett v. Barclays Bank Trust Co Ltd. [1980] Ch 515
*Cowan v. Scargill [1985] 2 Ch. 270, 289, per Megarry V-C:

’take such care as an ordinary prudent man would take if he were minded to make an investment for the benefit of other people for whom he feels morally bound to provide. This duty includes the duty to seek advice on matters which the trustee does not understand, such as the making of investments, and, on receiving that advice, to act with the same degree of prudence. Although a trustee who takes advice on investments is not bound to accept and act on that advice, he is not entitled to reject it merely because he sincerely disagrees with it, unless in addition he is acting as an ordinary prudent man would act.’

6) FSA Conduct of Business Sourcebook

Reading: Hudson, section 8.4
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (“MiFID”)
The principal requirements of COBS
- Seller must classify the level of expertise of the client
- Seller must act in the best interests of the client
- Seller must obtain best execution
- All communications must be clear, fair and not misleading
Exclusion of liability clauses prohibited (COBS, 2.12R.)

(D) Setting aside trustees’ decisions due to irrelevant considerations, or mistake.

Reading: Hudson, section 8.3.13

1) The basis of the principle in Hastings-Bass

(i) The leading case


(ii) The original, negative form of the principle

**Re Hastings-Bass [1975] Ch 25, 40, per Buckley LJ
‘… a trustee is given a discretion as to some matter under which he acts in good faith, the court should not interfere with his action notwithstanding that it does not have the full effect which he intended, unless (1) what he had achieved is unauthorised by the power conferred upon him, or (2) it is clear that he would not have acted as he did (a) had he not taken into account considerations which he should not have taken into account, or (b) had he not failed to take into account considerations which he ought to have taken into account.’

(iii) The positive form of the principle

*Mettoy Pensions Trustees v Evans [1990] 1 WLR 1587, 1624, per Warner J
‘If, as I believe, the reason for the application of the principle is the failure by the trustees to take into account considerations which they ought to have taken into account, it cannot matter whether that failure is due to their having overlooked (or to their legal advisers having overlooked) some relevant rule of law or limit on their discretion, or is due to some other cause. … [I]t is not enough that it should be shown that the trustees did not have a proper understanding of the effect of their act. It must also be clear that, had they had a proper understanding of it, they would not have acted as they did.

*Burrell v Burrell [2005] EWHC 245, [15], per Mann J

(iv) The requirement for a breach of trust

*Abacus Trust Company (Isle of Man) v Barr [2003] 2 WLR 1362, [23] per Lightman J
‘In my view it is not sufficient to bring the rule into play that the trustee made a mistake or by reason of ignorance or a mistake did not take into account a relevant consideration or took into account an irrelevant consideration. What has to be established is that the trustee in making his decision has … failed to consider what he was under a duty to consider. If the trustee has, in accordance with his duty, identified the relevant considerations and used all proper care and diligence in obtaining the relevant information and advice relating to those considerations, the trustee can be in no breach of duty and its decision cannot be impugned merely because in fact that information turns out to be partial or incorrect. … [T]he
rule does not afford the right to the trustee or any beneficiary to have a
decision declared invalid because a trustee’s decision was in some way
mistaken or has unforeseen and unpalatable consequences.’

Burrell v Burrell [2005] EWHC 245, [22], per Mann J (the principle could be invoked in
either case because there had been a breach of duty.)

Gallacher v Gallacher [2004] EWHC 42, [2005] All ER (D) 177, [162] et seq., per
Etherton J (point raised but not disposed of because not necessary on the facts.)

Sief v Fox [2005] EWHC 1312 (Ch), [2005] 1 WLR 3811

Betafence v Veys [2006] EWHC 999 (Ch), [2006] All ER (D) 91.

(v) The Abacus v Barr version of the test

a) That there might have been a different decision reached

*Abacus Trust Co (Isle of Man) v Barr [2003] 2 WLR 1362, 1369, per Lightman J

[This principle] does not require that the relevant consideration
unconsidered by the trustee should make a fundamental difference
between the facts as perceived by the trustee and the facts as they should
have been perceived and actually were. All that is required in this regard is
that the unconsidered relevant consideration would or might have affected
the trustee’s decision, and in a case such as the present that the trustee
would or might have made a different appointment or no appointment at
all.

Lightman J suggested four pre-requisites

1) whether or not the trustee’s actions were sufficiently fundamental;
2) whether the trustee had failed to consider something which she was duty-bound to
consider and failed to act with sufficient diligence in identifying that necessary information;
3) whether the trustee was at fault for failing to give effect to the settlor’s objectives; and
4) whether the exercise of the power was void or voidable.

b) Does this test set the barrier too low?

E Nugee [2003] PCB 173
B Green (2003) Trust Law Int 114
Thomas and Hudson, The Law of Trusts, 2010, 385 et seq

c) Is the test based on whether the trustees “would have” or whether they “might
have” reached a different decision if they had proceeded properly?

Re Hastings-Bass [1975] Ch 25 (would have)
Stannard v Fisons Pension Trust Ltd [1991] PLR 224 (might have)

Hearn v Younger [2002] WTLR 1317, 1338, [86], per Etherton J ((a) trustees have
failed to take into account a material consideration and (b) that consideration might have materially
affected their decision)

Hunter v Senate Support Services Ltd [2004] EWHC 1085: (might have is objective,
whereas would have is subjective).

(v) The leading case at present: re-interpreting Hastings-Bass

All E.R. 450, Lloyd LJ:-

“127. The cases which I am now considering concern acts which are
within the powers of the trustees but are said to be vitiated by the failure of
the trustees to take into account a relevant factor to which they should have
had regard - usually tax consequences - or by their taking into account
some irrelevant matter. It seems to me that the principled and correct
approach to these cases is, first, that the trustees’ act is not void, but that it
may be voidable. It will be voidable if, and only if, it can be shown to have
been done in breach of fiduciary duty on the part of the trustees. If it is
voidable, then it may be capable of being set aside at the suit of a beneficiary, but this would be subject to equitable defences and to the court's discretion. The trustees' duty to take relevant matters into account is a fiduciary duty, so an act done as a result of a breach of that duty is voidable. Fiscal considerations will often be among the relevant matters which ought to be taken into account. However, if the trustees seek advice (in general or in specific terms) from apparently competent advisers as to the implications of the course they are considering taking, and follow the advice so obtained, then, in the absence of any other basis for a challenge, I would hold that the trustees are not in breach of their fiduciary duty for failure to have regard to relevant matters if the failure occurs because it turns out that the advice given to them was materially wrong. Accordingly, in such a case I would not regard the trustees' act, done in reliance on that advice, as being vitiated by the error and therefore voidable."

Donaldson v Smith [2007] WTLR 421 (limiting Hastings-Bass to cases involving discretionary trust)

(vi) **Examples of considerations taken into account or not taken into account**

**Stannard v Fisons Pension Trust Ltd** [1991] PLR 224 (failure to take an up-to-date valuation of assets held in a pension fund before transferring assets between funds)

**Green v Cobham** [2002] STC 820 (failing to take into account the fiscal consequences of a decision & considerations in relation to a single beneficiary may differ from the considerations applicable in relation to a power over a large class of potential beneficiaries)

**Burrell v Burrell** [2005] EWHC 245 (failing to take into account the fiscal consequences of a decision: inheritance tax)

**Abacus Trust Company (Isle of Man) v Barr** [2003] 2 WLR 1362 (failing to take the settlor's wishes into account correctly)

**Smithson v Hamilton** [2008] 1 All ER 1216, Park J (pension scheme rule fails to take account of actuarial calculations)

2) **The remedy: set aside of the trustees' decision**

(i) **The traditional remedy**

*Re Hastings-Bass* [1975] Ch 25

**Scott v National Trust** [1998] 2 All ER 705

**Edge v Pensions Ombudsman** [2000] Ch 602.

(ii) **Exercisable of the power voidable but not void**

**AMP v Barker** [2001] PLR 77, per Lawrence Collins J

**Hearn v Younger** [2002] WTLR 1317, 1338, [90], per Etherton J

**Abacus Trust Company (Isle of Man) v Barr** [2003] 2 WLR 1362, [28]-[33], per Lightman J

**Hunter v Senate Support Services Ltd** [2004] EWHC 1085.

(iii) **Validation if effect of exercise of power substantively similar**

**Re Vestey's Settlement** [1951] Ch 209, 221, per Lord Evershed MR

(iv) **Alternative understanding as an excessive exercise of a power**


**Bestrustees v Stuart** [2001] PLR 283 (prospective alterations only permitted, alteration in fact purportedly retrospective too: invalid only to the extent that it is excessive)

**Mettoy Pension Trustees Ltd v Evans** [1990] 1 WLR 1587 (considered)
3) Mistake by the trustee capable of being set aside


**Pitt v Holt, Futter v Futter [2011] EWCA Civ 197, Lloyd LJ:

210. … for the equitable jurisdiction to set aside a voluntary disposition for mistake to be invoked, there must be a mistake on the part of the donor either as to the legal effect of the disposition or as to an existing fact which is basic to the transaction. … The fact that the transaction gives rise to unforeseen fiscal liabilities is a consequence, not an effect, for this purpose, and is not sufficient to bring the jurisdiction into play.

(E) Trustee’s duty to provide information and to account to the beneficiaries.

Reading: *Hudson*, section 8.4; *Martin* 592–596; *Pettit* 402–405

1) No general obligation for the trustees to give full information to anyone who considers themselves entitled to an equitable interest under the trust

**O’Rourke v Derbyshire [1920] AC 581 – right to information only if proprietary right

**Re Londonderry [1965] Ch 918, [1964] 3 All ER 855, 860, per Harman LJ (no obligation to give reasons for decisions nor to disclose confidential information)

‘I would hold that, even if documents of this type ought properly to be described as trust documents, they are protected for the special reason which protects the trustees’ deliberations on a discretionary matter from disclosure. If necessary, I hold that this principle overrides the ordinary rule. This is in my judgment no less in the true interest of the beneficiary than of the trustees. Again, if one of the trustees commits to paper his suggestions and circulates them among his co-trustees, or if inquiries are made in writing as to the circumstances of a member of the class, I decline to hold that such documents are trust documents the property of the beneficiaries. In my opinion such documents are not trust documents in the proper sense at all. On the other hand, if the solicitor advising the trustees commits to paper an aide-memoire summarising the state of the fund or of the family and reminding the trustees of past distributions and future possibilities, I think that must be a document which any beneficiary must be at liberty to inspect. … I cannot think that communications passing between individual trustees and appointors are documents in which beneficiaries have a proprietary right.’

*Hawkesley v May [1956] 1 QB 304 – duty only to inform sui juris beneficiaries of the existence of the trust

*Tito v Waddell (No 2) [1977] Ch 106, 242 – no duty to explain terms of trust to beneficiaries

2) The traditional English view: information only for those with proprietary rights

**O’Rourke v Derbyshire [1920] AC 581, 626, per Lord Wrenbury

[A beneficiary] is entitled to see all the trust documents because they are trust documents and because he is a beneficiary. They are in a sense his own. Action or no action, he is entitled to access to them. This has nothing to do with discovery. The right to discovery is a right to see someone else’s document. A proprietary right is a right to access to documents which are your own. … A beneficiary has a right of access to the documents which he desires to inspect upon what has been called in the judgments in this case a proprietary right. The beneficiary is entitled to see all trust documents, because they are trust documents, and because he is a beneficiary. They are, in this sense, his own.
3) The new approach

**Schmidt v Rosewood Trust Ltd [2003] 2 WLR 1442, 1463, per Lord Walker:**
‘... no beneficiary ... has any entitlement as of right to disclosure of anything which can plausibly be described as a trust document. Especially when there are issues as to personal or commercial confidentiality, the court may have to balance the competing interests of different beneficiaries, the trustees themselves, and third parties. Disclosure may have to be limited and safeguards may have to be put in place.’

4) Traditional applications of the new approach

Crowe v Stevedoring Employees Retirement Fund [2003] PLR 343
Foreman v Kingstone [2004] 1 NZLR 841

5) Problems with the Schmidt and Londonderry approaches

*Breakspear v Ackland [2008] 3 WLR 698, Briggs J

6) No obligation to give reasons for decision

Re Londonderry [1965] Ch 918 (*management information to be given, exercise of discretion not)*
Re Beloved Wilkes Charity (1851) 3 Mac & G 440
Klug v Klug [1918] 2 Ch 67
Wilson v Law Debenture Trust Corpn plc [1995] 2 All ER 337, per Rattee J

7) Confidential information

Re Londonderry [1965] Ch 918
(Lemos v Coutts & Co (1992) Cayman Islands ILR 460)
**Schmidt v Rosewood Trust Ltd [2003] 2 WLR 1442**
**Breakspear v Ackland [2008] 3 WLR 698**

8) Duty to render accounts; falsification and surcharge of accounts

*Hudson, para 8.4.8*

*Ultraframe (UK) Ltd v Fielding, [2005] EWHC 1638 (Ch), para [1513] per Lewison J:*

‘The taking of an account is the means by which a beneficiary requires a trustee to justify his stewardship of trust property. The trustee must show what he has done with that property. If the beneficiary is dissatisfied with the way that a trustee has dealt with trust assets, he may surcharge or falsify the account. He surcharges the account when he alleges that the trustee has not obtained for the benefit of the trust all that he might have done, if he had exercised due care and diligence. If the allegation is proved, then the account is taken as if the trustee had received, for the benefit of the trust, what he would have received if he had exercised due care and diligence. The beneficiary falsifies the account when he alleges that the trustee has applied trust property in a way that he should not have done (e.g. by making an unauthorised investment). If the allegation is proved, then the account will be taken as if the expenditure had not been made; and as if the unauthorised investment had not formed part of the assets of the trust. Of course, if the unauthorised investment has appreciated in value, the beneficiary may choose not to falsify the account: in which case the asset will remain a trust asset and the expenditure on it will be allowed in taking the account.’
(F) Judicial control of trustees’ actions.

Reading: *Hudson*, section 8.6.2

*Re Beloved Wilkes’s Charity* (1851) 3 Mac & G 440, 448, per Lord Truro:
‘… the duty of supervision on the part of the Court will thus be confined to
the question of the honesty, integrity, and fairness with which the
deliberation has been conducted, and will not be extended to the accuracy
of the conclusion arrived at, except in particular cases.’

II. **Breach of Trust**

General Reading: *Hudson*, Ch.18; *Martin* Ch.23; *Pettit* Ch.23

(A) The basis of liability for breach of trust.

Reading: *Hudson*, section 18.2

1) The old cases

*Re Massingberd’s Settlement* (1890) 63 LT 296
*Re Dawson* [1966] 2 NSWR 211, NSW SC

2) The modern law

*Clough v Bond* (1838) 3 My & C 490.
**Target Holdings v. Redfers* [1996] 1 AC 421, [1995] 3 All ER 785 HL

2 arguments put forward by Target:-
(A) T is now entitled to have the ‘fund’ restored on a restitutionary basis
(B) immediately the moneys were paid way there was an *immediate* loss to trust
fund and this should be made good.

Per Lord Browne-Wilkinson in *Target Holdings*:-
‘… in my judgement it is important, if the trust is not to be rendered
commercially useless, to distinguish between the basic principles of trust
law and those specialist rules developed in relation to traditional trusts
which are applicable only to such trusts and the rationale of which has no
application to trust of quite a different kind.’

*Bristol & West Building Society v. Mothew* [1996] 4 All ER 698
*Swindle v. Harrison* [1997] 4 All ER 705, CA

3) Loss as the foundation for the claim

**Target Holdings v. Redfers* [1996] 1 AC 421
*Re Massingberd’s Settlement* (1890) 63 LT 296

4) Loss in relation to investment
5) **The Principles of Liability: liability is personal and compensatory**

*Re Lucking’s Will Trust* [1968] 1 W.L.R. 866

(a) **Measure of liability**

(i) "The measure of liability is the loss caused to the trust estate, directly or indirectly, and the onus is on the complainant to prove a causal connection between the breach and the loss" (Hanbury & Martin, 18th ed., pp. 683-684)

- *Swindle v Harrison* [1997] 4 All ER 705
- *Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew* [1998] Ch 1
- *Halbert v Avens* [2003] EWHL 76; 2003 WL 116999; (2003) 100 (12) LSG 301

(ii) Profit in one transaction, loss in another

- *Fletcher v. Green* (1864) 33 Beav. 426
- *Bartlett v. Barclays Bank* (supra)

(b) **Liability is joint and several**

(c) **Liability for acts of retired trustees**

*Head v. Gould* [1898] 2 Ch. 250

2 **Liability of trustees inter se**

*Townley v Sherborne* (1633)
*Re Lucking’s Will Trust* (supra)

(B) **Remedies for breach of trust.**

Reading: *Hudson, section 18.3*


‘Courts of Equity did not award damages but, acting in personam, ordered the defaulting trustee to restore the trust estate. If specific restitution of the trust property is not possible, the liability of the trustee is to pay sufficient compensation to the trust estate to put it back to what it would have been had the breach not been committed. Even if the immediate cause of the loss is the dishonesty or failure of a third party, the trustee is liable to make good that loss to the trust estate if, but for the breach, such loss would not have occurred. Thus the common law rules of remoteness of damage and causation do not apply. However, there does have to be some causal connection between the breach of trust and the loss to the trust estate for which compensation is recoverable, viz the fact that the loss would not have occurred but for the breach.’

There are therefore three forms of remedy here:

1. specific restitution - proprietary obligation,
2. restore the value of the trust fund, or
3. equitable compensation for losses in general.
1) **Specific Restitution**

   *Harris v Kent* [2007] EWHC 463 (Ch), Briggs J

2) **Restore the value of the trust fund**

3) **Equitable compensation**

   *Swindle v Harrison* [1997] 4 All ER 705

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(C) **Valuation of loss to the trust.**

Reading: *Hudson, section 18.3.6*


(D) **Defences to breach of trust.**

Reading: *Hudson, section 18.4*

1) **Lack of a causal link between breach and loss**

   *Target Holdings v. Redferns* [1996] 1 AC 421

2) **Breach committed by another trustee**

   *Townley v Sherborne* (1633) Bridg 35; (1633) W & TLC 577.
   *Brice v Stokes* (1805) 11 Ves Jr 319

3) **Failure by beneficiary to alleviate loss**

   *Nacional del Cobre de Chile v Sogemin Metals Ltd* [1997] 1 WLR 1396

4) **Release**

   *Lyall v Edwards* (1861) 6 H & N 337; (1861) 158 ER 139
   *BCCI v Ali* [2000] 3 All ER 51

5) **Trustee exemption clause**

   *Armitage v Nurse* [1998] Ch 241
   *Wight v Olswang* [2000] WTLR 783
   *Walker v Stones* [2001] QB 902

6) **Excuses for breach of trust**

   *Trustee Act 1925, s.61:*
   "If it appears to the court that a trustee … is or may be personally liable for any breach of trust … but has acted honestly and reasonably, and ought fairly to be excused for the breach of trust and for omitting to obtain the directions of the court in the matter in which he committed such breach, then the court may relieve him either wholly or partly from personal liability for the same."

   *Chapman v Browne* [1902] 1 Ch 785
   *Re Evans (Deceased)* [1999] 2 All ER 777

7) **Action not in connection with fiduciary duties**

   *Ward v Brunt* [2000] WTLR 731
   *Galmerrow Securities Ltd v National Westminster Bank plc* [2002] WTLR 125
8) **Concurrence by beneficiary**

*Re Pauling’s Settlement Trusts* [1962] 1 WLR 86, at 108, *per* Wilberforce J.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Summary</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>The general liabilities</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Exclusion of liability</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <em>Armitage v Nurse</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <em>Walker v Stones</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <em>Spread Trustee Ltd v Hutcheson</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Misuse of powers</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <em>Re Hastings-Bass</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <em>Pitt v Holt</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dispersal of information</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <em>O’Rourke v Derbyshire</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <em>Schmidt v Rosewood</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <em>Breakspear v Ackland</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trustee Act 2000</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Duty of care</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Standard investment criteria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Suitability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Diversification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Proper advice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Investment of Trusts</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <em>Cowan v Scargill</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <em>Nestle v NatWest</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <em>Bartlett v Barclays Bank</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Breach of trust</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <em>Target Holdings v Redfairs</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
EQUITY & TRUSTS

PART II

TRUSTS IMPLIED BY LAW AND TRACING
There are four core areas:-

- Resulting trusts
- Trusts of Homes
- Constructive trusts
- Proprietary (equitable) estoppel

The aim of these lectures is to consider the situations in which the English courts will impose trusts (or the office of trustee) in situations where the parties have not sought to create an express trust on those terms.

s.53(2) of the Law of Property Act 1925 refers to "implied resulting or constructive trusts" not requiring formalities for their creation. The most important recent statement of the core principles of trusts law was made by Lord Browne-Wilkinson in ***Westdeutsche Landesbank v. Islington***:

"THE RELEVANT PRINCIPLES OF TRUST LAW:

(i) Equity operates on the conscience of the owner of the legal interest. In the case of a trust, the conscience of the legal owner requires him to carry out the purposes for which the property was vested in him (express or implied trust) or which the law imposes on him by reason of his unconscionable conduct (constructive trust).

(ii) Since the equitable jurisdiction to enforce trusts depends upon the conscience of the holder of the legal interest being affected, he cannot be a trustee of the property if and so long as he is ignorant of the facts alleged to affect his conscience, i.e. until he is aware that he is intended to hold the property for the benefit of others in the case of an express or implied trust, or, in the case of a constructive trust, of the factors which are alleged to affect his conscience.

(iii) In order to establish a trust there must be identifiable trust property. The only apparent exception to this rule is a constructive trust imposed on a person who dishonestly assists in a breach of trust who may come under fiduciary duties even if he does not receive identifiable trust property.

(iv) Once a trust is established, as from the date of its establishment the beneficiary has, in equity, a proprietary interest in the trust property, which proprietary interest will be enforceable in equity against any subsequent holder of the property (whether the original property or substituted property into which it can be traced) other than a purchaser for value of the legal interest without notice." [1996] 2 All E.R. 961, 988.
I. RESULTING TRUSTS

General reading: *Hudson*, Ch. 11.

A. INTRODUCTION

Reading: *Hudson*, section 11.1

The term "resulting" comes from the Latin 'resalire' meaning to 'jump back'.

1) The leading case on the definition of a "resulting trust"


2) Older understanding of resulting trusts on which many cases are based

*Vandervell No. 2 [1974] Ch 269, at 294; [1974] 1 All ER 47, 64; per Megarry J. - his lordship divided resulting trusts between ‘automatic’ and ‘presumed’ resulting trusts. The introductory lecture will follow this scheme - it should be borne in mind that this lay-out is itself controversial.

There must be a transfer of the property from S to T, without an intention that T take that property beneficially. Where it appears to have been the intention of the donor that the donee should not take property beneficially, there will be a resulting trust to the donor or the donor’s estate.

Lord Browne-Wilkinson in *Westdeutsche Landesbank v. Islington:-*

‘Under existing law a resulting trust arises in two sets of circumstances:

(A) where A makes a voluntary payment to B or pays (wholly or in part) for the purchase of property which is vested either in B alone or in the joint names of A and B, there is a presumption that A did not intend to make a gift to B: the money or property is held on trust for A (if he is the sole provider of the money) or in the case of a joint purchase by A and B in shares proportionate to their contributions. It is important to stress that this is only a presumption, which presumption is easily rebutted either by the counter-presumption of advancement or by direct evidence of A’s intention to make an outright transfer.

(B) Where A transfers property to B on express trusts, but the trusts declared do not exhaust the whole beneficial interest. Both types of resulting trust are traditionally regarded as examples of trusts giving effect to the common intention of the parties. A resulting trust is not imposed by law against the intentions of the trustee (as is a constructive trust) but gives effect to his presumed intention.

Megarry J. in Re Vandervell’s Trusts (No.2) suggests that a resulting trust of type (B) does not depend on intention but operates automatically. I am not convinced that this is right. If the settlor has expressly, or by necessary implication, abandoned any beneficial interest in the trust property, there is in my view no resulting trust: the undisposed-of equitable interest vests in the Crown as bona vacantia.”
B. AUTOMATIC RESULTING TRUSTS

This category of resulting trust arises automatically by operation of law. Where some part of the equitable interest in property is unallocated by S after transferring property to T, the equitable interest automatically results back to S.

Reading: Hudson, section 11.2

1) No declaration of trust, by mistake
   **Vandervell v. IRC** [1966] Ch 261; [1967] 2 AC 291

2) Incomplete disposal of the beneficial interest
   *Re Cochrane* [1955] Ch 309

3) Failure of trust
   *Chichester Diocesan Fund v. Simpson* [1941] Ch 253
   *Re Ames’ Settlement* [1964] Ch 217

4) Surplus property after performance of trust
   *Re Trusts of the Abbott Fund* [1900] Ch 326
   *Re Gillingham Fund* [1958] Ch 300
   *Re Osoba* [1979] 2 All ER 393
   *Davis v. Richards & Wallington Ltd.* [1990] 1 WLR 1511

5) Upon dissolution of unincorporated association
   *Re West Sussex, etc. Fund Trusts* [1971] Ch 1
   *Re Sick and Funeral Society of St John’s* [1973] Ch 51
   *Re The Bucks Fund* [1979] 1 All ER 623
   *Re GKN Sports Club* [1982] 1 WLR 774

C. PRESUMED RESULTING TRUSTS

Reading: Hudson, section 11.4

Where S transfers property to T without intending T to take that property beneficially, and where there is no presumption of advancement, there arises a presumed resulting trust over that property in favour of S.

1) Purchase

*Dyer v. Dyer* (1788) 2 Cox Eq 92
*Elithorn v Poulter* [2008] EWCA Civ 1364 (need to prove intention to take equitable ownership)
*cf. Lloyds Bank v. Rosset* [1990] 1 All ER 1111, [1990] 2 WLR 867 in relation to trusts of homes, below
*Cf. Hodgson v. Marks* [1971] Ch 892; M&B 216

2) Presumption of advancement - special relationships

(a) Abolition of presumptions of advancement

Equality Act 2010, s.199: “the presumption of advancement is abolished” but that abolition applies only to “anything done” after the Act has come into effect.

Equality Act 2010, s.198 of that Act it is provided that “[t]he rule of common law that a husband must maintain his wife is abolished”.
(b) father and child

\textit{Bennet v. Bennet} (1879) 10 ChD 474
\textit{Pecore v Pecore} [2007] WTLR 1591, Supreme Court of Canada (\textit{not adult children})
\textit{Sansom v Gardner} [2009] EWHC 3369 (QB) (\textit{in loco parentis can be covered})

(c) husband and wife

\textit{Tinker v. Tinker} [1970] P 136
\textit{Pettit v. Pettit} [1970] AC 777
\textit{Re Densham} [1975] 3 All ER 726

3. Rebutting the Presumption

a. Generally

\textit{Fowkes v. Pascoe} (1875) 10 Ch App Cas 343

b. Illegality

*\textit{Gascoigne v. Gascoigne} [1918] 1 KB 223
\textit{Tinker v. Tinker} [1970] P 136
**\textit{Tinsley v. Milligan} [1993] 3 All ER 65, [1993] 3 WLR 36

c. Cases applying \textit{Tinsley} and \textit{Tribe}

\textit{Barrett v Barrett} [2008] EWHC 1061 (Ch), [2008] BPIR 817.
\textit{Q v Q} [2008] EWHC 1874 (Fam), [2009] 1 P & CR D12 (also sub nom \textit{S v R}).

d. Sham trusts and insolvency

[\textit{Re Batterworth} (1882) 19 ChD 588]

e. Insolvency Act 1986, s.423

\textbf{Section 423 Insolvency Act 1986} provides that:

`'(1) This section relates to transactions entered into at an undervalue; and
a person enters into such a transaction with another person if –
(a) he makes a gift to the other person or he otherwise enters into a
transaction with the other on terms that provide for him to receive no
consideration …
(c) he enters into a transaction with the other for a consideration the value of
which, in money or money’s worth, is significantly less than the value, in
money or money’s worth, of the consideration provided by himself…'

'(2) (a) restoring the position to what it would have been if the transaction
had not been into, and
(b) protecting the interests of the persons who are the victims of the transaction.

‘(3) (a) of putting assets beyond the reach of a person who is making, or may at some time make, a claim against him …’

_IRC v Hashmi_ [2002] BCC 943, [2002] 2 BCLC 489 _need not be the sole purpose of the transaction, but rather only one of the purposes_
II. QUISTCLOSE TRUSTS

Reading: *Hudson, Chapter 22; and summary in section 11.3*

Further reading:

**Question: what type of trust is a Quistclose trust?**

1. **The principle in *Barclays Bank v. Quistclose*: taking security against insolvency**

   *Hassall v. Smither* (1806) 12 Ves. 119.
   *Re Rogers* (1891) 8 Morr 243, 248, *per* Lindley LJ (*must be a resulting trust to prevent trustee from taking benefit from property*)


   It is not difficult to establish precisely upon what terms the money was advanced ... to Rolls Razor Ltd. There is no doubt that the loan was made specifically in order to enable Rolls Razor Ltd. to pay the dividend ... and for no other purpose. There is surely no difficulty in recognising the co-existence in one transaction of legal and equitable rights and remedies: when the money is advanced, the lender acquires an equitable right to see that it is applied for the primary designated purpose (*In re Rogers*, 8 Morr. 243, *per* both Lindley LJ and Kay LJ): when the purpose has been carried out (i.e., the debt paid) the lender has his remedy against the borrower in debt: if the primary purpose cannot be carried out, the question arises if a secondary purpose (i.e., repayment to the lender) has been agreed, expressly or by implication: if it has, the remedies of equity may be invoked to give effect to it, if it has not (and the money is intended to fall within the general fund of the debtor's assets) then there is the appropriate remedy for recovery of a loan.

   I can appreciate no reason why the flexible interplay of law and equity cannot let in these practical arrangements, and other variations if desired; it would be to the discredit of both systems if they could not. In the present case the intention to create a secondary trust for the benefit of the lender, to arise if the primary trust, to pay the dividend, could not be carried out, is clear and I can find no reason why the law should not give effect to it.

   *Templeton Insurance Ltd v Penningtons Solicitors LLP* [2006] EWHC 685 (Ch)

2. **The Twinsectra model**

   S Worthington, *Proprietary Interests in Commercial Transactions*, 43-71

   **Twinsectra Ltd v. Yardley** [2002] 2 All E.R. 377, at 398, House of Lords, *per* Lord Millett:

   [81] '... the Quistclose trust is a simple, commercial arrangement akin ... to a retention of title clause (though with a different object) which enables the borrower to have recourse to the lender's money for a particular purpose without entrenching on the lender's property rights more than necessary to enable the purpose to be achieved. The money remains the property of the lender unless and until it is applied in accordance with his directions, and in so far as it is not so applied it must be returned to him. I am disposed,
perhaps predisposed, to think that this is the only analysis which is consistent both with orthodox trust law and with commercial reality.’

[100] ‘As Sherlock Holmes reminded Dr Watson, when you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth. I would reject all the alternative analyses, which I find unconvincing for the reasons I have endeavoured to explain, and hold the Quistclose trust to be an entirely orthodox example of the kind of default trust known as a resulting trust. The lender pays the money to the borrower by way of loan, but he does not part with the entire beneficial interest in the money, and in so far as he does not it is held on a resulting trust for the lender from the outset. Contrary to the opinion of the Court of Appeal, it is the borrower who has a very limited use of the money, being obliged to apply it for the stated purpose or return it. He has no beneficial interest in the money, which remains throughout in the lender subject only to the borrower’s power or duty to apply the money in accordance with the lender’s instructions. When the purpose fails, the money is returnable to the lender, not under some new trust in his favour which only comes into being on the failure of the purpose, but because the resulting trust in his favour is no longer subject to any power on the part of the borrower to make use of the money. Whether the borrower is obliged to apply the money for the stated purpose or merely at liberty to do so, and whether the lender can countermand the borrower’s mandate while it is still capable of being carried out, must depend on the circumstances of the particular case.’

Re Margaretta Ltd [2005] All ER (D) 262, per Deputy Judge Crystal QC (following the above)
Cf. Chambers, Resulting Trusts, 68-91

3.) Illustrations of the Quistclose principle

Templeton Insurance Ltd v Penningtons Solicitors LLP [2006] EWHC 685 (Ch)
Du Preez Ltd v Kaupthing Singer & Friedlander (Isle of Man) Ltd [2011] WTLR 559, (2010) 12 ITELR 943 (no proof of common intention that there would be a Quistclose arrangement when money passed through insolvent bank to third party)
Global Marine Drillships Ltd v Landmark Solicitors LLP [2011] EWHC 2685, Henderson J (money paid under a solicitor’s undertaking for a given purpose = Quistclose trust)
Mundy v Brown [2011] EWHC 377 (Ch)

4.) Different understandings of a Quistclose trust

a. Analysed as a resulting trust ...

Twinsectra Ltd v. Yardley [2002] 2 All E.R. 377 (considered below)

b. … or an express trust with two limbs, or a mere power to use the money? …

Re Elizabethan Theatre Trust (1991) 102 ALR 681, Gummow J
Cf. Templeton Insurance Ltd v Penningtons Solicitors LLP [2006] EWHC 685 (Ch)

c. … or a non-charitable purpose trust (express trust) with beneficial interest in suspension? …

*Carreras Rothmans v. Freeman Mathews Treasure Ltd [1985] 1 Ch 207
Re Northern Development Holdings Ltd (unreported, 6 October 1978, Megarry V-C)

d. … or even a constructive trust dealing with unconscionable breach of loan contract?

*Carreras Rothmans v. Freeman Mathews Treasure Ltd [1985] 1 Ch 207
Cf. Westdeutsche Landesbank [1996] 1 AC 669
4. Other issues

a. Can the intended recipient of the loan money sue?
   Re Northern Development Holdings Ltd (unreported, 6 October 1978, Megarry V-C)

b. What are the terms of the contract in a banking law context?

c. What would be the most sensible commercial method?
   - Vagueness of resulting trust biting only once the money has been misapplied, or
   - Vagueness of constructive trust biting only once the money has been misapplied, or
   - “Retention” (/ creation?) only of equitable interest in the money, or
   - Exactness of express trust in a trust instrument, or
   - Lender retains absolute title in the money and lender pays the money to the intended recipient?

d. Can this technique apply beyond loan contracts?
   Re Farepak Food and Gifts Ltd [2006] All ER (D) 265 (Dec).
   Annabel’s (Berkley Square) Ltd v Revenue and Customers Commissioners [2009] 4 All ER 55, at [31].

e. Useful as a means of commencing an equitable tracing claim.
   See “equitable tracing” later in the course.

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**Summary**

**Resulting trusts**

**The general principle**
- Westdeutsche Landesbank v Islington
- Re Vandervell No.2, Megarry J
- Vandervell v IRC – automatic resulting trusts
- Dyer v Dyer – purchase price resulting trusts

**Illegality**
- Tinsley v Milligan
- Tribe v Tribe
- Midland Bank v Wyatt
- s.423 Insolvency Act 1986

**Quistclose trusts**
- Barclays Bank v Quistclose
- Twinsectra v Yardley (the speech of Lord Millett on Quistclose trusts only)
- Templeton Insurance Ltd v Penningtons Solicitors LLP
- Re Farepak Food and Gifts Ltd (on Quistclose trusts only)
Topic 7. CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS

General Reading: Hudson, Ch.12 & 20; Martin Ch.12; Pettit Ch.8, 10

Constructive trusts are imposed by operation of law: that is to say, their imposition is not entirely at the discretion of the court, nor are they imposed as a remedy in certain situations. This is the attitude taken by all of the books and by the courts themselves. However, there are a number of objections to this categorisation and some dispute as to which interests fall within the category ‘constructive trust’. Some of the categories included below are a little controversial in that sense.

See generally Oakley ‘Constructive Trusts’ (Sweet & Maxwell, 1997). Note, Oakley disagrees on many points with the restitution lawyers like Birks. For a briefer account, see Parker and Mellows' Modern Law of Trusts Chap. 8, written by Oakley.

A. PROPRIETARY CLAIMS

1) The general principle: constructive trusts at large

Reading: Hudson, sections 12.2

The English model ‘institutional constructive trust’ will protect existing rights in proprietary by means of imposition of a trust. By definition, these are rights which would not be protected by common law remedies.

Bank of Ireland v Pexxnet Ltd [2010] EWHC 1872 (forged instruments used to acquire money from bank)

2) Fiduciary making unauthorised profits (“secret profits”), and conflicts of interest

Reading: Hudson, sections 12.5

(a) The basis of liability: avoidance of conflicts of interest

*Keech v. Sandford (1726) 2 Eq Cas Abr 741, per Lord King LC:
“This may seem hard, that the trustee is the only person of all mankind who might not have [the trust property]; but it is very proper that rule should be strictly pursued, and not in the least relaxed; for it is very obvious what would be the consequence of letting trustees have the lease …”

*Bray v Ford [1896] AC 44, [1895-99] All ER Rep 1009, 1011, per Lord Herschell:
“It is an inflexible rule of the court of equity that a person in a fiduciary position … is not, unless otherwise expressly provided [in the terms of the that person’s fiduciary duties], entitled to make a profit; he is not allowed to put himself in a position where his interest and duty conflict. It does not appear to me that this rule is, as had been said, founded upon principles of morality. I regard it rather as based on the consideration that, human nature being what it is, there is danger, in such circumstances, of the person holding a fiduciary position being swayed by interest rather than by duty, and thus prejudicing those whom he was bound to protect. It has, therefore, been deemed expedient to law down this positive rule.”


(b) The leading case

**Boardman v. Phipps [1967] 2 AC 46
(c) The nature of the constructive trust

*Sinclair Investment Holdings SA v Versailles Trade Finance Ltd (No 3) [2007] EWHC 915, 10 ITELR 58 per Rimer J:

"... any identifiable assets acquired by fiduciaries in breach of their fiduciary duty are, and can be declared to be, held upon constructive trust for the principal (Boardman v Phipps, AG Hong Kong v Reid, Daraydan Holdings Ltd v Solland) ... There will in practice often be no identifiable property which can be declared by the court to be held upon such a constructive trust, in which case no declaration will be made and the principal may at most be entitled to a personal remedy in the nature of an account of profits. In Boardman's case the court made a declaration that the shares that had been acquired by the fiduciaries were held on constructive trust (a proprietary remedy), and directed an account of the profits that had come into their hands from those shares (a personal remedy). Boardman's case can be said to have been a hard case as regards the fiduciaries, whose integrity and honesty was not in doubt; and it well illustrates the rigours of the applicable equitable principle. The recovery by the trust of the shares was obviously a valuable benefit to it; and equity's softer side was reflected in the making of an allowance to the fiduciaries for their work and skill in obtaining the shares and profits. On the very different facts of Reid's case, there was no question of any such allowance being made."

Markel International Insurance Co Ltd v Surety Guarantee Consultants Ltd [2008] EWHC 1135 (Comm)

(d) The defence of authorisation and the issue as to who may authorise secret profits

**Regal v Gulliver [1942] 1 All ER 378 (directors may not authorise other directors)
*Queensland Mines v. Hudson (1978) 18 ALR 1; (1979) 42 MLR 771
*Industrial Development Consultants v Cooley [1972] 2 All ER 162
Equiticorp Industries Group Ltd v The Crown [1998] 2 NZLR 485 (only shareholders may authorise)

Q: All of these cases relate to companies, only Boardman v Phipps does not: so, in what way does authorisation fall to be obtained in relation to trusts as opposed to corporate situations as in the corporate opportunity doctrine considered next?

(e) Equitable compensation for a defendant acting in good faith

Boardman v. Phipps [1967] 2 AC 46
Guinness v. Saunders [1988] 2 All ER 940

3) The corporate opportunity doctrine

(a) Authorisation predicated on appropriate disclosure

Regal v Gulliver [1942] 1 All ER 378 (directors may not authorise other directors)
*Queensland Mines v. Hudson (1978) 18 ALR 1; (1979) 42 MLR 771
**Companies Act 2006, s.175

(b) Cases in which there was no maturing business opportunity

Island Export Finance Ltd v Umanna [1986] BCC 460
Balston v Headline Filters Ltd [1990] FSR 385
In Plus Group Ltd v Pyke [2002] 2 BCLC 201
Ultraframe v Fielding [2005] EWHC 1638 (Ch)
(c) Cases in which there is an opportunity and insufficient disclosure is made

*Industrial Development Consultants v Cooley [1972] 2 All ER 162
Crown Dilmun v Sutton [2004] 1 BCLC 468

(d) Recent company law cases preferring a relaxation of the doctrine

*In Plus Group Ltd v Pyke [2002] 2 BCLC 201
Murad v Al-Saraj [2005] EWCA Civ 959 per Arden LJ
*Foster v Bryant [2007] Bus LR 1565 per Rix LJ

(e) A return to traditional approach

Re Allied Business and Financial Consultants Ltd [2009] 2 BCLC 666
*Berryland Books Ltd v BK Books Ltd [2009] 2 BCLC 709
PNC Telecom plc v Thomas (No2) [2008] 2 BCLC 95

(f) Companies Act 2006, s.175.

*s.170 Scope and nature of general duties

(1) The general duties specified in sections 171 to 177 are owed by a director of a company to the company.

(2) A person who ceases to be a director continues to be subject–

(a) to the duty in section 175 (duty to avoid conflicts of interest) as regards the exploitation of any property, information or opportunity of which he became aware at a time when he was a director, and

(b) to the duty in section 176 (duty not to accept benefits from third parties) as regards things done or omitted by him before he ceased to be a director.

To that extent those duties apply to a former director as to a director, subject to any necessary adaptations.

(3) The general duties are based on certain common law rules and equitable principles as they apply in relation to directors and have effect in place of those rules and principles as regards the duties owed to a company by a director.

(4) The general duties shall be interpreted and applied in the same way as common law rules or equitable principles, and regard shall be had to the corresponding common law rules and equitable principles in interpreting and applying the general duties.

**s.175 Duty to avoid conflicts of interest

(1) A director of a company must avoid a situation in which he has, or can have, a direct or indirect interest that conflicts, or possibly may conflict, with the interests of the company.

(2) This applies in particular to the exploitation of any property, information or opportunity (and it is immaterial whether the company could take advantage of the property, information or opportunity).

(3) This duty does not apply to a conflict of interest arising in relation to a transaction or arrangement with the company.

(4) This duty is not infringed–

(a) if the situation cannot reasonably be regarded as likely to give rise to a conflict of interest; or

(b) if the matter has been authorised by the directors.

(5) Authorisation may be given by the directors–

(a) where the company is a private company and nothing in the company’s constitution invalidates such authorisation, by the matter being proposed to and authorised by the directors; or
(b) where the company is a public company and its constitution includes provision
enabling the directors to authorise the matter, by the matter being proposed to and
authorised by them in accordance with the constitution.

(6) The authorisation is effective only if—

(a) any requirement as to the quorum at the meeting at which the matter is considered is
met without counting the director in question or any other interested director, and

(b) the matter was agreed to without their voting or would have been agreed to if their
votes had not been counted.

(7) Any reference in this section to a conflict of interest includes a conflict of interest and duty
and a conflict of duties.

(g) Agents

Imageview Management Ltd v Jack [2009] Bus LR 1034

4) Profits from bribes

Reading: *Hudson, para 12.4.1*

(a) The leading case: constructive trust over property acquired with the bribes; plus personal
liability if value of property falls

**Att-Gen for Hong Kong v. Reid** [1994] 1 All ER 1, 4-5; [1994] AC 324, 330; [1993] 3
WLR, per Lord Templeman:-

“A bribe is a gift accepted by a fiduciary as an inducement to him to betray his trust.
A secret benefit, which may or may not constitute a bribe is a benefit which the
fiduciary derives from trust property or obtains from knowledge which he acquires in
the course of acting as a fiduciary. A fiduciary is not always accountable for a secret
benefit but he is undoubtedly accountable for a secret benefit which consists of a
bribe. In addition a person who provides the bribe and the fiduciary who accepts the
bribe may each be guilty of a criminal offence. In the present case the first
respondent was clearly guilty of a criminal offence. Bribery is an evil practice which
threatens the foundations of any civilised society. In particular bribery of policemen
and prosecutors brings the administration of justice into disrepute. Where bribes are
accepted by a trustees, servant, agent or other fiduciary, loss and damage are
caused to the beneficiaries, master or principal whose interests have been betrayed.
The amount of loss or damage resulting from the acceptance of a bribe may or may
not be quantifiable. In the present case the amount of harm caused to the
administration of justice in Hong Kong by the first respondent in return for bribes
cannot be quantified.”

(b) Who will be a fiduciary in these circumstances?

*Reading v Att-Gen* [1951] 1 All ER 617 (*Army officer*)
*Brinks v Abu-Saleh (No 3)* [1996] CLC 133 (*security guard*)
*Petrotrade Inc v Smith* [2000] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 486 (*no fiduciary office, no constructive trust*)

(c) Applications of the *Reid* principle

*Mercedes Benz AG v Leiduck* [1996] AC 284, 300 (*in relation to interim relief*)
*Ocular Sciences Ltd v Aspect Vision Care Ltd* [1997] RPC 289
*Fyffes Group Ltd v Templeman* [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 643 (*where this case was obiter*)
*Dubai Aluminium Company Ltd v Alawi* [2002] EWHC 2051
*Tesco Stores v Pook* [2003] EWHC 823
**Daraydan Holdings Ltd v Sollund International** [2004] EWHC 622, [2004] 3 WLR 1106,
[2005] Ch 1
*Hurstanger Ltd v Wilson* [2007] EWCA Civ 299, [2007] 1 WLR 2351
Yugraneft v Abramovich [2008] EWHC 2613 (Comm), [2008] All ER (Comm) 299, para [373], per Clarke J: liability is “as a fiduciary unconscionable for him to retain the benefit of it”

(d) Alternative approaches not following Reid

nb: Lister v Stubbs (1890) 45 ChD 1 [now over-ruled by Reid]
Halloxi Building Society v Thomas [1996] Ch 217, 229 (applying Lister v Stubbs)
A-G v Blake [1997] Ch 84, 96, per Sir Richard Scott V-C

**Sinclair Investments (UK) Ltd v Versailles Trade Finance Group plc [2011] EWCA Civ 347, Lord Clarke MR:-

“… it seems to me that there is a real case for saying that the decision in Reid … is unsound. In cases where a fiduciary takes for himself an asset which, if he chose to take, he was under a duty to take for the beneficiary, it is easy to see why the asset should be treated as the property of the beneficiary. However, a bribe paid to a fiduciary could not possibly be said to be an asset which the fiduciary was under a duty to take for the beneficiary. There can thus be said to be a fundamental distinction between (i) a fiduciary enriching himself by depriving a claimant of an asset and (ii) a fiduciary enriching himself by doing a wrong to the claimant. Having said that, I can see a real policy reason in its favour (if equitable accounting is not available), but the fact that it may not accord with principle is obviously a good reason for not following it in preference to decisions of this court”.

Cadogan Petroleum plc v Tolly [2011] EWHC 2286, Newey J
Horn v Commercial Acceptances Ltd [2011] EWHC 1757 (Ch), Smith J

(e) Avoidance of liability by directors under Companies Act, s.176

**s.176 Duty not to accept benefits from third parties

(1) A director of a company must not accept a benefit from a third party conferred by reason of–

(a) his being a director, or

(b) his doing (or not doing) anything as director.

(2) A “third party” means a person other than the company, an associated body corporate or a person acting on behalf of the company or an associated body corporate.

(3) Benefits received by a director from a person by whom his services (as a director or otherwise) are provided to the company are not regarded as conferred by a third party.

(4) This duty is not infringed if the acceptance of the benefit cannot reasonably be regarded as likely to give rise to a conflict of interest.

(5) Any reference in this section to a conflict of interest includes a conflict of interest and duty and a conflict of duties.

5) Agreements to develop property, constructive trust and equitable estoppel

Reading: Hudson, sections 12.3.2 and 13.3

Pallant v Morgan [1953] Ch 43
Holiday Inns v Broadhead (1974) 232 EG 951
*Banner Homes Group plc v Luff Development Ltd [2000] Ch 372
Thames Cruises v George Wheeler Launches [2003] EWHC 3093 (Ch)
Kilcarne Holdings v Targetfellow (Birmingham) Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 1355
Button v Phelps [2006] EWHC 53 (Ch)
**Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row [2008] 1 WLR 1752
*Thorner v Major [2009] 1 WLR 776
6) Profits from theft

Reading: *Hudson*, para 12.4.3

*Attorney-General’s Ref (No 1 of 1985)* [1986] QB 491; Theft Act 1968, s.5(3)

*Westdeutsche Landesbank v Islington* [1996] 1 AC 669
*Cf. Att-Gen for Hong Kong v Reid* [1994] 1 All ER 1

*Box, Brown & Jacobs v Barclays Bank* [1998] Lloyd’s Rep Bank 185, 200, *per* Ferris J (*thief does not ordinarily acquire property rights*)

*Shalson v Russo* [2003] EWHC 1637, [110], *per* Rimer J (*ditto*)
*Cf. Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, s.6 (Assets Recovery Agency)*

7) Profits from killing

Reading: *Hudson*, para 12.4.2

*In the Estate of Crippen* [1911] P 108

8) Contract for the sale of property

Reading: *Hudson*, para 12.6.2

*Lysaght v Edwards* (1876) 2 Ch D 499 (*contract for sale of land*)
*Lloyds Bank v Carrick* [1996] 4 All ER 630 (*assumption of constructive trust*)
*Neville v Wilson* [1997] Ch 144 (*ditto, personality*)
*Shaw v Foster* (1872) LR 5 HL 321 (*any fiduciary obligations are limited; trustee may protect own position*)
*Chang v Registrar of Titles* (1976) 137 CLR 177 (*doubts Lysaght because purchase may not be completed but constructive trust may nevertheless seem to bite*)
*Cf. Jerome v Kelly* [2004] 2 All ER 835, [2004] UKHL 25 (*may be merely a trustee sub modo*)

9) Statute may not be used as an engine of fraud

Reading: *Hudson*, para 12.3.4

*Rochefoucauld v Boustead* [1897] 1 Ch 196
*Paragon Finance plc v. Thakerar & Co* [1999] 1 All E.R. 400 (*the equity in Rochefoucauld is a constructive trust*)

10) Is the doctrine of constructive trust coherent?

Consider the various competing forms of constructive trust we have encountered:

- *Westdeutsche Landesbank v Islington* – based on conscience
- *Att-Gen Hong Kong v Reid* – based on (i) equity looks upon as done that which ought to have been done (ii) the evil practice of accepting bribes and (iii) may lead to a personal liability over and above the proprietary liability
- *Boardman v Phipps* – avoidance of conflicts of interest
- *Lloyds Bank v Rosset* – common intention by agreement or by understanding
- *Neville v Wilson / Jerome v Kelly* – contract transfers equitable interest by constructive trust although nature of obligations take effect sub modo
- *Rochefoucauld v Boustead* – based on avoidance of fraud
- *Royal Brunei Airlines v Tan* – a personal liability to account (see next section)
- *Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row* – remedial constructive trust?

Given that these forms of constructive trust arise on different bases, is the doctrine coherent? If not, does it matter?
Summary

The general principle
- Westdeutsche Landesbank v Islington

Unauthorised profits
- Boardman v Phipps
- Regal v Gulliver
- Queensland Mines v Hudson
- Foster v Bryant
- Berryland Books v BK Books
- Sinclair Investments v Versailles Trading (No3)
- Companies Act 2006, s.175

Is the defendant a fiduciary?
Is there the possibility of a conflict of interest + a profit = constructive trust
Did the defendant receive authorisation?
Was there a right to equitable accounting?

Bribes
- Attorney-General HK v Reid
- Tesco Stores v Pook
- Daraydan v Solland
- Sinclair Investments v Versailles Trading (2011)
- Companies Act 2006, s.176

Killing
- Re Crippen

Contracts for property development
- Pallant v Morgan
- Banner Homes Group plc v Luff Development Ltd
- Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row
- Thorner v Major
Topic 8. TRUSTS OF HOMES

General Reading: Hudson, Ch.15 (&13); Martin Ch.11; Pettit 190–215

The area of trusts of land, specifically in relation to family homes, is particularly vexed. The following lectures will consider the manner in which Equity allocates rights in the home and will also consider the theoretical bases on which that allocation takes place. Any categorisation of the possible claims in this area will be controversial - the lay-out is therefore one possible way of categorising this subject.

A. THE POSITION UNDER ENGLISH LAW

Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996
s.37 Matrimonial Property and Proceedings Act 1970

1. Express trust of land
   Reading: Hudson, section 15.2

2. The decision in Jones v Kernott
   Reading: Hudson, section 15.1.4

(a) The prologue in Stack v Dowden

**Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17, [2007] 2 WLR 831**
Baroness Hale held, para [60]:

[60] ‘There is no need for me to rehearse all the developments in the case law since Pettitt v Pettitt and Gissing v Gissing [all of that is done in these Lecture Materials below], discussed over more than 70 pages following the quoted passage, by Chadwick LJ in Oxley v Hiscock, and most importantly by my noble and learned friend, Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe in his opinion, which make good that proposition. The law has indeed moved on in response to changing social and economic conditions. The search is to ascertain the parties’ shared intentions, actual, inferred or imputed, with respect to the property in the light of their whole course of conduct in relation to it.’

In expressing the idea that the court is concerned with identifying the parties’ common intention, Baroness Hale held the following, para [61]:

[61] ‘Oxley v Hiscock [2004] EWCA Civ 546, [2005] Fam 211 was, of course, a different case from this. The property had been conveyed into the sole name of one of the cohabitants [whereas in Stack v Dowden the property had been conveyed into joint names]. The Claimant had first to surmount the hurdle of showing that she had any beneficial interest at all, before showing exactly what that interest was. The first could readily be inferred from the fact that each party had made some kind of financial contribution towards the purchase. As to the second, Chadwick LJ said this, at para 69:

"... in many such cases, the answer will be provided by evidence of what they said and did at the time of the acquisition. But, in a case where there is no evidence of any discussion between them as to the amount of the share which each was to have - and even in a case where the evidence is that there was no discussion on that point - the question still requires an answer. It must now be accepted that (at least in this court and below) the answer is that each is entitled to that share which the court considers fair having regard to the whole course of dealing between them in relation to the property. And in that context, the whole course of dealing between them in relation to the property includes the arrangements which they make from time to time in order to meet the outgoings (for example, mortgage
contributions, council tax and utilities, repairs, insurance and housekeeping) which have to be met if they are to live in the property as their home.”

Oxley v Hiscock has been hailed by Gray and Gray as "an important breakthrough" (K Gray and S Francis Gray, Elements of Land Law (Oxford University Press, 2005) p 931, para 10.138). The passage quoted is very similar to the view of the Law Commission in Sharing Homes (Law Commission, Sharing Homes, 2002) on the quantification of beneficial entitlement:

“If the question really is one of the parties’ ‘common intention’, we believe that there is much to be said for adopting what has been called a 'holistic approach' to quantification, undertaking a survey of the whole course of dealing between the parties and taking account of all conduct which throws light on the question what shares were intended.”

That may be the preferable way of expressing what is essentially the same thought, for two reasons. First, it emphasises that the search is still for the result which reflects what the parties must, in the light of their conduct, be taken to have intended. Second, therefore, it does not enable the court to abandon that search in favour of the result which the court itself considers fair. For the court to impose its own view of what is fair upon the situation in which the parties find themselves would be to return to the days before Pettitt v Pettitt without even the fig leaf of s 17 of the 1882 Act.’

Cases on Stack v Dowden
Abbott v Abbott [2007] UKPC 53
The 'Up Yaws' [2007] EWHC 210 (Admlty), [2007] 2 FLR 444
James v Thomas [2008] 1 FLR 1598
Williams v Parris [2008] EWCA Civ 1147
Laskar v Laskar [2008] EWCA Civ 347, [2008] 2 FLR 589

(b) The principles in Jones v Kernott


(i) Lord Walker and Lady Hale

'[51]...the following are the principles applicable in a case such as this, where a family home is bought in the joint names of a cohabiting couple who are both responsible for any mortgage, but without any express declaration of their beneficial interests:

(1) The starting point is that equity follows the law and they are joint tenants both in law and in equity.

(2) That presumption can be displaced by showing (a) that the parties had a different common intention at the time when they acquired the home, or (b) that they later formed the common intention that their respective shares would change.

(3) Their common intention is to be deduced objectively from their conduct: ‘the relevant intention of each party is the intention which was reasonably understood by the other party to be manifested by that party's words or conduct notwithstanding that he did not consciously formulate that intention in his own mind or even acted with some different intention which he did not communicate to the other party' (Lord Diplock in Gissing v Gissing [1971] AC 886 at 906). Examples of the sort of evidence which might be relevant to drawing such inferences are given in Stack v Dowden.

(4) In those cases where it is clear either (a) that the parties did not intend joint tenancy at the outset, or (b) had changed their original intention, but it is not possible to ascertain by direct evidence or by inference what their actual intention was as to the shares in which they would own the property, ‘the answer is that each is entitled to that share which the court considers fair having regard to the whole course of dealing between them in relation to the property’: Chadwick LJ in Oxley v Hiscock [2004] 2 FCR 295 at [69], [2004] 3 All ER 703. In our judgment, ‘the whole course of dealing ... in relation to the property' should be given a broad meaning, enabling a similar range of factors to be taken into account as may be relevant to ascertaining the parties' actual intentions.
(5) Each case will turn on its own facts. Financial contributions are relevant but there are many other factors which may enable the court to decide what shares were either intended (as in case (3)) or fair (as in case (4)).

[52] This case is not concerned with a family home which is put into the name of one party only. The starting point is different. The first issue is whether it was intended that the other party have any beneficial interest in the property at all. If he does, the second issue is what that interest is. There is no presumption of joint beneficial ownership. But their common intention has once again to be deduced objectively from their conduct. If the evidence shows a common intention to share beneficial ownership but does not show what shares were intended, the court will have to proceed as at [51](4) and (5), above.

[53] The assumptions as to human motivation, which led the courts to impute particular intentions by way of the resulting trust, are not appropriate to the ascertainment of beneficial interests in a family home. Whether they remain appropriate in other contexts is not the issue in this case.’

(ii) Lord Kerr

‘(i) In joint names cases, the starting point is that equity follows the law. One begins the search for the proper allocation of shares in the property with the presumption that the parties are joint tenants and are thus entitled to equal shares;

(ii) That presumption can be displaced by showing (a) that the parties had a different common intention at the time when they acquired the home or (b) that they later formed the common intention that their respective shares would change;

(iii) The common intention, if it can be inferred, is to be deduced objectively from the parties’ conduct;

(iv) Where the intention as to the division of the property cannot be inferred, each is entitled to that share which the court considers fair. In considering the question of what is fair the court should have regard to the whole course of dealing between the parties.’

By contrast, the two areas of disagreement which his lordship identified were the following:

‘(a) is there sufficient evidence in the present case from which the parties' intentions can be inferred? (b) is the difference between inferring and imputing an intention likely to be great as a matter of general practice?’

3. Contribution to purchase price - resulting trusts

Reading: Hudson, section 15.3

Dyer v Dyer (1788) 2 Cox Eq Cas 92
Pettit v. Pettit [1970] 1 AC 777
Tinsley v Milligan [1994] 1 AC 340
Curley v Parkes [2004] All ER (D) 344 (resulting trust cannot be altered after purchase)
NB: Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53

4. Acquisition of equitable interest otherwise than by contribution to purchase price - constructive trusts

Reading: Hudson, para 15.4.1

*Cowcher v. Cowcher [1972] 1 All ER 948-951, 954-5
*Grant v. Edwards [1986] Ch 639, 654D, Browne-Wilkinson VC:

"If the legal estate in the joint home is vested in only one of the parties ('the legal owner') the other party ('the claimant'), in order to establish a beneficial interest, has to establish a constructive trust by showing that it would be inequitable for the legal owner to claim sole beneficial ownership. This requires two matters to be demonstrated: (a) that there was a common intention that both should have a
beneficial interest; (b) that the claimant has acted to his or her detriment on the basis of that common intention.”

5. Common intention constructive trust

**Reading: Hudson, section 15.4**
Hudson, section 15.4
Barlow, Cohabitants and the Law (Butterworths, 2001)

5.1 The core test …

**Lloyds Bank v Rosset [1990] 1 All ER 1111, [1990] 2 WLR 867**
The first and fundamental question which must always be resolved is whether, independently of any inference to be drawn from the conduct of the parties in the course of sharing the house as their home and managing their joint affairs, there has at any time prior to acquisition, or exceptionally at some later date, been any agreement, arrangement or understanding reached between them that the property is to be shared beneficially. …

In sharp contrast with [the foregoing] is the very different one where there is no evidence to support a finding of an agreement or arrangement to share … where the court must rely entirely on the conduct of the parties both as the basis from which to infer a common intention to share the property beneficially and as the conduct relied on to give rise to a constructive trust. In this situation direct contributions to the purchase price by the partner who is not the legal owner, whether initially or by payment of mortgage instalments, will readily justify the inference necessary to the creation of a constructive trust. But as I read the authorities it is at least extremely doubtful whether anything less will do.

*Burns v. Burns [1984] Ch 317, [1984] 1 All ER 244, [1984] 2 WLR 582*

5.1.1 the requirement of detriment

**Grant v. Edwards [1986] Ch 639**
*Lloyds Bank v. Rosset [1990] 1 All ER 1111, [1990] 2 WLR 867*
*Chan Pu Chan v Leung Kam Ho [2003] 1 FLR 23 (working in defendant’s business acquires right in property)*

5.1.2 the meaning of “detriment”

**Grant v. Edwards [1986] Ch 639**
*Coombes v. Smith [1986] 1 WLR 808*

5.1.3 the meaning and nature of “common intention”

**Lloyds Bank v. Rosset [1990] 1 All ER 1111, [1990] 2 WLR 867**
*Ungarian v Lesnoff [1990] Ch 206 (where no intention that a person acquires an interest, there will not be a common intention)*

**McHardy v Warren [1994] 2 FLR 338 (transmission of intention to subsequent purchases)**
*Drake v Whipp [1996] 1 FLR 826 (contribution of one-fifth of purchase price may acquire one-half interest if that was deemed to be the common intention)*
*Churchill v Roach [2004] 3 FCR 744 (the courts will not make up an intention where none exists)*
*Koulias v Makris [2005] All ER (D) 352 (ditto)*

5.1.4 “interest consensus” and “money consensus”

**Cowcher v. Cowcher [1972] 1 All ER 948-951, 954-5**
*Midland Bank v. Cooke [1995] 4 All ER 562*

5.2 Application of that test: what is the nature of the constructive trust now?

**Huntingford v. Hobbs [1993] 1 FLR 936**
*Midland Bank v. Cooke [1995] 4 All ER 562*

5.3 … and its remedial, as opposed to institutional, potential

Hayton, ‘Equitable rights of cohabiters’ [1990] Conv. 370
Ferguson, ‘Constructive trusts – a note of caution’ (1993) 109 LQR 114
Oakley Constructive Trusts (Sweet & Maxwell, 1997), 64-84
(Hudson, Swaps, restitution and trusts (1999), ch.12 - a place for common intention in commercial transactions?)


6.1 The “balance sheet” approach
Reading: Hudson, section 15.5
**Huntingford v. Hobbs [1993] 1 FLR 936

6.2 The “family assets” approach
Reading: Hudson, section 15.6
**Hammond v. Mitchell [1991] 1 WLR 1127 (this case is well worth a read!)
**Midland Bank v. Cooke [1995] 4 All ER 562 (undertake a survey of the entire course of dealing):
[The duty of the judge is to undertake a survey of the whole course of dealing between the parties relevant to their ownership and occupation of the property and their sharing of its burdens and advantages. That scrutiny will not confine itself to the limited range of acts of direct contribution of the sort that are needed to found a beneficial interest in the first place. It will take into consideration all conduct which throws light on the question what shares were intended. Only if that search proves inconclusive does the court fall back on the maxim that ‘equality is equity’. (Waite LJ)

6.3 The “unconscionability” approach
Reading: Hudson, section 15.8

6.3.1 The drift towards unconscionability
**Osley v Hiscock [2004] 3 FCR 693, [2004] Fam Law 569, per Chadwick LJ:
‘... what the court is doing in cases of this nature, is to supply or impute a common intention as to the parties’ respective shares (in circumstances in which there was in fact no common intention) on the basis of that which, in the light of all the material circumstances (including the acts and conduct of the parties after the acquisition) is shown to be fair ... and it may be more satisfactory to accept that there is no difference in cases of this nature between constructive trust and proprietary estoppel.’

Crossley v Crossley [2005] EWCA Civ 857
Tunr v Jacob [2006] EWHC 1317 (Ch)

6.3.2 Cases illustrating how Rosset did not apply
**Cox v Jones [2004] 3 FCR 693, [2004] Fam Law 569, per Chadwick LJ:
Kean v McDonald [2006] All ER (D) 348

6.3.3 Traditional constructive trust models
Van Laetham v Brooker [2005] EWHC 1478 (Ch), [2006] 2 FLR 495
Oates v Stimson [2006] EWCA Civ 548
Cf. Australia

6.3.4 The tacit approval for this approach in Stack v Dowden

6.4 What can be included: deposits, discounts and washing-up

6.4.1 Long-term relationships
6.4.2 Wedding gifts
*Midland Bank v. Cooke [1995] 4 All ER 562

6.4.3 Discounts on the purchase price
*Evans v Hayward [1995] 2 FLR 511 (negotiating reduction in price does not acquire right in property)
*Cox v Jones [2004] 3 FCR 693 (obtaining reduction in price can be taken into account)

6.4.4 Conservatories and building work

6.5 Can these various approaches be reconciled?
Reading: *Hudson, section 15.10
Thompson, ‘Constructive trusts, estoppel and the family home’, (2005) Conveyancer

7. Proprietary estoppel.

Reading: *Hudson, sections 13.3 and 15.7.
See generally:
Cooke, The Modern Law of Estoppel (OUP)
Pawlowski, The Doctrine of Proprietary Estoppel (Sweet & Maxwell)
Wilken and Villiers, Waiver, Variation and Estoppel (Wiley).

There is an extended and detailed discussion of the doctrine of equitable estoppel generally in
Hudson, Chapter 13 which goes into greater detail on the cases relating to this topic than the material
in chapter 15 which considers many of those cases more briefly and only in the sense that they relate
to trusts of homes.

7.1 Establishing the estoppel

7.1.1 The nature of the test: representation, reliance and detriment
*Re Basham [1987] 1 All ER 405, [1986] 1 WLR 1498

7.1.2 The representation can be formulated over time, it need not be a single representation
Re Basham [1987] 1 All ER 405, [1986] 1 WLR 1498
**Gillett v. Holt [2000] 2 All ER 289
*Lissimore v Downing [2003] 2 FLR 308

7.1.3 Irrevocability of assurances
A-G Hong Kong v. Humphreys Estate (Queen’s Gardens) Ltd [1987] AC 114, PC
*Gillett v. Holt [2000] 2 All ER 289, CA

7.1.4 The nature of the estoppel now
*Cobb v Yeomans Row [2008] 1 WLR 1752 HL
**Thorner v Major [2009] 1 WLR 776 HL

7.2 Identifying the appropriate remedy

7.2.1 A remedial approach - (i) “minimum equity necessary”
*Crabb v Arun DC [1976] Ch 179
7.2.2 A remedial approach - (ii) proprietary claim but personal remedy

Campbell v Griffin [2001] EWCA Civ 990, [2001] WTLR 981
(Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd [2005] All ER (D) 406)

7.2.3 The avoidance of detriment …

Lim v. Ang [1992] 1 WLR 113
Lloyds Bank v. Rosset, supra, op cit.

7.2.4 … or the enforcement of promises / representations …

*Pascoe v. Turner [1979] 2 All ER 945

7.2.5 … or to avoid unconscionability? All these cases identify unconscionability as the principle

Taylor Fashions Ltd v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co Ltd [1982] QB 133, 151.
at 842, per Lord Goff:
“In the end, I am inclined to think that the many circumstances capable of giving rise to an estoppel cannot be accommodated within a single formula, and that it is unconscionability which provides the link between them.”

Knowles v Knowles [2008] UKPC 30, para [27], per Sir Henry Brooke (reading the judgment of the entire court)

7.2.6 … or simply to intervene in the litigants’ lives


7.3 The nature of proprietary estoppel: fusion with constructive trust?

Ferguson (1993) 109 LQR 114
**Yaxley v. Gotts [2000] 1 All E.R. 711 (c.i.ct. and p.e. ‘almost indistinguishable’)!
**Cobbe v Yeomans Row [2008] 1 WLR 1752 HL

B. DIFFERENT APPROACHES IN THE COMMONWEALTH

The Commonwealth jurisdictions have taken a different approach since the decision in Gissing. The common intention constructive trust approach has not found favour generally.

Reading: *Hudson, section 15.9.*

1. Unjust enrichment - Canada

Sorochan v. Sorochan (1986) 29 DLR (4th) 1

2. Unconscionability - Australia

Austin v. Keele (1987) 61 ALJR 605, 610 (PC)
Walton Stores v. Maher (1988) 62 ALJR 110; 164 CLR 387
Commonwealth of Australia v. Verwayen (1990) 64 ALJR 540, 546; 170 CLR 394, 411-412

3. Reasonable expectations and fairness - New Zealand

Gillies v. Keogh [1989] 2 NZLR 327
Suggestion as to how to go about answering questions on trusts of homes:
The suggested outline for answering problems on this topic is to follow this structure:

1. apply the test in Lloyds Bank v Rosset literally and consider who wins and who loses;
2. apply the balance sheet / resulting trusts cases and see if the result is any different from 1;
3. apply the family assets cases and see if the result is any different from 1 or 2;
4. apply the unconscionability cases and see if the result is any different from 1, 2 or 3;
5. apply the doctrine of proprietary estoppel and see if the results are different from the above;
6. consider how any theoretical approaches would impact on the facts of the problem.

The suggested outline for essays is a matter for you. You could (i) create your own set of facts and through your
ey essay reflect on how the different case law models would produce different results (perhaps by changing the
facts of your own hypothetical example for emphasis) or (ii) consider some of the ideas set out in section (c)
immediately below.

C. IDEAS ABOUT TRUSTS OF HOMES

There is a large literature on this topic. You could refer generally to Hudson (ed), New
Perspectives on Property Law Human Rights and the Home (Cavendish, 2004) and in
particular to the following essays:

- Alastair Hudson, “Equity, individualisation and social justice: towards a new law of the
  home”, p.1-36
- Rebecca Probert, “Family law and property law: competing spheres in the regulation
  of the family home”, p.37-52
- Anne Barlow, “Rights in the family home – time for a conceptual revolution”, p.53-78
- Simone Wong, “Rethinking Rosset from a human rights perspective”, p.79-98.

The footnotes to these essays contain an extensive bibliography of recent articles and books
on this topic and are an excellent source of further reading. Choose the themes which
interest you most.

The Hopkins library – Prof. Nicholas Hopkins:

- Nicholas Hopkins, ‘The relevance of context in property law: a case for judicial
  restraint?’ (2010) Legal Studies, 31
- Nicholas Hopkins, ‘Regulating trusts of the home private law and social policy’ (2009)
  125 Law Quarterly Review, 310-337.
  26(4) Legal Studies, 475-499.
  20(3) Journal of Contract Law, 210-232

a) Conflation or separation?
Reading: Hudson, section 15.10

b) Social justice and trusts of homes
Reading: Hudson, section 17.5

c) Human rights and trusts of homes
Reading: Hudson, sections 17.4

d) Family law and the law of the home
Reading: Hudson, sections 17.4

e) Lord Denning’s view of the case law

Lord Denning, The Due Process of Law (Butterworths, 1980), at p.194:
‘No matter how you may dispute and argue, you cannot alter the fact that women are
different from men. The principal task in life of women is to bear and rear children:
and it is a task which occupies the best years of their lives. The man’s part in
bringing up the children is no doubt as important as hers, but of necessity he cannot
devote so much time to it. He is physically the stronger and she the weaker. He is
temperamentally the more aggressive and she the more submissive. It is he who
takes the initiative and she who responds. …'

f) Modern love

Arctic Monkeys, *You look good on the dancefloor* (2005):

‘There ain’t no love / No Montagues or Capulets / Just banging tunes in DJ’s sets /
And dirty dancefloors / And dreams of naughtiness.’

Q: is it always easy to verbalise your common intention … or, indeed, anything?


Talking in bed ought to be easiest,
Lying together there goes back so far,
An emblem of two people being honest.
Yet more and more time passes silently.
Outside, the wind’s incomplete unrest
Builds and disperses clouds in the sky,
And dark towns heap up on the horizon.
None of this cares for us. Nothing shows why
At this unique distance from isolation
It becomes still more difficult to find
Words at once true and kind,
Or not untrue and not unkind.


… Life is slow dying …

Hours giving evidence
Or birth, advance
On death equally slowly.
And saying so to some
Means nothing; others it leaves
Nothing to be said.

Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The leading case</th>
<th>Midland Bank v Cooke</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Jones v Kernott</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• (Stack v Dowden)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• (Oxley v Hiscock)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rigid common intention constructive trust</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Gissing v Gissing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lloyds Bank v Rosset</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resulting trusts – ‘balance sheet cases’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Springette v Dafoe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Huntingford v Hobbs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Stack v Dowden: Lord Neuberger</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family assets approach</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Hammond v Mitchell</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Unconscionability cases         |                      |
| • (Grant v Edwards)             |                      |
| • Jennings v Rice               |                      |
| • Cox v Jones                   |                      |
| • (Oates v Stimson)             |                      |

| Proprietary estoppel            |                      |
| • Re Basham                     |                      |
| • Baker v Baker                 |                      |
| • Gillett v Holt                |                      |
| • Lissimore v Downing           |                      |
| • Thorner v Major               |                      |
Topic 9: DISHONEST ASSISTANCE AND UNCONSCIONABLE RECEIPT

General Reading for this topic: Hudson, chapter 20

Exceptionally, the principle of constructive trust will impose a personal liability to account in certain circumstances. Oakley describes this jurisdiction as being based on equitable compensation - that is, Equity's equivalent of common law damages in making orders for payment of money. The principal category of this personal liability to account is in the area of ‘dishonest assistance’, considered below. Reference should also be made to the topic of Breach of Trust and in particular to the case of Target Holdings v. Redfem (1996) 1 AC 421, (1995) 3 All ER 785 HL where Lord Browne-Wilkinson sets out the application of equitable compensation.

STRANGERS TO THE TRUST

A “stranger” in this context is someone who is not a trustee of that trust.

1. Introduction.

Reading: Hudson, section 20.1

You should read first the introduction to chapter 20 to understand the background to these claims. The remedy is personal liability to account as a constructive trustee on the basis of being a dishonest assistant to a breach of trust or being a recipient of property knowing of a breach of trust.

2. Dishonest Assistance

Reading: Hudson, section 20.2

a). The basis for the action

Lord Selborne LC in *Barnes v. Addy* ((1874) 9 Ch. App. 244, 251-252):

“... strangers are not to be made constructive trustees merely because they act as the agents of trustees in transactions within their legal powers, transactions, perhaps, of which a Court of Equity may disapprove, unless those agents receive and become chargeable with some part of the trust property, or unless they assist with knowledge in a dishonest and fraudulent design on the part of the trustee …”

*Agip Africa v. Jackson* [1990] Ch 265

b). The objective test for dishonesty


“... acting dishonestly, or with a lack of probity, which is synonymous, means simply not acting as an honest person would in the circumstance. This is an objective standard. ... All investment involves risk. Imprudence is not dishonesty, although imprudence may be carried recklessly to lengths which call into question the honesty of the person making the decision. This is especially so if the transaction serves another purpose in which that person has an interest of his own.”

[1995] 2 A.C. 378, 389;

Before considering this issue further it will be helpful to define the terms being used by looking more closely at what dishonesty means in this context. Whatever may be the position in some criminal or other contexts (see, for instance, Reg. v. Ghosh [1982] Q.B. 1053), in the context of the accessory liability principle acting dishonestly, or with a lack of probity, which is synonymous, means simply not acting as an honest person would in the circumstances. This is an objective standard. At
first sight this may seem surprising. Honesty has a connotation of subjectivity, as distinct from the objectivity of negligence. Honesty, indeed, does have a strong subjective element in that it is a description of a type of conduct assessed in the light of what a person actually knew at the time, as distinct from what a reasonable person would have known or appreciated. Further, honesty and its counterpart dishonesty are mostly concerned with advertent conduct, not inadvertent conduct. Carelessness is not dishonesty. Thus for the most part dishonesty is to be equated with conscious impropriety. However, these subjective characteristics of honesty do not mean that individuals are free to set their own standards of honesty in particular circumstances. The standard of what constitutes honest conduct is not subjective. Honesty is not an optional scale, with higher or lower values according to the moral standards of each individual. If a person knowingly appropriates another's property, he will not escape a finding of dishonesty simply because he sees nothing wrong in such behaviour.

[1995] 2 A.C. 378, 391B:
"...when called upon to decide whether a person was acting honestly, a court will look at all the circumstances known to the third party at the time. The court will also have regard to personal attributes of the third party such as his experience and intelligence, and the reason why he acted as he did."

Brown v Bennett [1999] 1 BCLC 659
*Dubai Aluminium v Salaam [2002] 3 WLR 1913
**Barlow Clowes v Eurotrust [2006] 1 All ER 333, [2006] 1 WLR 1476

c). An alternative test for dishonesty based on subjectivity


**Twinsectra Ltd v. Yardley [2002] 2 All E.R. 377, 387, per Lord Hutton:
“...in my opinion, a further consideration [than deciding whether the test is one of knowledge or dishonesty as set out by Lord Nicholls] which supports the view that for liability as an accessory to arise the defendant must himself appreciate that what he was doing was dishonest by the standards of honest and reasonable men. A finding by the judge that a defendant has been dishonest is a grave finding, and it is particularly grave against a professional man, such as a solicitor. Notwithstanding that the issue arises in equity law [sic] and not in a criminal context, I think that it would be less than just for the law to permit a finding that a defendant had been ‘dishonest’ in assisting in a breach of trust where he knew of the facts which created the trust and its breach but had not been aware that what he was doing would be regarded by honest men as being dishonest.”

Manolakaki v Constantinides [2004] EWHC 749, [167], per Peter Smith J
*Ultraframe (UK) Ltd v Fielding [2005] EWHC 1638 (Ch), [2005] All ER (D) 397, para [1481], per Lewison J: effect of Twinsectra is to change the test

Cf. Royal Brunei Airlines v. Tan [1995] 3 WLR 64; [1995] 3 All ER 97, per Lord Nicholls:
“... subjective characteristics of dishonesty do not mean that individuals are free to set their own standards of honesty in particular circumstances. The standard of what constitutes honest conduct is not subjective. Honesty is not an optional scale, with higher or lower values according to the moral standards of each individual. If a person knowingly appropriates another’s property, he will not escape a finding of dishonesty simply because he sees nothing wrong in such behaviour.”

Cf. Walker v Stones [2000] 4 All ER 412, 444, per Sir Christopher Slade:
“A person may in some cases act dishonestly, according to the ordinary use of language, even though he genuinely believes that his action is morally justified. The penniless thief, for example, who picks the pocket of the multi-millionaire is dishonest even though he genuinely considers the theft is morally justified as a fair redistribution of wealth and that he is not therefore being dishonest.”
d). Applications of the objective test

*Corporacion Nacional Del Cobre De Chile v. Sogemin Metals [1997] 1 WLR 1396*
*Houghton v. Fayers [2000] 1 BCLC 571, CA*
*Tayeb v HSBC Bank plc [2004] 4 All ER 1024*
**Dubai Aluminium v Salaam [2002] 3 WLR 1913*

**Barlow Clowes v Eurotrust [2006] 1 All ER 333, [2005] UKPC 37,**

para [10]: ‘The judge stated the law in term largely derived from the advice of the Board given by Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead in Royal Brunei Airlines v Tan. In summary, she said that liability for dishonest assistance requires a dishonest state of mind on the part of the person who assists in a breach of trust. Such a state of mind may consist in knowledge that the transaction is one in which he cannot honestly participate (for example, a misappropriation of other people’s money), or it may consist in suspicion combined with a conscious decision not to make inquiries which might result in knowledge: see Manifest Shipping Co Ltd v Uni-Polaris Insurance Co Ltd [2003] 1 AC 469. Although a dishonest state of mind is a subjective mental state, the standard by which the law determines whether it is dishonest is objective. If by ordinary standards a defendant’s mental state would be characterised as dishonest, it is irrelevant that the defendant judges by different standards. The Court of Appeal held this to be a correct state of the law and their Lordships agree.’

[para 12] “[Henwood had an] exaggerated notion of dutiful service to clients, which produced a warped moral approach that it was not improper to treat carrying out clients’ instructions as being all important. Mr Henwood may well have thought this to be an honest attitude, but, if so, he was wrong”.


e) Persistent shoots of subjectivity

(i) Taking a narrow approach to Tan

Clarke, “Claims against professionals: negligence, dishonesty and fraud” [2006] 22 Professional Negligence 70-85:

‘The test is an objective one, but an objective one which takes account of the individual in question’s characteristics, experience, knowledge etc. It is a test which requires a court to assess an individual’s conduct according to an objective standard of dishonesty. In doing so, a court has to take account of what the individual knew, his experience, intelligence and reasons for acting as he did. Whether the individual was aware that his conduct fell below the objective standard is not part of the test.’

*AG Zambia v Meer Care & Desai & Others [2007] EWHC 952 (Ch), para [334], per Peter Smith J:

“[It] is essentially a question of fact whereby the state of mind of the Defendant had to be judged in the light of his subjective knowledge but by reference to an objective standard of honesty” … “The test is clearly an objective test but the breach involves a subjective assessment of the person in question in the light of what he knew at the time as distinct from what a reasonable person would have known or appreciated”


Following Zambia:
*JD Wetherspoon plc v Van de Berg & Co Ltd [2009] EWHC 639 (Ch), Peter Smith J*
*Independent Trustee Services Ltd v GP Noble Trustees Ltd [2010] EWHC 1653 (Ch), Peter Smith J*
(ii) Cases looking to the characteristics of the defendant:


“...when called upon to decide whether a person was acting honestly, a court will look at all the circumstances known to the third party at the time. The court will also have regard to personal attributes of the third party such as his experience and intelligence, and the reason why he acted as he did.”

**Starglade v Nash** [2010] EWCA Civ 1314, Morritt C:

[25] There is a single standard of honesty objectively determined by the court. That standard is applied to specific conduct of a specific individual possessing the knowledge and qualities he actually enjoyed. …

[28] There is no suggestion in any of the speeches in Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley that the standard of dishonesty is flexible or determined by any one other than by the court on an objective basis having regard to the ingredients of the combined test explained by Lord Hutton. …

[29] The relevant standard, described variously in the statements I have quoted, is the ordinary standard of honest behaviour. Just as the subjective understanding of the person concerned as to whether his conduct is dishonest is irrelevant so also is it irrelevant that there may be a body of opinion which regards the ordinary standard of honest behaviour as being set too high. Ultimately, in civil proceedings, it is for the court to determine what that standard is and to apply it to the facts of the case.’

**Fiona Trust & Holding Corporation v Privalov** [2010] EWHC 3199 (Comm), at [1437], *per* Andrew Smith J.

f). Dishonesty and investment risk


“All investment involves risk. Imprudence is not dishonesty, although imprudence may be carried recklessly to lengths which calls into question the honesty of the person making the decision. This is especially so if the transaction serves another purpose in which that person has an interest of his own.”

3. Unconscionable Receipt

Reading: *Hudson, section 20.3*

a). The basis of liability for “knowing receipt”

*Re Diplock* [1948] Ch 465, 478-479

*Re Montagu’s Settlements* [1987] Ch 264


*El Ajou v. Dollar Land Holdings* [1994] 2 All ER 685

*Meridian Global Funds v. Securities Commission* [1995] 3 All ER 918
**MCP Pension Trustees Ltd v AON Pension Trustees Ltd** [2010] EWCA Civ 377, [2011] 1 All ER (Comm) 228, [14], *per* Elias LJ (*following Montagu on “forgetting”*)


“If X has the necessary degree of knowledge, X may himself become a constructive trustee for B on the basis of knowing receipt. But unless he has the requisite degree of knowledge he is not personally liable to account as trustee. Therefore, innocent receipt of property by X subject to an existing equitable interest does not by itself make X a trustee despite the severance of the legal and equitable titles”.

**b). What type of knowledge?**

*Baden v. Societe Generale* (1983) [1993] 1 W.L.R. 509 *per* Peter Gibson J, the five types of knowledge:

1. actual knowledge;
2. wilfully shutting one’s eyes to the obvious;
3. wilfully and recklessly failing to make inquiries which an honest person would have made;
4. knowledge of circumstances which would indicate the facts to an honest and reasonable man;
5. knowledge of circumstances which would put an honest and reasonable man on inquiry.

(i) knowledge can be forgotten

**Re Montagu’s Settlements** [1987] Ch 264 (*only first three categories of knowledge; forgetfulness*)

(ii) ought you to have been suspicious in the circumstances?


(iii) account officers are not detectives


(iv) knowledge in complex fraud and money laundering cases

*El Ajou v. Dollar Land Holdings* [1994] 2 All ER 685

**c). The new test of “unconscionable receipt”**

*BCCI v Akindele* [2000] 4 All ER 221, *per* Nourse LJ:

‘What then, in the context of knowing receipt, is the purpose to be served by a categorisation of knowledge? It can only be to enable the court to determine whether, in the words of Buckley LJ in *Belmont Finance Corp Ltd v Williams Furniture Ltd (No 2)* [1980] 1 All ER 393, 405], the recipient can “conscientiously retain [the] funds against the company” or, in the words of Sir Robert Megarry V-C in *In re Montagu’s Settlement Trusts* [1987] Ch 264, 273, “[the recipient’s] conscience is sufficiently affected for it to be right to bind him by the obligations of a constructive trustee”. But, if that is the purpose, there is no need for categorisation. All that is necessary is that the recipient’s state of knowledge should be such as to make it unconscionable for him to retain the benefit of the receipt.

For these reasons I have come to the view that, just as there is now a single test of dishonesty for knowing assistance, so ought there to be a single test of knowledge for knowing receipt. The recipient’s state of knowledge must be such as to make it unconscionable for him to retain the benefit of the receipt. A test in that form, though it cannot, any more than any other, avoid difficulties of application, ought to avoid those of definition and allocation to which the previous categorisations have led. Moreover, it should better enable the courts to give commonsense decisions in the commercial context in which claims in knowing receipt are now frequently made…’

*Criterion Properties plc v Stratford UK Properties LLC* [2003] 2 BCLC 129, [38] (*expresses preference for flexibility of a test of unconscionability*)
Niru Battery Manufacturing Co v Milestone Trading Ltd [2004] 2 WLR 1415, [188], per Sedley LJ
Charter plc v City Index Ltd [2008] 2 WLR 950, Carnwath LJ: ‘liability for “knowing receipt” depends on the defendant having sufficient knowledge of the circumstances of the payment to make it “unconscionable” for him to retain the benefit or pay it away for his own purposes’.

Applying Akindele:
Independent Trustee Services Ltd v GP Noble Trustees Ltd [2010] EWHC 1653 (Ch), Peter Smith J
Law Society of England and Wales v Habitable Concepts Ltd [2010] EWHC 1449 (Ch), Norris J

Cases suggesting that the test should be dishonesty
Ali v Al-Basri [2004] EWHC 2608, [195] (dishonesty suggests knowledge and so attracts liability)
Cf. Niru Battery Manufacturing Co v Milestone Trading Ltd [2004] 2 WLR 1415, [188], per Sedley LJ (dishonesty not a requirement of liability)

The requirement of receipt
(i) traceable proceeds beneficially owned
El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings [1994] 2 All ER 685, 700, per Hoffmann LJ: ‘For this purpose the plaintiff must show, first, a disposal of his assets in breach of fiduciary duty; secondly, the beneficial receipt by the defendant of assets which are traceable as representing the assets of the plaintiff; and thirdly, knowledge on the part of the defendant that the assets he received are traceable to a breach of fiduciary duty.’
Charter plc v City Index Ltd [2007] 1 WLR 26, 31, per Morris C (approved El Ajou)

(ii) possession and control is enough
Agip (Africa) Ltd v Jackson [1990] Ch 265, 286, Millett J ‘... there is receipt of trust property when a company’s funds are misapplied by any person whose fiduciary position gave him control of them or enabled him to misapply them.’

Academic commentary:-
Birks [1993] LMCLQ 318;
Gardner (1996) 112 LQR 56
4. Liability to account in corporate contexts.

Reading: *Hudson, section 20.5*

If an individual is dishonest or has knowledge, then the claimant can claim against that individual. However, if that individual is employed by a company, then there is a question as to whether or not that company can also be said to have been dishonest or to have had knowledge so that the claimant could claim against the company instead.

a) Controlling mind test

Reading: *Hudson, section 20.5.1*

*Tesco v Nattrass* [1972] AC 153 (controlling mind test)

*Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v Securities Commission* [1995] 3 All ER 918, [1995] 2 BCLC 116

**El Ajou v. Dollar Land Holdings** [1994] 2 All ER 685, CA, overruling Millett J (controlling mind in relation to the particular transaction at issue)

*Crown Dilmun v Sutton* [2004] EWHC 52 (Ch), [23] (controlling mind test)


b) Liability of employee

*Royal Brunei Airlines v. Tan* [1995] 2 AC 378

*Brown v Bennett* [1999] 1 BCLC 649 (assisting a director)

*Standard Chartered Bank v Pakistan National Shipping Corp* [2003] 1 AC 959

c) Risk in commercial transactions

*Royal Brunei Airlines v. Tan* [1995] 2 AC 378

“All investment involves risk. Imprudence is not dishonesty, although imprudence may be carried recklessly to lengths which call into question the honesty of the person making the decision. This is especially so if the transaction serves another purpose in which that person has an interest of his own. … [Where a person] takes a risk that a clearly unauthorised transaction will not cause loss … If the risk materialises and causes loss, those who knowingly took the risk will be accountable accordingly.”

*Catch-22: Tayeb v HSBC Bank plc* [2004] 4 All ER 1024 (bank may breach contract if it refuses to accept payment)

Cf. Criminal Justice Act 1988, s.93A (bank may commit offence to accept payment from suspicious client)

d) Standard commercial conduct in the context in that market

Reading: *Hudson, section 20.5.2*


*Cowan de Groot Properties Ltd v Eagle Trust plc* [1992] 4 All ER 700, 761, *per* Knox J (a person guilty of “commercial unacceptable conduct in the particular context” is likely to be held to have been dishonest)

*Polly Peck v Nadir (No 2)* [1992] 4 All ER 769 (liability of financial advisors dependent on context and whether they ought to have been suspicious)

*Royal Brunei Airlines v. Tan* [1995] 2 AC 378

*Heinl v Jyske Bank (Gibraltar) Ltd* [1999] Lloyd’s Rep Bank 511, at 535, *per* Colman J (contravention of financial regulation)

*Bank of Scotland v A Ltd* [2001] 3 All ER 58 (contravention of financial regulation)

*Sphere Drake Insurance Ltd v Euro International Underwriting Ltd* [2003] EWHC 1636 (Comm) (taking unacceptable risk in contravention of conduct of business regulation = dishonesty).

*Manolakaki v Constantinides* [2004] EWHC 749 (clear dishonesty where contravention of financial regulation, backdating of documents and including untrue statements in documents; absence of personal profit would militate against finding of dishonesty)

E.g. Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 – FSA Conduct of Business Rules:-
Summary

Dishonest assistance

Objective
Royal Brunei Airlines v. Tan
Dubai Aluminium v. Salaam

Hybrid test
Twinsectra Ltd v. Yardley

Restoring objectivity
Barlow Clowes v. Eurotrust

Personal characteristics nevertheless
Abou-Rahmah v. Abacha
AG Zambia v. Meer Care & Desai
Starglade v. Nash
Aerostar Maintenance v. International Ltd v. Wilson

Unconscionable receipt

Knowledge
Baden v. Societe Generale
Re Montagu's Settlements
Westdeutsche Landesbank v. Islington

No positive obligation to know
Polly Peck v. Nadir
Macmillan Inc. v. Bishopsgate Investment Trust
El Ajou v. Dollar Land Holdings

Unconscionability
BCCI v. Akindele
Charter plc v. City Index Ltd

Corporate liability
Cowan de Groot v. Eagle Trust
Agip (Africa) Ltd v. Jackson
Topic 10. THE LAW ON TRACING

General Reading on this topic: **Hudson, chapter 19**

The law relating to tracing is not straightforward. There is a need to distinguish between common law tracing and equitable tracing. These lectures will focus on equitable tracing for the most part.

There is a second distinction to be made: that is, between 'following' claims and 'tracing' claims. A following claim requires simply that a specific piece of property is followed and identified by its original common law owner, thus being returned to that original owner. A tracing claim concerns the identification of property or value in which the claimant has some pre-existing interest which the court is then asked to recognise.

Tracing is a process. It does nothing more than trace a right in an original piece of property into subsequent items of property or value. Tracing is concerned specifically with tracing value, not necessarily specific items of property. That is, it identifies property. There is then the further issue as to the form of remedy which should be granted or the form of trust which arises on institutional principles.

General reading:-

A. THE PROCESS OF TRACING, AND THEN CLAIMING

Reading: **Hudson, section 19.1**

**Boscawen v. Bajwa [1995] 4 All ER 769 - tracing is the process of identification, the appropriate claim is something else.**


B. COMMON LAW TRACING

Reading: **Hudson, section 19.2**


C. EQUITABLE TRACING

1. Need for prior equitable interest / proprietary base

Reading: *Hudson*, para 19.3.2

*Re Diplock* [1948] Ch 465 - fiduciary relationship required to base equitable proprietary claim.


**Boscawen v. Bajwa** [1995] 4 All ER 769 - fiduciary relationship / equitable interest a pre-requisite for equitable tracing.


*Ibrahim v Barclays Bank* [2011] EWHC 1897 (Ch)

Academic commentary:- Birks ‘Mixing and Tracing: Property and Restitution’ (1992) 45 CLP 69;


2. Mixture of trust money with trustee’s own money

Reading: *Hudson*, para 19.4.1

a) Honest trustee approach

*Re Hallett’s Estate* (1880) 13 ChD. 695 - presumption of trustee honesty.

b) Beneficiary election approach

*Re Oatway* [1903] 2 Ch. 356 - beneficiary election.

c) Other approaches

*Roscoe v. Winder* [1915] 1 Ch 62

*Re Tilley W.T.* [1967] Ch. 1179

3) The modern approach – a question of property law, not justice nor unjust enrichment

**Foskett v. McKeown** [2001] 1 AC 102, [2000] 3 All E.R. 97 – fraudster mixing innocent volunteer’s money with own money; disapproving Hallett in part, now there is no restriction to a lien.

*Clark v Cutland* [2003] 4 All ER 733

3. Mixture of two trust funds or with innocent volunteer’s money

Reading: *Hudson*, paras 19.4.2 and 19.4.3

a) The general rule

*Re Diplock* [1948] Ch 465, 524:

‘Where an innocent volunteer (as distinct from a purchaser for value without notice) mixes ‘money’ of his own with ‘money’ which in equity belongs to another person, or is found in possession of such a mixture, although that other person cannot claim a charge on the mass superior to the claim of the volunteer, he is entitled, nevertheless, to a charge ranking pari passu with the claim of the volunteer ... Such a person is not in conscience bound to give precedence to the equitable owner of the other of the two funds.’
b) **The specific rule for current bank accounts**

*Clayton’s Case* (1816) 1 Mer 572 - first in, first out w.r.t current accounts


c) **The retreat from Clayton’s Case in relation to current bank accounts**


*Re Registered Securities* [1991] 1 NZLR 545


There is no reason in law or justice why his depredations upon the fund should not be borne equally between [the parties]. To throw all the loss upon one, through the mere chance of his being earlier in time, is irrational and arbitrary, and is equally a fiction as the rule in *Clayton’s Case*. When the law adopts a fiction, it is, or at least it should be, for some purpose of justice. To adopt it here is to apportion a common misfortune through a test which has no relation whatever to the justice of the case.

**Russell-Cooke Trust Co v Prentis** [2003] 2 All ER 478

*Commerzbank AG v IMB Morgan plc* [2004] EWHC 2771


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**Russell-Cooke Trust Co v Prentis** [2003] 2 All ER 478

*Commerzbank AG v IMB Morgan plc* [2004] EWHC 2771

Birks [1993] LMCLQ 218


d) **Tracing into pension fund rights**

*Clark v Cutland* [2003] 4 All ER 733, [2003] EWCA Civ 810

*Cf. Foskett v McKeown* [2000] 3 All ER 97


4. **Loss of right to trace**

Reading: *Hudson, para 19.5.5*

*Roscoe v. Winder* [1915] 1 Ch. 62 - cannot claim more than lowest intermediate balance.

*Bishopsgate Investment Management v. Homan* [1995] Ch 211

*Ultraframe (UK) Ltd v Fielding* [2005] EWHC 1638 (Ch), [2005] All ER (D) 397

*Re BA Peters plc, Atkinson v Moriarty* [2008] EWCA Civ 1604, [2010] 1 BCLC 142, [15], *per* Lord Neuberger


5. **Theft**

Reading: *Hudson, section 19.8.3*

*Bishopsgate v. Maxwell* [1993] Ch 1, 70 - stolen money can be traced in equity

*Westdeutsche Landesbank v. Islington* (supra) L. B-W: ‘I agree that stolen monies are traceable in equity.’
D. REMEDIES AFTER TRACING

Reading: Hudson, section 19.6

1. Charges
2. Liens
3. Constructive trusts
4. Subrogation
5. ‘Swollen assets’ charge

1. Introduction to tracing remedies – charge, lien or constructive trust?
Reading: Hudson, para 19.6.1

2. Charges, liens and proportionate shares
Reading: Hudson, paras 19.6.1 and 19.6.3

Re Tilley [1967] Ch 1178
Paul Davies Pty Ltd v. Davies [1983] 1 NSWLR 440

3. Constructive trusts in relation to tracing: is unconscionability necessary?
Reading: Hudson, para 19.6.2

**Westdeutsche Landesbank v Islington [1996] AC 669

Re Diplock [1948] Ch 465
Cf. Chase Manhattan v Israel-British Bank [1981] Ch 105
Cf. Attorney-General for Hong Kong v Reid [1994] 1 AC 324
*Foskett v McKeown [2001] AC 102
Allen v Rea Brothers Trustees Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 85

4. Subrogation
Reading: Hudson, para 19.6.4

Subrogation is the substitution of one claim for another - e.g.: where X uses Y’s money to pay off a debt owed to Z, Y can occupy the place of Z and claim the money as though the debt were owed to Y instead.

*Boscawen v. Bajwa [1995] 4 All ER 769
Wenlock v. River Dee Co. (1887) 19 QBD 155

5. Swollen assets theory
Reading: Hudson, para 19.6.5

Space Investments Ltd v. Canadian Bank [1986] 3 All ER 75, 76-77; [1986] 1 WLR 1072, 1074 - per Lord Templeman:-
‘In these circumstances it is impossible for the beneficiaries interested in trust money misappropriated from their trust to trace their money to any particular asset belonging to the trustee bank. But equity allows the beneficiaries, or a new trustee appointed in place of an insolvent bank trustee … to trace the trust money to all the assets of the bank and to recover the trust money by the exercise of an equitable charge over all the assets of the bank … that equitable charge secures for the beneficiaries and the trust priority over the claims of customers … and … all other unsecured creditors.’

*Seriou... Office v Lexi Holdings plc* [2008] EWCA Crim 1443, [2009] 1 All ER 586, [2009] QB 376

*Re Lehman Brothers (Europe)(No2)* [2009] EWHC 3228 (Ch), [2010] EWHC 47 (Ch), [2010] 2 BCLC 301, Briggs J

*Bellmont Park Investments Pty Ltd v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd* [2011] UKSC 38, [2011] 3 WLR 521 (*anti-deprivation principle*).

*British Eagle International Airlines Ltd v Cie Nationale Air France* [1975] 1 WLR 758 (*pari passu principle*).

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**E. DEFENCES**

Reading: *Hudson, section 19.7*

1. **Change of Position**

Reading: *Hudson, para 19.7.1*

a) The test for change of position

**Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale**, supra; per Lord Goff:-

‘Where an innocent defendant’s position is so changed that he will suffer an injustice if called upon to repay or to repay in full, the injustice of requiring him so to repay outweighs the injustice of denying the plaintiff restitution.’

*Haugesund Kommune v DEPFA ACS Bank* [2011] 1 All ER 190, [152], Pill LJ:

“The defence [of change of position] is not fixed in stone, and has developed and can be expected to develop further over time on a case by case basis. Broadly speaking the defence is available to a person whose position has so changed that it would be inequitable in all the circumstances to require them to make restitution or alternatively to make restitution in full ... Concepts of relative fault are not applicable; good faith being a sufficient requirement in this context ... The defence is to be regarded as founded on a principle of justice designed to protect the defendant from a claim to restitution in respect of a benefit received by him in circumstances in which it would be inequitable to pursue that claim or to pursue it in full ...”.

b) Bad faith as a barrier to change of position

*Niru Battery Manufacturing Co and anor v Milestone Trading Ltd and ors* [2003] EWCA Civ 1446

*Maersk Air Ltd v Expeditors International (UK) Ltd* [2003] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 491

c) Activity which will constitute a change of position

*Philip Collins Ltd v Davis* [2000] 3 All ER 808

*Scottish Equitable plc v. Derby* [2001] 3 All ER 818

*Barros v MacDaniels Ltd* [2004] 3 All ER 299, [2004] EWHC 1188

*Campden Hill Ltd v Chakrani* [2005] EWHC 911

d) When must the change of position have taken place?

*South Tyneside MBC v Svenska International plc* [1995] 1 All ER 545

*Pearce v Lloyds Bank plc* [2001] EWCA Civ 1097

*Dextra Bank and Trust Co v Bank of Jamaica* [2002] 1 All ER (Comm) 193
e) Is change of position now equitable as opposed to restitutionary?

*Niru Battery Manufacturing Co and anor v Milestone Trading Ltd and ors [2003] EWCA Civ 1446

2. Is change of position now to be understood in terms of estoppel by representation?

Reading: *Hudson, para 19.7.2*

*Jorden v Money* (1854) V HLC 185, 10 ER 868
*Avon CC v Howlett* [1983] 1 WLR 605
*Niru Battery Manufacturing Co and anor v Milestone Trading Ltd and ors* [2003] EWCA Civ 1446

3. Bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the defendant’s rights

Reading: *Hudson, para 19.7.4*

*Westdeutsche Landesbank v Islington* [1996] AC 669

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**Summary**

**Following and tracing**

*Foskett v McKeown*

**Common law tracing**

*FC Jones, etc. v Jones*

**Equitable tracing**

**Pre-requisite of equitable interest**

*Westdeutsche Landesbank v Islington*

**The process of equitable tracing**

*Boscawen v Bajwa*

**Mixture with trustee’s own property**

*Re Hallett’s Estate*
*Re Oatway*
*Re Diplock*
*Foskett v McKeown*

**Equitable tracing into mixed accounts**

*Clayton’s Case*
*Re Ontario Securities*
*Barlow Clowes v Vaughan*
*Russell-Cooke v Prentis*

**Loss of the right to trace**

*Westdeutsche Landesbank v Islington*

**Remedies after equitable tracing**

**Charges**

*Re Ontario Securities Commission*

**Barlow Clowes International v. Vaughan**

**Liens**

**Constructive trusts**

*Chase Manhattan v Israel-British Bank*
*Westdeutsche Landesbank v Islington*

**Subrogation**

*Boscawen v. Bajwa*

**‘Swollen assets’ charge**

*Space Investments Ltd v. Canadian Bank*
*Bishopsgate Investment v. Homan*
*Serious Fraud Office v Lexi Holdings plc*
*Re Lehman Brothers (Europe)(No2), Briggs J*

**Defences**

**Change of position**

*Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale*
*Niru Battery Manufacturing v Milestone Trading Ltd*
*Philip Collins Ltd v Davis*
*Scottish Equitable plc v. Derby*
*Dextra Bank and Trust Co v Bank of Jamaica*

**Estoppel by representation**

*NatWest v Somer*

**Equity’s darling**

*Westdeutsche Landesbank v Islington*
There are two practitioners' books on charities:-
Picarda, *The Law and Practice Relating to Charities*
Warburton, *Tudor on Charities.*

(A) Introduction.

1) The significance of charitable trusts and organisations.
2) Advantages enjoyed by charitable trusts.
   a) *Relaxed requirements of certainty of objects.*
      (i) Relaxed test of certainty of purposes as long as general charitable intention clear.
      (ii) Public benefit test replaces private trusts certainty requirement as regards beneficiaries.
   b) *Relaxed application of perpetuity rules.*
      Charitable trusts may exist in perpetuity but remoteness rules generally apply to vesting of property in charity trustees. *Christ's Hospital v. Grainger* (1849) 1 Mac. & G. 460.
   c) Fiscal advantages.
3) Regulation of charities
   See now Charities Act 2011.
4) Traditional Requirements of a Charitable Trust
   (a) The trust must be of a *charitable nature*
   (b) The trust must be for the *public benefit*
   (c) The trust must be *exclusively charitable*
5) Charitable trusts enjoyed abroad
   See Charity Commissioners Annual Report 1992, paras.74, 75
   *Re Carapiet's Trusts* [2002] EWCH 1304; 2002 WL 1310905

(B) The Definition of “charity”.

1) Preamble to the Statute of Charitable Uses 1601
   The ‘spirit and intendment’ of the Preamble to the Statute of Charitable Uses 1601 (repealed by the Mortmain and Charitable Uses Act 1888; preamble repealed by the Charities Act 1960 s38).
2) **The four heads of charity in Pemsel’s Case**

"Charity in its legal sense comprises four principal divisions: trusts for the relief of poverty; trusts for the advancement of education; trusts for the advancement of religion; and trusts for other purposes beneficial to the community." (Commissioners of Special Income Tax v. Pemsel [1891] A.C. 531, at 583, per Lord Macnaghten).


3) **The position under the case law before 2006**

This approach now simplified by the categorisation adopted by Lord Macnaghten in *IRC v. Pemsel* into four principal divisions:

(i) Relief of poverty
(ii) Advancement of education
(iii) Advancement of religion
(iv) Other purposes beneficial to the community

See also the Recreational Charities Act 1958

i) **Relief of Poverty**

What is poverty?

(a) Preamble to 1601 Act - "aged, impotent and poor people" is now accepted that these terms may be read disjunctively and thus sufficient if a gift comes within just one of the categories.

*Joseph Rowntree Memorial Trust Housing Association Ltd. v. A-G* [1983] Ch 159

(b) Poverty means having to go short having regard to the individual's standing in life

(c) The gift must be in terms that exclude those who are not poor. Thus, a trust to provide "knickers" for boys aged 10-15 whose parents were resident in Farnham was held not to be charitable on the ground that there was nothing in the terms of the gift to exclude rich sons. Further, it would seem to follow that a gift would not be charitable if it excluded the poor, eg a gift to benefit impotent millionaires

ii) **Advancement of Education**

Since 1601, the term education has come to include a far wider range of objects than those set out in the Preamble

(a) Education of the young

*IRC v. McMullen* [1981] AC 1

(b) Research

*Re Shaw* [1957] 1 WLR. 729
*Re Hopkins* [1965] Ch 669
*McGovern v. AG* [1982] Ch 321

c) Artistic Pursuits

*Royal Choral Society v. IRC* [1943] 2 All ER 101
iii) **Advancement of Religion**

The term in this context means some form of spiritual faith that is not subversive of morality. Today, it would cover any of the major religions, with trusts for the promotion of Judaism, Buddhism and Mohammedanism having been recognised as charitable.

- *Bowman v. Secular Society* [1917] AC 406
- *Re South Place Ethical Society* [1980] 1 WLR 1565
- *Thornton v. Howe* (1862) 31 Beav. 14; 54 ER 1042
- *Gilmour v. Coats* [1949] AC 426
- *Funnell v. Stewart* [1996] 1 All ER 715

iv) **Other Purposes Beneficial to the Community**

In determining what purposes come within this head of charity, the traditional approach has been to decide whether a given purpose falls within the spirit and intendment of the Preamble to the Statute of 1601.

- *Williams' Trustees v. IRC* [1947] AC 447

In practice, and in order to satisfy a modern society, this principle has been applied by finding an analogy between the object under consideration and some other object already held to be charitable in an earlier case.


An alternative approach is to accept as charitable any object that is clearly beneficial to the community and of general public utility unless there are grounds for holding it to be outside the equity of the Statute.


Whichever the approach taken, it is the case that this head really contains miscellaneous categories derived from case law.

(a) **Gifts in respect of animals.** A trust for the protection and benefit of animals is charitable.

- *Re Wedgwood* [1915] 1 Ch 113
- *Re Green's Will Trust* [1985] 3 All ER 455

Anti-vivisection is not charitable

- *National Anti-Vivisection Society v. IRC* [1948] AC 31

(b) **Hospitals**

- *Re Smith's Will Trusts* [1962] 2 All ER 563
- *Re Resch's Will Trusts* [1969] 1 AC 514
(c) Gifts for relief of distress caused by disaster eg North Devon Relief Fund; RNLI
(d) Gifts for armed forces
(e) Gifts for the administration of justice

_Incorporated Council of Law Reporting v. AG [1972] Ch 73_

v) **Recreational Charities**

The provision of land for public recreation is charitable e.g., gift for playing fields, gyms and other places that will give recreation to as many young people as possible.

Where there is included in the gift a social element, e.g. bingo, the trust will fail as a charitable gift because the whole of the trust cannot be viewed as charitable

*Williams Trustees v. IRC* [1947] AC 447
*IRC v. Baddeley* [1955] AC 573

But see latterly:-

**Recreational Charities Act 1958**

Section 1 of this Act makes charitable the provision of facilities for recreation of other leisure time occupation but

(a) it must be for the public benefit; and

(b) it must be provided in the interest of social welfare. This test of social welfare is satisfied if social facilities are provided for the improvement of the conditions or life of the beneficiaries, and

(i) they have need of it by reason of youth, age, infirmity, poverty, social or economic circumstances; OR

(ii) they are open to members or female members of the public at large

*IRC v. McMullen* [1981] AC 1
*Guild v. IRC* [1992] 2 WLR 397


4) **Charities Act 2011**

Reading: *Hudson, sections 25.1.4*

**Charities Act 2011, s.3**

The statutory heads of “charitable purposes”:

(a) the prevention or relief of poverty
(b) the advancement of education
(c) the advancement of religion
(d) the advancement of health or the saving of lives … including “the prevention or relief of sickness, disease or human suffering”
(e) the advancement of citizenship or community development … including “rural or urban regeneration” and “the promotion of civic responsibility, volunteering, the voluntary sector or the effectiveness or efficiency of charities”
(f) the advancement of the arts, culture, heritage or science
(g) the advancement of amateur sport
(h) the advancement of human rights, conflict resolution or reconciliation or the promotion of religious or racial harmony or equality and diversity
(i) the advancement of environmental protection or improvement
(j) the relief of those in need by reason of youth, age, ill-health, disability, financial hardship or other disadvantage
(k) the advancement of animal welfare

(C) Relief and prevention of poverty.

Reading: Hudson, section 25.4

A) Statutory material – see also photocopy of the Act distributed in lectures

1) The heads of charitable purpose
   **Charities Act 2011, s.3(1)

2) The continued relevance of the old case law categories after the Act
   **Charities Act 2011, s.3(1)(m)(iii)

B) Case law principles relevant in the interpretation of the Act

1) Approach of the courts to “poverty”

2) Meaning of “relief of poverty”
   Re Coulthurst’s Will Trusts [1951] Ch. 661, at 666 (more than “going short”).
   Re Cottam [1955] 3 All E.R. 704 (flats at “economic rents”).
   *Joseph Rowntree Memorial Trust Housing Association Ltd. v. A.-G. [1983] 1 All ER 288
   (special housing for the elderly; “alleviation” = “relief”).

3) Trusts for limited classes of persons
   Re Gardom [1914] 1 Ch. 662 (“ladies of limited means”).
   Spiller v. Maude (1881) 32 Ch. D. 158 (“decayed actors”!)

4) Trust must relieve some person’s poverty: i.e. there must be some poverty to be relieved
   Re Sanders’ Will Trusts [19541 Ch. 265 (working classes not necessarily impoverished).
   Re Gwyon [1930] 1 Ch. 225 (clothing for boys, administered so as to be for impoverished boys).
   *Joseph Rowntree Memorial Trust Housing Association Ltd. v. A.-G. [1983] 1 All ER 288
   (soup kitchens for millionaires would not alleviate any poverty)

5) No necessary public benefit element if a genuine charitable intention; hence trusts for relatives
   Re Scarisbrick [1951] Ch. 622 (relatives).

6) Note the addition of “prevention” of poverty by the Act
(D) Advancement of education.

Reading: *Hudson*, section 25.5

A) Statutory material – see also photocopy of the Act distributed in lectures

**Charities Act 2011, ss.3(1)**

B) Case law principles relevant in the interpretation of the Act

1) Definition of “education” in relation to academic establishments

2) Academic endeavour outside academic establishments: research, etc.
   - *Re Hopkins’ Will Trusts* [1965] Ch 669 (research - Francis Bacon Society).
   - *Re Shaw* [1957] 1 All E.R. 745.
   - *Re South Place Ethical Society* [1980] 1 WLR 1565 (ethical principles and rational religious sentiment).
   - *ICLR v. AG* [1972] Ch 73.

3) Public benefit: exclusion of personal nexus
   - *Re Koettgen’s Will Trusts* [1954] Ch. 252.

4) Public schools

(E) Advancement of religion.

Reading: *Hudson*, section 25.6

A) Statutory material – see also photocopy of the Act distributed in lectures

**Charities Act 2011, s.3(1)**

B) Case law principles relevant in the interpretation of the Act

1) What is “religion”?*
   - “As between different religions, the law stands neutral, but it assumes that any religion is at least likely to be better than none” (Cross J. in *Neville Estates Ltd. v. Madden* [1962] 1 Ch 832).
   - *Gilmour v Coats* [1949] AC 426
   - *Re South Place Ethical Society* [1980] 1 WLR 1565.
   - *Re Hetherington’s Will Trusts* [1990] Ch. 1.

2) Requirement of public benefit
   - *Neville Estates Ltd. v. Madden* [19621 Ch 832.
   - *Gilmour v. Coats* [1949] AC 426 (when is public benefit lacking?).
   - **Re Hetherington’s Will Trusts** [1990] Ch. 1 (saying masses).
   - *Kings v Bultitude* [2010] EWHC 1795 (Ch)
   - *White v Williams* [2010] EWHC 940 (Ch)
(F) Other purposes beneficial to the community.

Reading: *Hudson, section 25.7*

A) This head no longer exists as a separate category, but the cases continue to be important because the old law continues to be effective.

**Charities Act 2011 s.3.**

B) Case law principles relevant in the interpretation of the Act

1) The means of determining benefit under the ‘fourth head’ of charity

- *National Anti-Vivisection Society v. I.R.C.* [1948] A.C. 31 (how is to be determined?).
- Cf. Preamble to the Statute of Charitable Uses 1601.

Illustrations of purposes under the fourth head:

2) Community and public services:

- **Charities Act 2006, s.2**
  - Re Wokingham Fire Brigade Trusts [1951] Ch. 373 (fire brigade).
- *Joseph Rowntree Memorial Trust Housing Association Ltd. v. A.-G.* [1983] 1 All ER 288 (special housing for the elderly)
- *A-G Cayman Islands v. Wahr-Hansen* [2000] 3 All E.R. 642, HL – (too narrow a class; too limited a geographic area; “general welfare trusts” not charitable trusts.)

3) Sport and recreation.

- **Charities Act 2006, s.2**
  - Re Nottage [1895] 2 Ch. 649 (yacht racing).
- Recreational Charities Act 1958

4) Animals.

- **Charities Act 2006, s.2**
  - Re Wedgwood [1915] 1 Ch. 113.

(G) Disqualifying Factors: Political Purposes.

Reading: *Hudson, section 25.3.2*

- Baldry v. Feintuck [1972] 1 W.L.R. 552
- Re Bushnell [1952] 1 W.L.R. 1596
- McGovern v. AG [1982] Ch. 321
- Re Koeppler's WT [1986] Ch. 423
- Southwood v AG The Times, July 18 2000; 2000 WL 877698
(H) Requirement of the exclusivity of the charitable purpose.

**Reading:** *Hudson, section 25.3.1*

In interpreting charitable gifts, the courts are generous and give a benign construction: *Guild v. IRC* [1992] 2 A.C. 310

1. Cases of "OR":
   *Chichester Diocesan Fund v. Simpson* [1944] A.C. 341

2. Cases of "AND":

3. Incidental Non-Charitable Purposes
   *Re Coxen* [1948] Ch. 747

4. Subsidiary Purposes
   *Oxford Group v. IRC* [1949] 2 All E.R. 537

5. Charitable Trusts (Validation) Act 1954
   This Act applies only to instruments (and declarations) before 1952 and is a "qualification" to the exclusively charitable rule in respect of imperfect trust provisions. *Re Gillingham Bus Disaster Fund* [1959] Ch. 62,
   *Ulrich v Treasury Solicitor* [2006] 1 WLR 33.

6. Literal interpretation of charitable trust instrument
   *Blair v. Duncan* [1902] A.C. 37 (charitable or public purposes).
   *Chichester Diocesan Board of Finance v. Simpson* [1944] A.C. 341 (charitable or benevolent purpose).
   *Cf. Re Best* [1904] 2 Ch. 354 (‘charitable and benevolent’).
   *Att.-Gen. v. National Provincial and Union Bank of England* [1924] A.C. 262 (‘such patriotic purposes or objects and such charitable institution or institutions or charitable object or objects...’).

7. Purposive approaches to interpretation
   *Re Coxen* [1948] Ch. 747 (quantification of separable charitable and non-charitable elements).
   Charitable Trusts (Validation) Act 1954.

8. Modern approaches to the interpretation of charities seeking their validation
   *Neville Estates Ltd. v. Madden* [1962] Ch 832
   **Re Hetherington’s Will Trusts** [1990] Ch. 1
   *Cf. the interpretation of non-charitable abstract purpose trusts*

9. Change of purpose
   *Catholic Care v Charity Commission* [2010] 4 All ER 1041

(I) The *Cy-Pres* doctrine.

**Reading:** *Hudson, section 25.9*

In outline only...

1. Charities Act 1993, s.13
   Charities Act 1993, s. 13 (1) (impossibility or impracticability).
   General charitable intent (initial impossibility or impracticability).
2) Initial failure? Gift to specific charitable purpose:
   *Biscoe v. Jackson* (1887) 35 Ch. D. 460.
   *Re Lysaght* [1966] Ch. 191.

3) Initial failure? Gift to charitable institution:
   *Re Vernon’s Will Trusts* [1971] 3 All E.R. 1061 (incorporated Guild dissolved; hospital and clinic still operating).
   *Re Rymer* [1895] 1 Ch. 19 (lapse where particular institution no longer existing).
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
ON
EQUITY & TRUSTS

Further materials for these lectures will be generated closer to the time. There will be four themes:-

1. The paradox of express trusts
2. The idea of conscience in equity
3. The (in)coherence of constructive trusts
4. Restitution and unjust enrichment

Theme 1.
THE PARADOX OF EXPRESS TRUSTS

Hudson, Equity & Trusts, Chapter 7.

A. Express trusts based on conscience

The general, equitable approaches
- Earl of Oxford’s Case
- Rochefoucauld v Boustead
- Westdeutsche Landesbank v Islington
- Hodgson v Marks

Where does equity come from?
- Re Hallett
- Re Diplock

Equitable estoppel
- Yaxley v Gotts
- Thorner v Major

B. Practitioners’ devices relying on predictability

Disposition of equitable interests
- Grey v IRC
- Vandervell v IRC
- Oughtred v IRC

Purpose trusts
- Leahy v Att Gen NSW
- Re Denley
- Re Lipinski
- Re Recher
Theme 2.

THE IDEA OF CONSCIENCE IN EQUITY

Hudson, *Equity & Trusts*, Chapters 1 and 32.

1. The role of conscience in trusts law

   **What is a conscience?**
   That still, small voice that speaks to us mainly of shame.
   - Sigmund Freud, *Civilisation and its Discontents*
   - Sigmund Freud, *The Future of an Illusion*
   - Norbert Elias, *The Society of Individuals*

   **Key cases on the idea of conscience**
   - *Earl of Oxford’s Case* (1615)
   - *Westdeutsche Landesbank v Islington LBC* [1996] AC 669
   - *Tinsley v Milligan* [1994] 1 AC 340
   - *Tribe v Tribe* [1995] 4 All ER 236

   **Journal literature on the nature of equity – but what is the “conscience” they identify?**

2. The return of conscience in trusts of homes

   **A tale of two women: positivism and natural law theory**
   - *Cox v Jones* [2004] 3 FCR 693
   - Simone Weil

   **Law as romantic poetry**
   - *Hammond v Mitchell* [1991] 1 WLR 1127
   - *Midland Bank v Cooke* [1995] 4 All ER 562

   **Talking and not talking: representing and not representing**
   - *Oxley v Hiscock* [2004] EWCA Civ 546
   - *Thorner v Major* [2009] 1 WLR 776

3. Morality or positivism? Conscience or property?

   - *Attorney-General for Hong Kong v Reid* [1994] 1 AC 324
   - *Re Goldcorp* [1995] 1 AC 74

4. A commercial conscience, or an old-fashioned free market?

   - *Armitage v Nurse* [1998] Ch 241
Polly Peck International v Nadir (No. 2) [1992] 4 All ER 769.
Macmillan v Bishopsgate (No3) [1996] 1 WLR 387
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, ss.328, 335, 338
Money Laundering Regulations 2007
FSA, Conduct of Business Sourcebook, COBS 2.1.1R, 11.2.1R

5. Conscience or knowledge?
 Re Montagu’s Settlements [1987] Ch 264
BCCI (Overseas) Ltd v Akindele [2000] 3 WLR 1423
Westdeutsche Landesbank v Islington LBC [1996] AC 669

6. Honesty and “not honesty”
 Royal Brunei Airlines v Tan [1995] 2 AC 378
Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] 2 AC 164
Barlow Clowes Ltd v Eurotrust International Ltd [2006] 1 WLR 1476

7. A land of make believe
 Re Hallett’s Estate (1880) 13 Ch D 696
Re Diplock [1948] Ch 465
Barlow Clowes v Vaughan [1992] 4 All ER 22
Lon Fuller, Legal Fictions (Stanford University Press, 1968)

Theme 3.
THE (IN)COHERENCE OF CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS

Hudson, Equity & Trusts, Chapters 12 and 13.

Is the doctrine of constructive trusts coherent?
- Westdeutsche Landesbank v Islington – based on conscience
- Ati-Gen Hong Kong v Reid – based on (i) equity looks upon as done that which ought to have been done (ii) the evil practice of accepting bribes and (iii) may lead to a personal liability over and above the proprietary liability
- Boardman v Phipps – avoidance of conflicts of interest
- Lloyds Bank v Rosset – common intention by agreement or by understanding
- Neville v Wilson / Jerome v Kelly – contract transfers equitable interest by constructive trust although nature of obligations take effect sub modo
- Rochefoucauld v Boustead – based on avoidance of fraud
- Royal Brunei Airlines v Tan – a personal liability to account (see next section)
- Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row – remedial constructive trust?

The arguments for incoherence
- Burrows, “We Do This at Common Law but That in Equity” (2002) 22 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1

The traditional equitable approaches
- Story, Equity Jurisprudence (1886)
- Maitland, Equity (CUP, 1936)
Theme 4.
RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT

These lectures consider the law of restitution of unjust enrichment which received a renewed lease of life principally due to work done at the University of Oxford to challenge the existing principles of equity in English law. Students on Law of Property II are not required to know these principles, but their study is a requirement of professional exemption for lawyers in England and Wales and the theory of unjust enrichment forms an intellectual counterpoint to traditional equity which may be of interest of Property II students. The focus of this topic is therefore on (i) the intellectual nature of restitution and (ii) how restitution claims to offer intellectual coherence in a way equity (it is said) does not.

Literature

Some treatise / textbook literature:-

Birks, Unjust Enrichment (2nd ed, Clarendon Press, 2005)

Some journal literature:-

Jones, ‘Unjust enrichment and the fiduciary’s duty of loyalty’ (1968) 84 LQR 472

Some dissenting voices:-

Hedley, ‘Unjust enrichment as the basis of restitution – an overworked concept’ (1985) 5 LS 56

A. Fundamentals of Private Law

1. The current division of English private law

“Private law”: not criminal law and not public law (judicial review, constitutional law, etc.)

Involving fundamental concepts and also the applications of those concepts to particular contexts: that is, there are the conceptual underpinnings of the law (such as rights to enforce contracts or to protect private property) which are the bedrock of legal principle and which are then deployed by the case law, often in tandem with legislative developments, in new contexts. Frequently, these contextual developments are a result of social development. For example, company law grew out of contract law and property (trusts) law and, coupled with legislation, developed its own principles.
### Concepts and Contexts

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<tr>
<th>Concepts</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contract</td>
<td>Family law</td>
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<tr>
<td>Torts</td>
<td>Company law</td>
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<td>Property</td>
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2. **The division suggested by Prof. Peter Birks**

2.1 *To emulate Justinian’s Institutes* in Roman law (actions, people, things), Birks suggested the following division of private law:

- **Consent**: contract, express trusts, etc. *(remedy: damages, specific performance, etc.)*
- **Wrongs**: torts, breach of contract, breach of trust, etc. *(remedy: damages, restitution wrongdoing)*
- **Unjust enrichment**: restitution of unjust enrichment, considered below

The aim was to introduce order (and possibly a minimalist elegance?) to the law.

2.2 *On the emulation of Roman law*


2.3 *Looking for restitution in legal history*


3. **The suspicion of equity among commercial lawyers and restitutionists**

- Burrows, ‘We do this at common law but that in equity’ (2002) 22 OJLS 1.

#### B. The Basics of Restitution

1. **The foundation of restitution of unjust enrichment (“RUE”)**

- The principle was identified by Goff and Jones in *The Law of Restitution* first published in 1966.
- It is a principle which has existed in US law since before the enactment of the *Restatement of Restitution* in 1939, and was known to civil law before that.
- Peter Birks developed the idea in *Introduction to the Law of Restitution*, first published in 1985, revised in 1989. Restitution law moved beyond “quasi-contract”.

2. **The original* categories of restitution** *(by “original” I mean the matrix adopted in England after 1985.)*

- Restitution for unjust enrichment
- Restitution for wrongdoing
- Restitution to vindicate property rights – Virgo, *The Principles of the Law of Restitution*
3. How the 1992 model of unjust enrichment works: “Restitution Mk 1”

3.1 The classic three-step
- There must have been an enrichment
- That enrichment must have been made at the claimant’s expense
- That enrichment must have arisen as a result of some unjust factor

3.2 An enrichment

3.3 The concept of an “unjust factor”
- So, do we have a complete list of the unjust factors?
  - Answer: no.
    - There are either 43 of them (Birks and Chambers, *Restitution Research Resource*, (Mansfield Press, 1997)); or
    - There is only 1 (Meier and Zimmerman (1999) 115 LQR 556).

3.4 The nature of the restitutionary response
- Restitution is not interested in “compensation” nor in “remedies”, but rather in “subtraction of the unjust enrichment”.
- The approach of restitution lawyers is centred around the development of responses which require a defendant to give up an enrichment received at the plaintiff’s expense. The appropriate response is then one which requires the defendant to give up to another an enrichment received at the other’s expense or its value in money.
- Birks declares his central concern to be with ‘the second sense of “restitution” ... that is, with gains to be given up, not with losses to be made good.’ (Birks, *Introduction to the Law of Restitution* (Oxford, 1989), 11.)
- The law of restitution creates a new right, rather than giving effect ex post facto to a pre-existing right. That right is generated by the receipt of the unjust enrichment with the effect of depriving the defendant of the value received at the plaintiff’s expense. (The issue which arises in the context of the swaps cases is whether I am deprived of that value if I have already contracted to give it to you.)
- In Birks’ terms: ‘Restitution is that active or creative response at the moment of enrichment.’ (Birks, *Introduction to the Law of Restitution* (Oxford, 1989), 14.)

3.5 The principal defence: change of position

3.6 The Quadration Thesis
- The “quadration thesis” of restitution of unjust enrichment suggests that whenever there is an unjust enrichment some restitution is to be made, and that wherever restitution is made that is in response to the presence of an unjust enrichment.
- The question has become whether or not restitution might also arise (a) in relation to wrongdoing and (b) in vindication of someone’s rights.

3.7 Examples of doctrines which do not work under unjust enrichment
- Proprietary estoppel – because it is remedial; possibly aimed at compensating detriment.
- Constructive trust – to deal with unconscionable behaviour, etc., is not addressed at the enrichment but rather at the unconscionability: see below.
- Common law damages – because they are aimed at “wrongs” and not at subtraction of unjust enrichment.

4. The early spring of restitution

4.1 Early cases
- *Orakpo v Manson Investments Ltd* [1978] AC 95, 104, *per* Lord Diplock (‘There is no general doctrine of unjust enrichment in English law.’)
- *Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd* [1943] AC 32, 61, *per* Lord Wright: “It is clear that any civilised system of law is bound to provide remedies for cases
of what has been called unjust enrichment or unjust benefit, that is to prevent a man from retaining the money or some benefit derived from another which it is against conscience that he should keep.”

4.2 The modern development

- *Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale* [1991] 2 AC 548, per Lord Goff (‘I accept that the solicitors’ claim [for money had and received] in the present case is founded upon the unjust enrichment of the club, and can only succeed if, in accordance with the principles of the law of restitution, the club was indeed unjustly enriched at the expense of the solicitors.’) A claim for common law tracing was also upheld.
- *Woolwich v IRC* [1993] AC 70 (an incorrect claim for tax is “the paradigm of a case of unjust enrichment” p.197, per Lord Browne-Wilkinson)

5. What went wrong

5.1 The pivotal case

- *Westdeutsche Landesbank v Islington* [1996] AC 669
- Hudson, *Swaps, Restitution and Trusts* (Sweet & Maxwell, 1999)

5.2 The response

- E.g. Burrows, *The Law of Restitution*, 2nd ed.: sees Westdeutsche Landesbank as a case which advances personal claims in restitution, i.e. money had and received.
- A little like being knocked out by a boxer and then claiming to have hurt his fist with your nose.

6. “Restitution Mk 2”

6.1 Rethinking proprietary unjust enrichment

- Do not consider property to have left the claimant if the defendant is unjustly enriched.
- E.g. theft, no property leaves the victim of the crime.
- E.g. common law tracing: vindication.

6.2 The means of effecting restitution of unjust enrichment

- Birks identifies three approaches to establishing a proprietary claim over property which has passed from the original, absolute owner to another party.
  1. The first is a following claim where the original owner is able to identify the specific property and say “that’s mine”.
  2. The second approach is to establish that the defendant has committed a wrong, further to a tort of conversion.
  3. The third approach would be to establish some unjust enrichment in the current possessor of that property.

6.3 A right necessarily carries its remedy

- Birks, ‘Rights, wrongs and remedies’ (2000) OJLS, 1
7. **“Restitution Mk 3”**

7.1 **The mistake analogy**

- This book was, tragically, published posthumously and so we must extrapolate from it what it might have meant for the future of restitution.

8. **Where is restitution now?**

8.1 **Recent case law**

- There are fewer cases decided recently citing “unjust enrichment” on LexisNexis than one might have expected.
- NEC Semi-Conductors Ltd v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2006] EWCA Civ 25, [2006] All ER (D) 252; (the most recent case at the time of writing; citing the view that an incorrect claim for tax is “the paradigm of a case of unjust enrichment” p.197, per Lord Browne-Wilkinson).

8.2 **A retreat from unjust enrichment, and a restoration of equitable thinking?**

- Niru Battery v Milestone [2003] EWCA Civ 1446, per Sedley LJ and per Clarke LJ: difficulties with change of position as being, perhaps, an equitable doctrine
- National Westminster Bank v Somer [2002] QB 1286: is change of position now to be replaced by estoppel by representation?

8.3 **Is the principle of unjust enrichment merely a part of natural justice and so a part of equity?**

- See e.g. Moses v Macferlan below at C2.

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**C. Restitution and the Law of Obligations**

1. **The early cases – looking for the matrix**

*Moses v Macferlan* (1760) 2 Burr 1005, per Lord Mansfield CJ:

‘[The action for money had and received] lies for money paid by mistake; or upon a consideration which happens to fail; or for money got through imposition (express or implied) or extortion; or oppression; or an undue advantage taken of the plaintiff’s situation, contrary to laws made for the protection of persons under those circumstances. In one word, the gist of this kind of action is, that the defendant, upon the circumstances of the case, is obliged by the ties of natural justice and equity to refund the money.’

*Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd* [1943] AC 32, HL (approving the above)

2. **Thinking Moses v Macferlan through again**

- The speech delivered by Lord Mansfield begins: “The action for money had and received, an equitable action to recover money which the defendant ought not in justice to keep …” In what way is this (a) restitutory or (b) to do with the common law? (It is the list of claims that matters.)
- What is particularly interesting is that the judges in these cases do not use the expression “unjust enrichment” – instead they talk of “equity”: rather the restitutionists have reinterpreted these cases to fit their matrix.

3. **The theory of the law of obligations**

In any of the following categories of case (taken broadly from Goff and Jones’ *The Law of Restitution*), it is said that if the defendant takes an enrichment as a result of this list of
actions, then the claimant should be entitled to a remedy which subtracts that enrichment from the defendant (as opposed to imposing damages simpliciter).

- **Mistake**
  - Recovery of money paid under mistake of fact
  - Recovery of money paid under mistake of law
  - Restitution in respect of services rendered under a mistake
  - Restitution in relation to chattels transferred under a mistake
  - Restitution in relation to land transferred under a mistake
  - Reponses: rescission, rectification and reopening accounts

- **Compulsion**
  - Recovery of benefits conferred under undue influence*
  - Recovery of benefits conferred under duress*
  - Relief from unconscionable bargains*
  - The right to contribution or recoupment

- **Necessity**
  - Ineffective transactions
    - Frustration
    - Transfers void for lack of formality
    - Lack of authority
    - Lack of capacity

- **Illegality***
  - Acquisition of a benefit through a wrongful act
    - Breach of fiduciary relationships*
    - Breach of confidence*
    - Property acquired through tortious acts
    - Benefits accruing from crime*

*The starred items are already well-known in equity. So, why are they necessarily restitutionary in all circumstances?

### D. Restitution and Property Law

1. **Resulting trusts**
   - Birks, ‘Restitution and resulting trusts’, in Goldstein (ed), *Equity: Contemporary Legal Developments* (Jerusalem University, 1992), 335.

2. **Tracing**
   - Again, tracing is said to effect restitution because it makes restitution of the property whereas otherwise the defendant would have been unjustly enriched.
   - However, Virgo, *Principles of the Law of Restitution* (OUP, 1999) and *Foskett v. McKeown* [2001] 1 AC 102 tells us that tracing operates to vindicate one’s property rights. (Birks complained that vindication merely expresses one’s motivation for imposing tracing but does not explain the legal basis on which it arises.)
   - In *Foskett v McKeown*, Lord Millett tells us that tracing is not part of unjust enrichment.

3. **Constructive trusts**
   - Disliked by restitutionists because, they say (Birks, *Introduction to Restitution* (Clarendon Press, 1989)) it is not possible for one to know on what legal basis the constructive trust has been imposed. Conscience enthusiasts, however, see the constructive trust as being a means of policing conscience in a range of circumstances.
• Elias, Explaining Constructive Trusts (Clarendon Press, 1990) considered that one of the bases on which the constructive trust might arise is to effect restitution but that there were other bases too.

• See, however, Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Westdeutsche Landesbank v Islington: ‘Although the resulting trust is an unsuitable basis for developing proprietary restitutionary remedies, the remedial constructive trust, if introduced into English law, may provide a more satisfactory road forward.’ ([1996] 2 All E.R. 961, 999).

4. **Subrogation**


• Banque Financiere v. Parc (Battersea) Ltd [1999] 1 AC 221: although the House of Lords failed to realise that subrogation is meant to effect restitution, not that there is a call for restitution and therefore subrogation is one of a choice of remedies.

E. **Sceptical perspectives on unjust enrichment**

1. **How is restitution thinking better than conscience thinking?**

• The fundamental question is whether restitution does offer a more coherent re-ordering of equity and common law: what of express trusts? Specific performance? Interim injunctions? Trusts of homes? Restitution of unjust enrichment has nothing (certainly not yet) to say about these areas.

• Many cases taken to be foundational in restitution of unjust enrichment are actually cases on equity, e.g. Moses v Macferlan (1760) 2 Burr 1005. So, most of this restitution of unjust enrichment scholarship is prescriptive, not descriptive.

2. **Hedley’s approach**


‘Indeed, a noticeable recent tendency [in restitution scholarship] has been to accuse equity lawyers of being no better than Nazis. This (slightly surprising) argument relies on the point that, like one famous Nazi, they sometimes appeal to conscience. It appears that Reinhard Heydrich, chief of the Gestapo and director of the ‘final solution’, once used justified his conduct by reference to his conscience.

“For the fulfilment of my task I do fundamentally that for which I can answer to my conscience ... I am completely indifferent whether others gabble about breaking the law”

(Quoted in AH Campbell ‘Fascism and legality’ (1946) 62 LQR 141, 147).

This is, apparently, too uncomfortably close to the reasoning employed by others who do not subscribe to restitution of unjust enrichment.’

• The accusation was initially made against ‘beginners’ and ‘the young’ (P Birks ‘Trusts raised to reverse unjust enrichment: The Westdeutsche case’ [1996] RLR 3, 20-21), though it was soon made also against law teachers generally, or at least those of them who are ‘realists or post-realists’.

• Opposition to restitution of unjust enrichment is thought to risk ‘persecutions and pogroms every time the community’s conscience is set on fire by some passing demagogue’ (P Birks ‘Equity in the modern law: An exercise in taxonomy’ (1996) 26 WALR 1, 98).’

3. **Hudson’s approach**

• See generally the essay on restitution in earlier editions of Equity & Trusts and now on www.alastairhudson.com/trustslaw/restitutionofunjustenrichment

• The following are the key points:
  o It is not possible to legislate in the abstract with certainty.
Recovery of an enrichment will not compensate the loss suffered by a claimant.
Restitution is a jumble of currently existing odds and ends which will cause more confusion by leaving ragged, unattached elements of equity, etc.
The word “unjust” is given a purely “technical meaning”, which overlooks its jurisprudential force (e.g. Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*).
Restitution has nothing to say about non-pecuniary, non-proprietary claims.
Judges require flexibility to achieve fair results.
- See *Equity & Trusts, 4th ed.*, Chapter 37:
  - Human beings are fragile and need someone to “listen to their story”
  - The world is fundamentally chaotic and equity is required to meet that chaos
- See e.g. Story’s *Equity Jurisprudence* (1886), 4: the concept of equity was a part even of Roman law in the Pandects.
- “Equity must have a place in every rational system of jurisprudence, if not in name, at least in substance.” (Story, *op cit.*, 6) – e.g. is family law a part of equity?

### F. Topics on which unjust enrichment thinking has little to say

1. **Family Law**

   1.1 *Family law is focused on needs, not enrichments*
   - Family is focused on needs – e.g. the needs of children, and the needs of the spouses (spice?).
   - Focus on any “unjust enrichment” would not give all of the parties who are within the focus of family law the discretionary rights which the courts consider necessary.

1.2 *Other models of unjust enrichment?*
   - The English courts could, however, emulate the Canadian cases on trusts of homes in their use of unjust enrichment.
   - Significantly, the Canadian approach to the home is very, very different from the positivism of English restitution.

2. **Avoidance through company law**

   Under company law, each company in a group is a distinct person. It is only in very rare circumstances that company law will pierce the veil of incorporation: e.g. *Saloman v A Saloman & Co Ltd* [1897] AC 22. If the defendant organises that the enrichment is passed to A Ltd but the unjust act is committed by B Ltd, then the matrix will not seem to apply.
1. **Trusts of homes**

In 2000, Gerald and Daphne were a married couple who had decided to move away from London. Daphne’s mother Thelma was growing old and so all three of them decided to live together in a bigger house in the country.

All three of them decided to buy a house in the Essex countryside for £120,000. The Essex house was bought with £100,000 provided by way of mortgage in the names of Gerald and Daphne. As a pensioner Thelma was entitled to a £20,000 relocation grant on giving up her council flat: this also went towards acquisition of the Essex house.

From 2000, Thelma required daily medical attention at the Essex house. Gerald and Daphne both worked as teachers and both earned £1,000 per month. The mortgage cost £600 per month and Thelma’s daily care cost £600 per month. It was decided after a family meeting that Gerald would pay for the mortgage and Daphne would pay for the medical costs.

In 2000, before completing the purchase of the Essex house, Gerald had promised Thelma that she could live there for the rest of her life. He said: “I want you to think of this house as being as much your home as ours”. Meanwhile Thelma looked after all the housework, looked after her two grandchildren, and in 2005 used all her savings of £3,000 to repair the basement after a freak flood.

In March 2008 Gerald and Daphne realised that they could no longer cope with Thelma and so have decided that she must be relocated to a full-time old persons’ nursing home for which Thelma will be required to pay.

Advise Thelma

2. **Secret profits and bribes**

William was managing director of Cake Ltd, a company which manufactured high quality sponge cakes. While on company business, William was told that there were big opportunities for biscuit manufacturers who manufactured high volumes of biscuits for family size boxes. Cake Ltd had never been involved in biscuit manufacture.

William employed a consultant, Tariq, to conduct research for him into this opportunity. William was told that to establish Cake Ltd in the biscuit business would require an initial investment of about £10 million and would generate profits of about £2 million per annum. William knew that the board of directors of Cake Ltd had previously only agreed to invest in new businesses which would generate £2.5 million in annual profits after an initial investment of £8 million.

However, William had decided that he wanted to exploit this opportunity for himself. He was concerned that the board of directors might choose to invest in this opportunity in spite of its previous practice. Therefore, William paid Tariq £20,000 to inflate the estimate of the start-up costs to £12 million and to depress the profits estimate to £1.5 million. Tariq did as he was paid to do.

William presented Tariq’s revised estimates to the next meeting of the board of directors. The minutes of that meeting show that the board ‘does not wish Cake Ltd to pursue this biscuit manufacture opportunity because its profit estimate is below £2.5 million and the initial investment will be more than £8 million.’ William resigned from Cake Ltd the next week and began to manufacture biscuits six months later.

William earned personal profits of £2 million in 2006. On 5th April 2007 he paid these profits into a current bank account in which he held £500,000 on trust for his mother. On 6th April he spent £400,000 on acquiring Go Tech plc shares, which have now trebled in value. On 7th April he spent
£200,000 on Static plc shares which have not changed in value. On 8th April he invested the remaining £1.9 million with conmen who absconded with the money and cannot now be found.

Tariq paid his £20,000 into his personal bank account and mixed it with £10,000 of his own money. He then spent £10,000 on a round-the-world cruise and the remaining money was invested on his behalf by Profit Bank. These investments have increased in value by 5%.

Advise the directors of Cake Ltd.

3. Dishonest assistance and unconscionable receipt

Arthur was the trustee of the Davis family trust. The trust fund contained a valuable sculpture by Claudin. The terms of the trust provided that the trustees ‘must continue to hold the sculpture on trust throughout the life of the trust’.

Arthur sought an up-to-date valuation of the sculpture from Bernard. Bernard was employed by Shelley’s Ltd, a company which specialised in dealing in artworks. Bernard was one of five dealers retained by the company, although he was not on the board of directors.

Arthur told Bernard that he expected that the sculpture was worth about £50,000. Bernard knew that the sculpture was worth much more than that. However, Bernard refused to give Arthur a valuation on the basis, Bernard said, that Bernard might want to buy the sculpture and therefore did not think it was ethical to give Arthur a valuation himself. Instead Bernard directed Arthur to his friend Colin, who worked as a self-employed art dealer, so that Colin could give Arthur an independent valuation.

In the time it took for Arthur to walk to Colin’s shop, Bernard telephoned Colin to tell him that he had sent Arthur round with a sculpture which Bernard believed to be ‘a Claudin sculpture worth about £50,000.’ Colin was puzzled: ‘surely, Bernard, a Claudin should be worth at least £100,000.’ Bernard answered: ‘well, yes, Colin, that may be true but I want to buy the sculpture off him and make a good profit for Shelley’s Ltd. So, I’m sure you’ll agree with my valuation when you see the sculpture – I will even give you double your ordinary fee for valuing the sculpture for us.’

Colin told Arthur that the sculpture was not a particularly interesting Claudin which would only receive £50,000 on the open market. Shortly afterwards, Bernard telephoned Arthur and said that he would pay Arthur £55,000 for the sculpture. Arthur was sure that this was a good deal for the trust and so agreed to the sale.

Shelley’s Ltd has a business motto of which the dealers are reminded every morning: ‘Your only duty is to the shareholders of Shelley’s Ltd. Your only duty is to make them as much money as possible.’ Bernard will claim that this is his principal business ethic.

Bernard paid Colin his fee and subsequently sold the sculpture for £100,000. Bernard made a personal commission from his employer of £10,000 on this sale. Arthur has been declared personally bankrupt.

Advise the beneficiaries of the Davis family trust.

4. Tracing

Trevor was trustee and also one of the beneficiaries of the Brand family trust. The trust was created by the successful playwright Squirrel Brand who died in 2005 settling £20 million on the terms of this trust. The beneficiaries were ten members of the Brand family. The terms of the trust provided that the trustee was not permitted in any circumstances to take any capital from the trust, nor was the trustee permitted to advance any amount of capital to any of the beneficiaries. Instead income was to be accumulated from stock market investments and divided equally between the beneficiaries.

Trevor decided that he was tired of always working for the benefit of the other beneficiaries. Therefore, on 20th July 2007, Trevor took £2 million from the trust fund, which he considered to be his share of the capital.
Trevor paid the £2 million into bank account No.100 on 21st July. Trevor already held £100,000 in that account on trust for his children, Jeremy and Alan. On 22nd July Trevor spent £150,000 from account No.100 to acquire Gotech plc shares, which have since trebled in value. On 23rd July Trevor spent £50,000 from account No.100 to acquire Static plc shares which have not changed in value. On 24th July Trevor spent the remaining money on a large house in the South of France which was destroyed in a freak forest fire before Trevor had insured it and which is now worthless.

Trevor’s children, both of whom are aged 18 or over, were informed on 1st March 2008 by Trevor that their trust fund was now worth £450,000, since the increase in value of the Gotech plc shares. In reliance on this news, Jeremy entered into a contract to acquire £225,000 worth of recording equipment with which to start his intended career as a pop music producer. Also in reliance on the same news, Alan made plans to go on a luxury round-the-world cruise costing £20,000, but he has not yet spent any money on that cruise. Alan has, however, spent £10,000 refitting the bathroom in his flat in reliance on this anticipated windfall.

Advise the beneficiaries of the Brand family trust.